Ram Neta
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 983597 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Ram Neta |
| NOMBRES | Ram |
| APELLIDO | Neta |
| FIRMA | RAM |
| AFILIACIONES | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0903-9468 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 22 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 74 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 21 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2003 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 6 |
Classical foundationalism and the dawning light
Inquiry, research, and articulate free agency
Credence and belief
Capacitism and the transparency of evidence
Susanna Schellenberg develops a unified account—“capacitism”—of perceptual content, phenomenology, and epistemic force. In this paper, I raise questions about her arguments for a capacitist account of evidential force, and then challenge her claim that such an account, even if correct, demands that our evidence be less than fully transparent to us
Book Symposium on Ernest Sosa’s Epistemic Explanations
Ernest Sosa’s new monograph, Epistemic Explanations, develops an important new account of epistemic evaluation, epistemic normativity, and the explanatory role of these. The first two sections of the present paper develop an interpretation of Sosa’s metaphysics of the mental states of rational agents as a version of hylomorphism (a view according to which such states can be understood as composed of matter and form). The second half of the paper …
An evidentialist account of hinges
Arguing About Knowledge
The Basing Relation
Sometimes, there are reasons for which we believe, intend, resent, decide, and so on: these reasons are the “bases” of the latter, and the explanatory relation between these bases and the latter is what I will call “the basing relation.” What kind of explanatory relation is this? Dispositionalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's manifesting a disposition to respond to those bases by having the belief, intention, resentment,…
Coherence and Deontology
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Book Review| April 01 2012 Knowledge and Practical Interests Stanley, Jason, Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. xi+208 pp. Ram Neta Ram Neta Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 298–301. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1539143 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Ram Neta; Knowledge an…
The Case Against Purity
Should We Swap Internal Foundations for Virtues
Internalist foundationalism was popular through much of the history of Western epistemology, but has been subjected to intense critical scrutiny in the last century. Ernest Sosa’s new book presents some novel and seemingly powerful arguments against internalist foundationalism. After laying out these arguments, I attempt to rebut them. I argue that Sosa does not, after all, give us good reason for abandoning internalist foundationalism
Empiricism about Experience
Expression and the Inner
Book Review| April 01 2008 Expression and the Inner David Finkelstein, Expression and the Inner. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. ix + 182 pp. Ram Neta Ram Neta Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 310–313. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-045 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Ram Neta; Expression and th…
What Evidence Do You Have
Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evid…
Safety and epistemic luck
Naturalism in Question
Book Review| October 01 2007 Naturalism in Question Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, eds., Naturalism in Question. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. viii + 340 pp. Ram Neta Ram Neta Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 657–663. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-020 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Ram …
McDowell and the New Evil Genius
Anti‐intellectualism and the Knowledge‐Action Principle
Epistemology Factualized
Contextualism and the Problem of the External World
A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because she employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. But the skeptic does not employ unusually high standards for knowledge. Rather, she employs unusually restrictive standards of evidence. Thus, her claim that we lack knowledge of the external world is supported by considerations that would equally support…
Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self‐Knowledge
Stephen Schiffer has argued that contextualist solutions to skepticism rest on an implausible “error theory” concerning our own semantic intentions. Similar arguments have recently been offered also by Thomas Hofweber and Patrick Rysiew. I attempt to show how contextualists can rebut these arguments. The kind of self‐knowledge that contextualists are committed to denying us is not a kind of self‐knowledge that we need, nor is it a kind of self‐kn…
Safety and epistemic luck
McDowell and the New Evil Genius
Contextualism and the Problem of the External World
A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because she employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. But the skeptic does not employ unusually high standards for knowledge. Rather, she employs unusually restrictive standards of evidence. Thus, her claim that we lack knowledge of the external world is supported by considerations that would equally support…
The Basing Relation
Sometimes, there are reasons for which we believe, intend, resent, decide, and so on: these reasons are the “bases” of the latter, and the explanatory relation between these bases and the latter is what I will call “the basing relation.” What kind of explanatory relation is this? Dispositionalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's manifesting a disposition to respond to those bases by having the belief, intention, resentment,…
What Evidence Do You Have
Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evid…
Anti‐intellectualism and the Knowledge‐Action Principle
The Case Against Purity
An evidentialist account of hinges
Epistemology Factualized
Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self‐Knowledge
Stephen Schiffer has argued that contextualist solutions to skepticism rest on an implausible “error theory” concerning our own semantic intentions. Similar arguments have recently been offered also by Thomas Hofweber and Patrick Rysiew. I attempt to show how contextualists can rebut these arguments. The kind of self‐knowledge that contextualists are committed to denying us is not a kind of self‐knowledge that we need, nor is it a kind of self‐kn…
Coherence and Deontology
Naturalism in Question
Book Review| October 01 2007 Naturalism in Question Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, eds., Naturalism in Question. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. viii + 340 pp. Ram Neta Ram Neta Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 657–663. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-020 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Ram …
Contextualism and the Problem of the External World
A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because she employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. But the skeptic does not employ unusually high standards for knowledge. Rather, she employs unusually restrictive standards of evidence. Thus, her claim that we lack knowledge of the external world is supported by considerations that would equally support…
Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self‐Knowledge
Stephen Schiffer has argued that contextualist solutions to skepticism rest on an implausible “error theory” concerning our own semantic intentions. Similar arguments have recently been offered also by Thomas Hofweber and Patrick Rysiew. I attempt to show how contextualists can rebut these arguments. The kind of self‐knowledge that contextualists are committed to denying us is not a kind of self‐knowledge that we need, nor is it a kind of self‐kn…
Epistemology Factualized
Safety and epistemic luck
Naturalism in Question
Book Review| October 01 2007 Naturalism in Question Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, eds., Naturalism in Question. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. viii + 340 pp. Ram Neta Ram Neta Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 657–663. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-020 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Ram …
McDowell and the New Evil Genius
Anti‐intellectualism and the Knowledge‐Action Principle
Expression and the Inner
Book Review| April 01 2008 Expression and the Inner David Finkelstein, Expression and the Inner. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. ix + 182 pp. Ram Neta Ram Neta Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 310–313. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-045 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Ram Neta; Expression and th…
What Evidence Do You Have
Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evid…
Empiricism about Experience
Should We Swap Internal Foundations for Virtues
Internalist foundationalism was popular through much of the history of Western epistemology, but has been subjected to intense critical scrutiny in the last century. Ernest Sosa’s new book presents some novel and seemingly powerful arguments against internalist foundationalism. After laying out these arguments, I attempt to rebut them. I argue that Sosa does not, after all, give us good reason for abandoning internalist foundationalism
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Book Review| April 01 2012 Knowledge and Practical Interests Stanley, Jason, Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. xi+208 pp. Ram Neta Ram Neta Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 298–301. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1539143 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Ram Neta; Knowledge an…
The Case Against Purity
Coherence and Deontology
The Basing Relation
Sometimes, there are reasons for which we believe, intend, resent, decide, and so on: these reasons are the “bases” of the latter, and the explanatory relation between these bases and the latter is what I will call “the basing relation.” What kind of explanatory relation is this? Dispositionalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's manifesting a disposition to respond to those bases by having the belief, intention, resentment,…
Arguing About Knowledge
Book Symposium on Ernest Sosa’s Epistemic Explanations
Ernest Sosa’s new monograph, Epistemic Explanations, develops an important new account of epistemic evaluation, epistemic normativity, and the explanatory role of these. The first two sections of the present paper develop an interpretation of Sosa’s metaphysics of the mental states of rational agents as a version of hylomorphism (a view according to which such states can be understood as composed of matter and form). The second half of the paper …
An evidentialist account of hinges
Capacitism and the transparency of evidence
Susanna Schellenberg develops a unified account—“capacitism”—of perceptual content, phenomenology, and epistemic force. In this paper, I raise questions about her arguments for a capacitist account of evidential force, and then challenge her claim that such an account, even if correct, demands that our evidence be less than fully transparent to us
Credence and belief
Classical foundationalism and the dawning light
Inquiry, research, and articulate free agency
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (20 obras) · Philosophy (20 obras) · Epistemology (17 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (16 obras) · Computer Science (14 obras) · Citation (8 obras) · Metaphysics (8 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Free Will and Agency (6 obras) · Philosophy of language (6 obras)