Transition to Human Beings
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 23736686 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Philippa Foot (autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2001 |
| Páginas | 38-51 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2001-02-22 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | CHAPTER |
| Revista | Natural goodness (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Editorial | Oxford University PressOxford (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/0198235089.003.0004 |
| OpenAlex | W2491348800 |
| ISBN | 9780198235088 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 24 |
Foot proposes to transfer the conceptual patterns of natural normativity discussed in the preceding chapter to the realm of human action. Foot argues that we can evaluate features and operations of humans in relation to the part they play in human life, according to the schema of natural normativity found in the case of plants and animals. In support of her thesis, she draws upon Anscombe's discussion of the institution of promising, taking care to distinguish this from utilitarianism. The same normative pattern, that of natural normativity, Foot concludes, is to be found in the evaluations of plants, animals, and human beings; although human good is different to the good in the world of animals and plants, nevertheless there is a common conceptual structure.
Biology · Transition (genetics) · Biochemistry · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy, Science, and History
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories
Moral Thinking
Good and Evil
Language, Truth and Logic.
Utilitarianism and Welfarism
Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality
Virtue Ethics
Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics
Skepticism about Practical Reason
Nietzsche
The Humean Theory of Motivation
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
Aristotle and moral realism
Essays on Actions and Events
The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche
Ethics
Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings
Motive Utilitarianism
Philosophical investigations
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |