Natural goodness
Datos de la Revista
| Tipo | SOURCE_BOOK |
|---|---|
| Editorial | Clarendon |
| ISBN-13 | 9780198235088 |
| Open Library | OL5957471W |
| Total de publicaciones | 8 |
| Periodo de cobertura | 2001 - 2001 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citada por | 185 |
| Índice h | 1 |
| Índice i10 | 1 |
"Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied also with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only to living things considered as such: she finds this form of evaluation in moral judgements. Her vivid discussion ranges over topics such as practical rationality, erring conscience, and the relation between virtue and happiness, ending with a critique of Nietzsche's immoralism. This work is an exposition of an approach to moral philosophy, which represents a fundamental break away from the assumptions of previous debates."--Jacket.
Transition to Human Beings
Foot proposes to transfer the conceptual patterns of natural normativity discussed in the preceding chapter to the realm of human action. Foot argues that we can evaluate features and operations of humans in relation to the part they play in human life, according to the schema of natural normativity found in the case of plants and animals. In support of her thesis, she draws upon Anscombe's discussion of the institution of promising, taking care …
Immoralism
Foot discusses Nietzsche's immoralism in the light of the foregoing account of moral evaluation. She begins with a preliminary account of Plato's response to immoralism in the first two books of the Republic. Foot distinguishes three theses in Nietzsche that may be called ‘immoralist’: the denial of free will, the attack on Christian or ‘pity’ morality, and the denial of intrinsic badness in acts; she discusses only the latter two. Regarding the …
A Fresh Start?
Foot criticizes G. E. Moore's anti‐naturalism and the subjectivist or non‐cognitivist theories influenced by Moore, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism. Foot traces the roots of non‐cognitivism to a desire‐based, egoistic interpretation of David Hume's practicality requirement, i.e. that morality is necessarily practical. Foot eschews this interpretation of Hume's requirement for an alternative, cognitivist, notion of practical ra…
Natural Norms
Foot defends her proposal to meet Hume's practicality requirement with a cognitivist ethical theory. The central feature of Foot's theory is that she places the evaluation of human action in the wider contexts not only of the evaluation of other features of human life, but also of evaluative judgements of the characteristics and operations of other living things. She focuses on the description of natural goodness in plant and animal life, and arg…
Human Goodness
Foot considers the difference between calling a plant and an animal ‘good’ and calling a human being ‘good’; in the former case we think of the plant or animal as a whole, while in the latter we are evaluating the person with respect to his or her rational will. This particular type of evaluation may be called ‘moral evaluation’, although Foot is keen to show that ‘moral’ judgements belong to a wider class of evaluations of conduct with which the…
Happiness and Human Good
Foot considers the view that practical rationality is nothing but the pursuit of happiness, which constitutes an objection to the account of practical rationality developed in the preceding chapters. Foot considers the different ways happiness is predicated of human beings, distinguishing happiness as humanity's good from enjoyment and contentment. She argues that the common view that happiness is a state of mind, detachable from beliefs about sp…
Practical Rationality
Foot considers an objection to the suggestion that the same normative pattern is to be found in plants, animals, and human beings: i.e. human beings, because they are rational creatures, can question and indeed reject ‘natural goodness’. This is a problem about the rationality of doing what virtue demands. To meet the challenge, Foot embarks on a discussion of practical rationality, or the nature and provenance of human reasoning. Foot argues tha…
Natural Goodness
Philippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and to be found in G. E. Moore and modern theories of ethics influenced by Moore, such as emotivism and prescriptivism. Natural normativity involves a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect to living things qua living things, and …
Natural Goodness
Philippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and to be found in G. E. Moore and modern theories of ethics influenced by Moore, such as emotivism and prescriptivism. Natural normativity involves a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect to living things qua living things, and …
Transition to Human Beings
Foot proposes to transfer the conceptual patterns of natural normativity discussed in the preceding chapter to the realm of human action. Foot argues that we can evaluate features and operations of humans in relation to the part they play in human life, according to the schema of natural normativity found in the case of plants and animals. In support of her thesis, she draws upon Anscombe's discussion of the institution of promising, taking care …
Immoralism
Foot discusses Nietzsche's immoralism in the light of the foregoing account of moral evaluation. She begins with a preliminary account of Plato's response to immoralism in the first two books of the Republic. Foot distinguishes three theses in Nietzsche that may be called ‘immoralist’: the denial of free will, the attack on Christian or ‘pity’ morality, and the denial of intrinsic badness in acts; she discusses only the latter two. Regarding the …
A Fresh Start?
Foot criticizes G. E. Moore's anti‐naturalism and the subjectivist or non‐cognitivist theories influenced by Moore, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism. Foot traces the roots of non‐cognitivism to a desire‐based, egoistic interpretation of David Hume's practicality requirement, i.e. that morality is necessarily practical. Foot eschews this interpretation of Hume's requirement for an alternative, cognitivist, notion of practical ra…
Natural Norms
Foot defends her proposal to meet Hume's practicality requirement with a cognitivist ethical theory. The central feature of Foot's theory is that she places the evaluation of human action in the wider contexts not only of the evaluation of other features of human life, but also of evaluative judgements of the characteristics and operations of other living things. She focuses on the description of natural goodness in plant and animal life, and arg…
Human Goodness
Foot considers the difference between calling a plant and an animal ‘good’ and calling a human being ‘good’; in the former case we think of the plant or animal as a whole, while in the latter we are evaluating the person with respect to his or her rational will. This particular type of evaluation may be called ‘moral evaluation’, although Foot is keen to show that ‘moral’ judgements belong to a wider class of evaluations of conduct with which the…
Happiness and Human Good
Foot considers the view that practical rationality is nothing but the pursuit of happiness, which constitutes an objection to the account of practical rationality developed in the preceding chapters. Foot considers the different ways happiness is predicated of human beings, distinguishing happiness as humanity's good from enjoyment and contentment. She argues that the common view that happiness is a state of mind, detachable from beliefs about sp…
Practical Rationality
Foot considers an objection to the suggestion that the same normative pattern is to be found in plants, animals, and human beings: i.e. human beings, because they are rational creatures, can question and indeed reject ‘natural goodness’. This is a problem about the rationality of doing what virtue demands. To meet the challenge, Foot embarks on a discussion of practical rationality, or the nature and provenance of human reasoning. Foot argues tha…
Natural Goodness
Philippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and to be found in G. E. Moore and modern theories of ethics influenced by Moore, such as emotivism and prescriptivism. Natural normativity involves a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect to living things qua living things, and …