Keith Kowalczyk
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 198238 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Keith Kowalczyk |
| NOMBRES | Keith |
| APELLIDO | Kowalczyk |
| FIRMA | KOWALCZYK K |
| AFILIACIONES | University College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5494-9965 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 0 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2021 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 0 |
Ex Ante Pareto and the Opaque-Identity Puzzle
Anna Mahtani describes a puzzle meant to show that the Ex Ante Pareto Principle is incomplete as it stands and, since it cannot be completed in a satisfactory manner, decades of debate in welfare economics and ethics are undermined. In this paper, we provide a better solution to the puzzle which saves the Ex Ante Pareto Principle from this challenge. We also explain how the plausibility of our solution is reinforced by its similarity to a standar…
Saving Fanaticism
Fanaticism is the view that, for every finite good x and every positive probability p, there is a finite good y such that getting y with probability p is better than getting x for sure. I develop a neglected argument for a form of fanaticism limited to rescue scenarios. I explain how my argument is compatible with some forms of small-probability discounting, imprecise probabilism, risk-aversion, and aggregation scepticism. I also try to respond t…
Investigating the Usage of Abiraterone in African American Men with Metastatic Prostate Cancer
Opaque Options
Moral options are permissions to do less than best, impartially speaking. In this paper, we investigate the challenge of reconciling moral options with the ideal of justifiability to each individual. We examine ex-post and ex-ante views of moral options and show how they might conflict with this ideal in single-choice and sequential-choice cases, respectively. We consider some ways of avoiding this conflict in sequential-choice cases, showing tha…
Johnston versus Johnston
Personites are like continuant people but shorter-lived. Johnston argues that personites do not exist since otherwise personites would have the same moral status as persons, which is untenable. I argue that Johnston’s arguments fail. To do that I propose an alternative way to understand intrinsicness and I clarify the meaning of reductionism about persons. I also argue that a plausible ethical theory is possible even if personites have the same m…
Transfinitely Transitive Value
This paper develops transfinite extensions of transitivity and acyclicity in the context of population ethics. They are used to argue that it is better to add good lives, worse to add bad lives, and equally good to add neutral lives, where a life's value is understood as personal value. These conclusions rule out a number of theories of population ethics, feed into an argument for the repugnant conclusion, and allow us to reduce different-number …
Sin obras prominentes en esta página.
Transfinitely Transitive Value
This paper develops transfinite extensions of transitivity and acyclicity in the context of population ethics. They are used to argue that it is better to add good lives, worse to add bad lives, and equally good to add neutral lives, where a life's value is understood as personal value. These conclusions rule out a number of theories of population ethics, feed into an argument for the repugnant conclusion, and allow us to reduce different-number …
Johnston versus Johnston
Personites are like continuant people but shorter-lived. Johnston argues that personites do not exist since otherwise personites would have the same moral status as persons, which is untenable. I argue that Johnston’s arguments fail. To do that I propose an alternative way to understand intrinsicness and I clarify the meaning of reductionism about persons. I also argue that a plausible ethical theory is possible even if personites have the same m…
Opaque Options
Moral options are permissions to do less than best, impartially speaking. In this paper, we investigate the challenge of reconciling moral options with the ideal of justifiability to each individual. We examine ex-post and ex-ante views of moral options and show how they might conflict with this ideal in single-choice and sequential-choice cases, respectively. We consider some ways of avoiding this conflict in sequential-choice cases, showing tha…
Saving Fanaticism
Fanaticism is the view that, for every finite good x and every positive probability p, there is a finite good y such that getting y with probability p is better than getting x for sure. I develop a neglected argument for a form of fanaticism limited to rescue scenarios. I explain how my argument is compatible with some forms of small-probability discounting, imprecise probabilism, risk-aversion, and aggregation scepticism. I also try to respond t…
Investigating the Usage of Abiraterone in African American Men with Metastatic Prostate Cancer
Ex Ante Pareto and the Opaque-Identity Puzzle
Anna Mahtani describes a puzzle meant to show that the Ex Ante Pareto Principle is incomplete as it stands and, since it cannot be completed in a satisfactory manner, decades of debate in welfare economics and ethics are undermined. In this paper, we provide a better solution to the puzzle which saves the Ex Ante Pareto Principle from this challenge. We also explain how the plausibility of our solution is reinforced by its similarity to a standar…
Philosophy (5 obras) · Epistemology (3 obras) · Identity (music) (2 obras) · Mathematical economics (2 obras) · Medicine (2 obras) · Metaphysics (2 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 obras) · Philosophy of language (2 obras) · Sociology (2 obras)