An Intrapersonal Addition Paradox
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8095907 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jacob M Nebel (0000-0002-1813-0351, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2018 |
| Volumen | 129 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 309-343 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2018-12-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0014-1704 • E-ISSN: 1539-297X |
| Editorial | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/700085 |
| OpenAlex | W2905700650 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 19 |
| Referencias citadas | 25 |
I present a new argument for the repugnant conclusion. The core of the argument is a risky, intrapersonal analogue of the mere addition paradox. The argument is important for three reasons. First, some solutions to Parfit’s original puzzle do not obviously generalize to the intrapersonal puzzle in a plausible way. Second, it raises independently important questions about how to make decisions under uncertainty for the sake of people whose existence might depend on what we do. Third, it suggests various difficulties for leading views about the value of a person’s life compared to her nonexistence
Argument (complex analysis · Core (optical fiber · Economics · Epistemology · Interpersonal communication · Intrapersonal communication · Positive economics · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · Philosophy · Social Psychology
Does the Repugnant Conclusion Have Important Implications for Axiology or for Public Policy?
A Fission Problem for Person-Affecting Views
The (im)possibility of prudence
Repugnance without Mere Addition
Future generations and the evidential veil of ignorance
Population ethics under risk
The impossibility of a satisfactory population prospect axiology (independently of Finite Fine-Grainedness)
Infinite ethics and the limits of impartiality
Intrapersonal Arguments for the Repugnant Conclusion
Discounting Small Probabilities Solves the Intrapersonal Addition Paradox
Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism and the Veil of Ignorance
Conservatisms about the Valuable
Saving Fanaticism
Spectrum Arguments, Parity and Persistency
Asymmetries in the Value of Existence
Superiority Discounting Implies the Preposterous Conclusion
Equality for Prospective People
Parity and Pareto
Transfinitely Transitive Value
Problems of Population Theory Obligations to Future Generations . R. I. Sikora , Brian Barry
Uncertainty and Justifiability to Each Person
A New Way of Doing the Best That We Can
Weighing Lives
Priority, Not Equality, for Possible People
Priority or Equality for Possible People?
Variable-population extensions of social aggregation theorems
Should We Value Population
Prioritarianism for Prospects
Another Defence of the Priority View
Assessing Risky Social Situations
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility
| Obras citantes distintas | 19 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 2,71 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 19 |