Common Sense and Evidence
Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 20142014 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Artūrs Logins (0000-0003-4760-9027, King's College London and University of Geneva, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2017 |
| Volumen | 83 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 120-137 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2017-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12111 |
| OpenAlex | W2557307044 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 53 |
In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common‐sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations
Common sense · Economics · Epistemology · Focus (optics) · Physics · Positive economics · Sense (electronics) · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
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Evidentialism
Knowledge and its Limits
Knowledge in an Uncertain World
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge
Action, Knowledge, and Will
Unreasonable Knowledge
Deception and Evidence 1
Defeatism Defeated
Evidence and armchair access
Reflections on Knowledge and Its Limits
Ignorance
Reflections on Knowledge and its Limits
Can We Infer Naturalism from Scepticism
Knowledge and Evidence
Is Evidence Knowledge
Internalism Explained
Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson
What Evidence Do You Have
Self-Knowledge and Self-Love
But That's Not Evidence; It's Not Even True
Knowledge and Practical Reason
Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic
How Knowledge Works
Evidence
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,4 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2021 - 2022 (2) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |