Saving Fanaticism
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21293370 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Keith Kowalczyk (0000-0001-5494-9965, University College London, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2025 |
| Volumen | 103 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 1011-1023 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2025-10-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Editorial | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2025.2489120 |
| OpenAlex | W4410329489 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
| Referencias citadas | 43 |
Fanaticism is the view that, for every finite good x and every positive probability p, there is a finite good y such that getting y with probability p is better than getting x for sure. I develop a neglected argument for a form of fanaticism limited to rescue scenarios. I explain how my argument is compatible with some forms of small-probability discounting, imprecise probabilism, risk-aversion, and aggregation scepticism. I also try to respond to theoretical problems that fanatical arguments encounter in cases that involve infinitely many possible people. I also suggest why, even if fanaticism is true, we might often be warranted in our intuitive reluctance to accept fanatical conclusions
Fanaticism · Political science · Politics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Law · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life
Our Intuitive Grasp of the Repugnant Conclusion
Theory Change and The Indterminacy of Reference
Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority
Weighing Goods
Weighing Lives
Writing the Book of the World
A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values
On two arguments for fanaticism
In Defense of Fanaticism
Discounting Small Probabilities Solves the Intrapersonal Addition Paradox
Infinite Aggregation and Risk
Utilitarianism, Decision Theory and Eternity
Fission and the Facts
A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi–Sen–Weymark Debate on Utilitarianism
Choices
Too much of a good thing
Should We Wish Well to All
Verbal Disputes
Assessing Risky Social Situations
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
The Limits of Kindness
An Intrapersonal Addition Paradox
Maximal Cluelessness
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 3 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |