Philippa Foot
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3597558 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Philippa Foot |
| NOMBRES | Philippa |
| APELLIDO | Foot |
| FIRMA | FOOT P |
| AFILIACIONES | University of California, Los Angeles |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 33 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 220 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 33 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1957 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2004 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Modern Moral Philosophy
Although this collection of articles is not formally a commentary on Elizabeth Anscombe's famous article of the same title, in which she criticised the moral philosophy prevalent in 1958, a number of the contributors do take Anscombe's work as a starting point. Taken together the collection could be seen as a demonstration of the extent to which moral philosophers have since attempted to answer Anscombe's challenge, and to develop an approach to …
Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma
Argues against two articles of Bernard Williams in which he attacks moral realism. In the first (Ethical Consistency), Williams finds a disanalogy between judgements of matters of fact and moral judgements in that when two beliefs are irreconcilable one must simply cede: whereas an obligation that overrides another obligation does so only with ‘remainder.’ Foot argues that although the notion of obligation when understood in one way does indeed a…
Nietzsche
Few philosophers in recent years have attempted to refute Friedrich Nietzsche's attack on Christian and other moralities. Nietzsche sees the morality derived from Christianity as harmful because it is slavish, rooted in weakness, fear, malice, and a desire for punishment of oneself and others. He sees the preoccupation with others through pity and charity as a sign of spiritual ill health and argues that we should value the strong; hence his conc…
Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
It is commonly supposed that Immanuel Kant, distinguishing categorical imperatives from hypothetical (or desire based) imperatives, proved that moral judgements give categorical imperatives. These views are challenged
Moral Dilemmas Revisited
This essay is a continuation of one Foot had written ten years earlier under the title ‘Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma’. Foot attacks Ruth Marcus’ notion that some moral dilemmas involve circumstances in which one is guilty whatever one does: being ‘damned if one does something and damned if one doesn’t’. Foot's opposition to Marcus’ thesis rests on the argument that the guilty feelings one may experience when coping with some serious moral dile…
The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect
One of the reasons why most of us feel puzzled about the problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults and children. When we think of a baby about to be born it seems absurd to think that the next few minutes or even hours could make so radical a difference to its status; yet as we go back in the life of the fetus we are more and more reluctant to say that this is a human being…
Moral Beliefs
This essay looks critically at the arguments by which moral philosophers have rejected ethical naturalism. The author denies the supposed logical gap between assertions of fact and moral evaluations, arguing that there is an internal logical relation between the two. The word ‘good’ no more ‘floats free’ than does, e.g., ‘dangerous’. Both have a connexion in meaning with particular facts, and through them with reasons for action
Virtues and Vices
Virtues and vices, often neglected in analytic philosophy, are discussed here, drawing on the works of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant. Virtues are first described as beneficial characteristics that consist in goodness of the will, but a discussion of the virtue of wisdom shows a virtue may also require knowledge. Virtues are seen as correctives of harmful human passions and other general temptations, but this does not mean that …
Nietzsche's Immoralism
An in‐depth assessment of Nietzsche's attack on morality. Foot takes up the challenge by asking the fundamental question, ‘Can morality be discredited?’ Historically, Anglo‐American analytic philosophy has overlooked the significance of Nietzsche's views on morality by dismissing or ignoring his arguments. The central thrust of Nietzsche's attack is, according to Foot, that no kinds of action are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in themselves, whoever does them. …
Reasons for Action and Desires
This essay engages with Michael Woods' paper of the same title arguing against the theory that all reasons for actions derive from wants or desires, relying on the case of moral reasons. It is suggested that an argument from prudential reasons is stronger
Virtues and Vices
Philippa Foot is regarded as standing out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties justice, or consequences. This book collects 12 of her essays published between 1957-77 and two new ones
Moral Dilemmas
Moral Dilemmas is the second volume of collected essays by the eminent moral philosopher Philippa Foot. It fills the gap between her 1978 collection Virtues and Vices and her acclaimed monograph Natural Goodness, published in 2001. Moral Dilemmas contains the best of Prof. Foot's work from the late 1970s to the 1990s. In these essays, she develops further her influential critique of the ’non‐cognitivist’ approaches that have dominated moral philo…
Transition to Human Beings
Foot proposes to transfer the conceptual patterns of natural normativity discussed in the preceding chapter to the realm of human action. Foot argues that we can evaluate features and operations of humans in relation to the part they play in human life, according to the schema of natural normativity found in the case of plants and animals. In support of her thesis, she draws upon Anscombe's discussion of the institution of promising, taking care …
Immoralism
Foot discusses Nietzsche's immoralism in the light of the foregoing account of moral evaluation. She begins with a preliminary account of Plato's response to immoralism in the first two books of the Republic. Foot distinguishes three theses in Nietzsche that may be called ‘immoralist’: the denial of free will, the attack on Christian or ‘pity’ morality, and the denial of intrinsic badness in acts; she discusses only the latter two. Regarding the …
A Fresh Start?
Foot criticizes G. E. Moore's anti‐naturalism and the subjectivist or non‐cognitivist theories influenced by Moore, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism. Foot traces the roots of non‐cognitivism to a desire‐based, egoistic interpretation of David Hume's practicality requirement, i.e. that morality is necessarily practical. Foot eschews this interpretation of Hume's requirement for an alternative, cognitivist, notion of practical ra…
Natural Norms
Foot defends her proposal to meet Hume's practicality requirement with a cognitivist ethical theory. The central feature of Foot's theory is that she places the evaluation of human action in the wider contexts not only of the evaluation of other features of human life, but also of evaluative judgements of the characteristics and operations of other living things. She focuses on the description of natural goodness in plant and animal life, and arg…
Human Goodness
Foot considers the difference between calling a plant and an animal ‘good’ and calling a human being ‘good’; in the former case we think of the plant or animal as a whole, while in the latter we are evaluating the person with respect to his or her rational will. This particular type of evaluation may be called ‘moral evaluation’, although Foot is keen to show that ‘moral’ judgements belong to a wider class of evaluations of conduct with which the…
Happiness and Human Good
Foot considers the view that practical rationality is nothing but the pursuit of happiness, which constitutes an objection to the account of practical rationality developed in the preceding chapters. Foot considers the different ways happiness is predicated of human beings, distinguishing happiness as humanity's good from enjoyment and contentment. She argues that the common view that happiness is a state of mind, detachable from beliefs about sp…
Practical Rationality
Foot considers an objection to the suggestion that the same normative pattern is to be found in plants, animals, and human beings: i.e. human beings, because they are rational creatures, can question and indeed reject ‘natural goodness’. This is a problem about the rationality of doing what virtue demands. To meet the challenge, Foot embarks on a discussion of practical rationality, or the nature and provenance of human reasoning. Foot argues tha…
Natural Goodness
Philippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and to be found in G. E. Moore and modern theories of ethics influenced by Moore, such as emotivism and prescriptivism. Natural normativity involves a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect to living things qua living things, and …
Virtues and reasons
Nietzsche's Immoralism
Utilitarianism and the Virtues
Journal Article Utilitarianism and the Virtues Get access PHILIPPA FOOT PHILIPPA FOOT Department of Philosophy University of California at Los AngelesLos Angeles, California 90024 U.S.A. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XCIV, Issue 374, April 1985, Pages 196–209, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCIV.374.196 Published: 01 April 1985
Peacocke on Wittgenstein and Experience
Journal Article Peacocke on Wittgenstein and Experience Get access Philippa Foot Philippa Foot The University of California at Los Angeles and Somerville College, Oxfor Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, Issue 131, April 1983, Pages 187–191, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218745 Published: 01 April 1983
Case Studies in Bioethics
Natural Goodness
Philippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and to be found in G. E. Moore and modern theories of ethics influenced by Moore, such as emotivism and prescriptivism. Natural normativity involves a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect to living things qua living things, and …
Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
Free Will Involving Determinism
Peacocke on Wittgenstein and Experience
Journal Article Peacocke on Wittgenstein and Experience Get access Philippa Foot Philippa Foot The University of California at Los Angeles and Somerville College, Oxfor Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, Issue 131, April 1983, Pages 187–191, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218745 Published: 01 April 1983
Hart and Honore
Free Will Involving Determinism
Goodness and Choice
Philippa Foot, Alan Montefiore; Goodness and Choice, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 35, Issue 1, 9 July 1961, Pages 45–80, https://doi.o
Rights and Right Conduct
Hume on Personal Identity
A person is sometimes said to have no strong sense of his own identity. What that usually means is that he lacks some of the things that give inner stability and continuity to a human life: for instance, he may be uncertain about his beliefs, feelings and desires; he may not know the sort of person that he is, or the sort of person that he wants to be. But there is also another way in which a person may lose the sense of his own identity: he may …
Hart and Honore
The Varieties of Goodness
Reasons for Action and Desires
Michael Woods, Philippa Foot; Reasons for Action and Desires, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 46, Issue 1, 9 July 1972, Pages 189–210, ht
Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
Case Studies in Bioethics
Peacocke on Wittgenstein and Experience
Journal Article Peacocke on Wittgenstein and Experience Get access Philippa Foot Philippa Foot The University of California at Los Angeles and Somerville College, Oxfor Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, Issue 131, April 1983, Pages 187–191, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218745 Published: 01 April 1983
Utilitarianism and the Virtues
Journal Article Utilitarianism and the Virtues Get access PHILIPPA FOOT PHILIPPA FOOT Department of Philosophy University of California at Los AngelesLos Angeles, California 90024 U.S.A. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XCIV, Issue 374, April 1985, Pages 196–209, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCIV.374.196 Published: 01 April 1985
Nietzsche's Immoralism
Virtues and reasons
Transition to Human Beings
Foot proposes to transfer the conceptual patterns of natural normativity discussed in the preceding chapter to the realm of human action. Foot argues that we can evaluate features and operations of humans in relation to the part they play in human life, according to the schema of natural normativity found in the case of plants and animals. In support of her thesis, she draws upon Anscombe's discussion of the institution of promising, taking care …
Immoralism
Foot discusses Nietzsche's immoralism in the light of the foregoing account of moral evaluation. She begins with a preliminary account of Plato's response to immoralism in the first two books of the Republic. Foot distinguishes three theses in Nietzsche that may be called ‘immoralist’: the denial of free will, the attack on Christian or ‘pity’ morality, and the denial of intrinsic badness in acts; she discusses only the latter two. Regarding the …
A Fresh Start?
Foot criticizes G. E. Moore's anti‐naturalism and the subjectivist or non‐cognitivist theories influenced by Moore, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism. Foot traces the roots of non‐cognitivism to a desire‐based, egoistic interpretation of David Hume's practicality requirement, i.e. that morality is necessarily practical. Foot eschews this interpretation of Hume's requirement for an alternative, cognitivist, notion of practical ra…
Natural Norms
Foot defends her proposal to meet Hume's practicality requirement with a cognitivist ethical theory. The central feature of Foot's theory is that she places the evaluation of human action in the wider contexts not only of the evaluation of other features of human life, but also of evaluative judgements of the characteristics and operations of other living things. She focuses on the description of natural goodness in plant and animal life, and arg…
Human Goodness
Foot considers the difference between calling a plant and an animal ‘good’ and calling a human being ‘good’; in the former case we think of the plant or animal as a whole, while in the latter we are evaluating the person with respect to his or her rational will. This particular type of evaluation may be called ‘moral evaluation’, although Foot is keen to show that ‘moral’ judgements belong to a wider class of evaluations of conduct with which the…
Happiness and Human Good
Foot considers the view that practical rationality is nothing but the pursuit of happiness, which constitutes an objection to the account of practical rationality developed in the preceding chapters. Foot considers the different ways happiness is predicated of human beings, distinguishing happiness as humanity's good from enjoyment and contentment. She argues that the common view that happiness is a state of mind, detachable from beliefs about sp…
Practical Rationality
Foot considers an objection to the suggestion that the same normative pattern is to be found in plants, animals, and human beings: i.e. human beings, because they are rational creatures, can question and indeed reject ‘natural goodness’. This is a problem about the rationality of doing what virtue demands. To meet the challenge, Foot embarks on a discussion of practical rationality, or the nature and provenance of human reasoning. Foot argues tha…
Natural Goodness
Philippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and to be found in G. E. Moore and modern theories of ethics influenced by Moore, such as emotivism and prescriptivism. Natural normativity involves a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect to living things qua living things, and …
Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma
Argues against two articles of Bernard Williams in which he attacks moral realism. In the first (Ethical Consistency), Williams finds a disanalogy between judgements of matters of fact and moral judgements in that when two beliefs are irreconcilable one must simply cede: whereas an obligation that overrides another obligation does so only with ‘remainder.’ Foot argues that although the notion of obligation when understood in one way does indeed a…
Nietzsche
Few philosophers in recent years have attempted to refute Friedrich Nietzsche's attack on Christian and other moralities. Nietzsche sees the morality derived from Christianity as harmful because it is slavish, rooted in weakness, fear, malice, and a desire for punishment of oneself and others. He sees the preoccupation with others through pity and charity as a sign of spiritual ill health and argues that we should value the strong; hence his conc…
Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
It is commonly supposed that Immanuel Kant, distinguishing categorical imperatives from hypothetical (or desire based) imperatives, proved that moral judgements give categorical imperatives. These views are challenged
Moral Dilemmas Revisited
This essay is a continuation of one Foot had written ten years earlier under the title ‘Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma’. Foot attacks Ruth Marcus’ notion that some moral dilemmas involve circumstances in which one is guilty whatever one does: being ‘damned if one does something and damned if one doesn’t’. Foot's opposition to Marcus’ thesis rests on the argument that the guilty feelings one may experience when coping with some serious moral dile…
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