A Fission Problem for Person-Affecting Views
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 22109448 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Elliott Thornley (0000-0002-6665-5267, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2026 |
| Volumen | 13 |
| Número | 0 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2026-03-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 2330-4014 • E-ISSN: 2330-4014 |
| Editorial | University of Michigan Library (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.3998/ergo.9268 |
| OpenAlex | W7133242152 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 48 |
On person-affecting views in population ethics, the moral import of a person’s welfare depends on that person’s temporal or modal status. These views typically imply that—all else equal—we’re never required to create extra people, or to act in ways that increase the probability of extra people coming into existence. In this paper, I use Parfit-style fission cases to construct a dilemma for person-affecting views: either they forfeit their seeming-advantages and face fission analogues of the problems faced by their rival impersonal views, or else they turn out to be not so person-affecting after all. In light of this dilemma, the attractions of person-affecting views largely evaporate. What remains are the problems unique to them
Dilemma · Fission · Modal · Population · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · War, Ethics, and Justification
Ethics out of Economics
Genethics
Practical Ethics
Persons, Interests, and Justice
Moral Problems of Population
On the survival of humanity
Value Receptacles
Do Lefty and Righty Matter More Than Lefty Alone
The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission
The impossibility of a satisfactory population prospect axiology (independently of Finite Fine-Grainedness)
Three paradoxes of supererogation
A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values
New and Improvable Lives
Critical-Set Views, Biographical Identity, and the Long Term
The Asymmetry
Reasons and the Good
Asymmetries in the Value of Existence
Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry
The Ethics of Existence
Complaints and tournament population ethics
The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term
Person-affecting views and saturating counterpart relations
Morality, Mortality Volume II
An Intrapersonal Addition Paradox
Rethinking the GoodMoral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning
An Actualist Explanation of the Procreation Asymmetry
Intricate Ethics
An Asymmetry in the Ethics of Procreation
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |