Katie Steele
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3701433 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Katie Steele |
| NOMBRES | Katie |
| APELLIDO | Steele |
| FIRMA | STEELE K |
| AFILIACIONES | Independent Consultants |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 14 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 71 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 14 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2007 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
What the Demands of Sustainability Can(not) Be
Constellations in a starry sky
Every child has the right to express their authentic self and to have those expressions validated by the adults responsible for their care. However, young transgender and gender-expansive children’s attempts to communicate about their genders are too often dismissed and discredited. In this conceptual paper, the authors draw on the concept of epistemic injustice – and, specifically, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice – as central to understa…
Moral uncertainty, noncognitivism, and the multi‐objective story
We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty , i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire‐like attitudes as opposed to belief‐like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a c…
Transformative Experience, Awareness Growth, and the Limits of Rational Planning
Laurie Paul argues that, when it comes to many of your most significant life-changing decisions, the principles of rational choice are silent. That is because, in these cases, you anticipate that one of your choice options would yield a transformative experience . We argue that such decisions are best seen as ones in which you anticipate awareness growth . You do not merely lack knowledge about which possible outcome will arise from a transformat…
What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion
The Repugnant Conclusion is an implication of some approaches to population ethics. It states, in Derek Parfit's original formulation, For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living. (Parfit 1984: 388)
Levelling counterfactual scepticism
In this paper, we develop a novel response to counterfactual scepticism, the thesis that most ordinary counterfactual claims are false. In the process we aim to shed light on the relationship between debates in the philosophy of science and debates concerning the semantics and pragmatics of counterfactuals. We argue that science is concerned with many domains of inquiry, each with its own characteristic entities and regularities; moreover, statem…
The problem of evaluating automated large-scale evidence aggregators
In the biomedical context, policy makers face a large amount of potentially discordant evidence from different sources. This prompts the question of how this evidence should be aggregated in the interests of best-informed policy recommendations. The starting point of our discussion is Hunter and Williams’ recent work on an automated aggregation method for medical evidence. Our negative claim is that it is far from clear what the relevant criteria…
Model-Selection Theory
This article argues that common intuitions regarding (a) the specialness of ‘use-novel’ data for confirmation and (b) that this specialness implies the ‘no-double-counting rule’, which says that data used in ‘constructing’ (calibrating) a model cannot also play a role in confirming the model’s predictions, are too crude. The intuitions in question are pertinent in all the sciences, but we appeal to a climate science case study to illustrate what …
The Diversity of Model Tuning Practices in Climate Science
Many examples of calibration in climate science raise no alarms regarding model reliability. We examine one example and show that, in employing classical hypothesis testing, it involves calibrating a base model against data that are also used to confirm the model. This is counter to the ‘intuitive position’ (in favor of use novelty and against double counting). We argue, however, that aspects of the intuitive position are upheld by some methods, …
Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist
This article considers a puzzling conflict between two positions that are each compelling: ( a ) it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid ‘free’ evidence, and ( b ) rational agents may have imprecise beliefs. An important aspect of responding to this conflict is resolving the question of how rational (imprecise) agents ought to make sequences of decisions—we make explicit what the key alternatives are and defend our own approach. We endorse …
Making Climate Decisions
Many fine-grained (if not bigger picture) decisions concerning climate change involve significant, even severe, uncertainty. Here, we focus on modelling the decisions of single agents, whether individual persons or groups perceived as corporate entities. We offer a taxonomy of the sources and kinds of uncertainty that arise in framing these decision problems, as well as strategies for making a choice in spite of uncertainty. The aim is to facilit…
Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation
We argue that concerns about double-counting—using the same evidence both to calibrate or tune climate models and also to confirm or verify that the models are adequate—deserve more careful scrutiny in climate modelling circles. It is widely held that double-counting is bad and that separate data must be used for calibration and confirmation. We show that this is far from obviously true, and that climate scientists may be confusing their targets.…
The Scientist qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments
