What Evidence Do You Have

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8399080
AutoresRam Neta (0000-0002-0903-9468, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, autor de correspondencia)
Año2008
Volumen59
Número1
Páginas89-119
Fecha de publicación2008-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axn003
OpenAlexW2113397006
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas17
Referencias citadas10

Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evidence has these two epistemic powers? I argue that various proposed accounts of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set cannot answer this question. I then propose an alternative account of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set. 1. Introduction2. The elements of one's evidence set are propositions3. Which kinds of propositions are in one's evidence set?3.1. Doxastic accounts of evidence3.2. Non-doxastic accounts of evidence4. Elaborating and defending the LIE

Doxastic logic · Element (criminal law) · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Political science · Rationality · Set (abstract data type) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science