Richard Rudner famously argues that the communication of scientific advice to policy makers involves ethical value judgments. His argument has, however, been rightly criticized. This article revives Rudner's conclusion, by strengthening both his lines of argument: we generalize his initial assumption regarding the form in which scientists must communicate their results and complete his ‘backup’ argument by appealing to the difference between priv…
Distinguishing indeterminate belief from “risk-averse” preferences
The Scientist qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments
Richard Rudner famously argues that the communication of scientific advice to policy makers involves ethical value judgments. His argument has, however, been rightly criticized. This article revives Rudner's conclusion, by strengthening both his lines of argument: we generalize his initial assumption regarding the form in which scientists must communicate their results and complete his ‘backup’ argument by appealing to the difference between priv…
Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation
We argue that concerns about double-counting—using the same evidence both to calibrate or tune climate models and also to confirm or verify that the models are adequate—deserve more careful scrutiny in climate modelling circles. It is widely held that double-counting is bad and that separate data must be used for calibration and confirmation. We show that this is far from obviously true, and that climate scientists may be confusing their targets.…
Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist
This article considers a puzzling conflict between two positions that are each compelling: ( a ) it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid ‘free’ evidence, and ( b ) rational agents may have imprecise beliefs. An important aspect of responding to this conflict is resolving the question of how rational (imprecise) agents ought to make sequences of decisions—we make explicit what the key alternatives are and defend our own approach. We endorse …
What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion
The Repugnant Conclusion is an implication of some approaches to population ethics. It states, in Derek Parfit's original formulation, For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living. (Parfit 1984: 388)
Making Climate Decisions
Many fine-grained (if not bigger picture) decisions concerning climate change involve significant, even severe, uncertainty. Here, we focus on modelling the decisions of single agents, whether individual persons or groups perceived as corporate entities. We offer a taxonomy of the sources and kinds of uncertainty that arise in framing these decision problems, as well as strategies for making a choice in spite of uncertainty. The aim is to facilit…
Levelling counterfactual scepticism
In this paper, we develop a novel response to counterfactual scepticism, the thesis that most ordinary counterfactual claims are false. In the process we aim to shed light on the relationship between debates in the philosophy of science and debates concerning the semantics and pragmatics of counterfactuals. We argue that science is concerned with many domains of inquiry, each with its own characteristic entities and regularities; moreover, statem…
Model-Selection Theory
This article argues that common intuitions regarding (a) the specialness of ‘use-novel’ data for confirmation and (b) that this specialness implies the ‘no-double-counting rule’, which says that data used in ‘constructing’ (calibrating) a model cannot also play a role in confirming the model’s predictions, are too crude. The intuitions in question are pertinent in all the sciences, but we appeal to a climate science case study to illustrate what …
The Diversity of Model Tuning Practices in Climate Science
Many examples of calibration in climate science raise no alarms regarding model reliability. We examine one example and show that, in employing classical hypothesis testing, it involves calibrating a base model against data that are also used to confirm the model. This is counter to the ‘intuitive position’ (in favor of use novelty and against double counting). We argue, however, that aspects of the intuitive position are upheld by some methods, …
Transformative Experience, Awareness Growth, and the Limits of Rational Planning
Laurie Paul argues that, when it comes to many of your most significant life-changing decisions, the principles of rational choice are silent. That is because, in these cases, you anticipate that one of your choice options would yield a transformative experience . We argue that such decisions are best seen as ones in which you anticipate awareness growth . You do not merely lack knowledge about which possible outcome will arise from a transformat…
The problem of evaluating automated large-scale evidence aggregators
In the biomedical context, policy makers face a large amount of potentially discordant evidence from different sources. This prompts the question of how this evidence should be aggregated in the interests of best-informed policy recommendations. The starting point of our discussion is Hunter and Williams’ recent work on an automated aggregation method for medical evidence. Our negative claim is that it is far from clear what the relevant criteria…
Distinguishing indeterminate belief from “risk-averse” preferences
Distinguishing indeterminate belief from “risk-averse” preferences
The Scientist qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments
Richard Rudner famously argues that the communication of scientific advice to policy makers involves ethical value judgments. His argument has, however, been rightly criticized. This article revives Rudner's conclusion, by strengthening both his lines of argument: we generalize his initial assumption regarding the form in which scientists must communicate their results and complete his ‘backup’ argument by appealing to the difference between priv…
Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation
We argue that concerns about double-counting—using the same evidence both to calibrate or tune climate models and also to confirm or verify that the models are adequate—deserve more careful scrutiny in climate modelling circles. It is widely held that double-counting is bad and that separate data must be used for calibration and confirmation. We show that this is far from obviously true, and that climate scientists may be confusing their targets.…
Making Climate Decisions
Many fine-grained (if not bigger picture) decisions concerning climate change involve significant, even severe, uncertainty. Here, we focus on modelling the decisions of single agents, whether individual persons or groups perceived as corporate entities. We offer a taxonomy of the sources and kinds of uncertainty that arise in framing these decision problems, as well as strategies for making a choice in spite of uncertainty. The aim is to facilit…
The Diversity of Model Tuning Practices in Climate Science
Many examples of calibration in climate science raise no alarms regarding model reliability. We examine one example and show that, in employing classical hypothesis testing, it involves calibrating a base model against data that are also used to confirm the model. This is counter to the ‘intuitive position’ (in favor of use novelty and against double counting). We argue, however, that aspects of the intuitive position are upheld by some methods, …
Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist
This article considers a puzzling conflict between two positions that are each compelling: ( a ) it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid ‘free’ evidence, and ( b ) rational agents may have imprecise beliefs. An important aspect of responding to this conflict is resolving the question of how rational (imprecise) agents ought to make sequences of decisions—we make explicit what the key alternatives are and defend our own approach. We endorse …
Model-Selection Theory
This article argues that common intuitions regarding (a) the specialness of ‘use-novel’ data for confirmation and (b) that this specialness implies the ‘no-double-counting rule’, which says that data used in ‘constructing’ (calibrating) a model cannot also play a role in confirming the model’s predictions, are too crude. The intuitions in question are pertinent in all the sciences, but we appeal to a climate science case study to illustrate what …
The problem of evaluating automated large-scale evidence aggregators
In the biomedical context, policy makers face a large amount of potentially discordant evidence from different sources. This prompts the question of how this evidence should be aggregated in the interests of best-informed policy recommendations. The starting point of our discussion is Hunter and Williams’ recent work on an automated aggregation method for medical evidence. Our negative claim is that it is far from clear what the relevant criteria…
What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion
The Repugnant Conclusion is an implication of some approaches to population ethics. It states, in Derek Parfit's original formulation, For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living. (Parfit 1984: 388)
Levelling counterfactual scepticism
In this paper, we develop a novel response to counterfactual scepticism, the thesis that most ordinary counterfactual claims are false. In the process we aim to shed light on the relationship between debates in the philosophy of science and debates concerning the semantics and pragmatics of counterfactuals. We argue that science is concerned with many domains of inquiry, each with its own characteristic entities and regularities; moreover, statem…
Transformative Experience, Awareness Growth, and the Limits of Rational Planning
Laurie Paul argues that, when it comes to many of your most significant life-changing decisions, the principles of rational choice are silent. That is because, in these cases, you anticipate that one of your choice options would yield a transformative experience . We argue that such decisions are best seen as ones in which you anticipate awareness growth . You do not merely lack knowledge about which possible outcome will arise from a transformat…
Moral uncertainty, noncognitivism, and the multi‐objective story
We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty , i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire‐like attitudes as opposed to belief‐like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a c…
Constellations in a starry sky
Every child has the right to express their authentic self and to have those expressions validated by the adults responsible for their care. However, young transgender and gender-expansive children’s attempts to communicate about their genders are too often dismissed and discredited. In this conceptual paper, the authors draw on the concept of epistemic injustice – and, specifically, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice – as central to understa…
What the Demands of Sustainability Can(not) Be
Epistemology (10 obras) · Computer Science (9 obras) · Economics (9 obras) · Philosophy (9 obras) · Mathematics (6 obras) · Psychology (6 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (5 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Sociology (5 obras)