Joe Horton
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3873345 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Joe Horton |
| NOMBRES | Joe |
| APELLIDO | Horton |
| FIRMA | HORTON J |
| AFILIACIONES | University College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3703-4947 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 7 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 29 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2017 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Evaluative Uncertainty and Permissible Preference
There has recently been an explosion of interest in rational and moral choice under evaluative uncertainty—uncertainty about values or reasons. However, the dominant views on such choice have at least three major problems: they are overly demanding, they are incompatible with supererogation, and they cannot be applied to agents with credence in indeterminate evaluative theories. The authors propose a unified view that solves all these problems. A…
New and Improvable Lives
According to weak utilitarianism, at least when other things are equal, you should maximize the sum of well-being. This view has considerable explanatory power, but it also has two implications that seem to me implausible. First, it implies that, other things equal, it is wrong to harm yourself, or even to deny yourself benefits. Second, it implies that, other things equal, given the opportunity to create new happy people, it is wrong not to. The…
Partial aggregation in ethics
Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer 'yes' and 'no', respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. These views contrast with fully aggregative moral views, which imply that the answer…
Aggregation, Risk, and Reductio
Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer “yes” and “no,” respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. In this article, I develop a risk-based reductio argument that shows that there can …
The Exploitation Problem
Always Aggregate
Aggregation, Complaints, and Risk
Joe Horton I. IntroductionMany of our acts benefit some people and burden others.According to some moral views, when all other things are equal, we are morally required to act in the way that maximizes the sum of benefits minus burdens. 1 We can say that these views are aggregative.The bestknown aggregative view is Utilitarianism, but there are others. 2 Aggregative views tend to have counterintuitive implications in cases in which we must choose…
Always Aggregate
Aggregation, Complaints, and Risk
Joe Horton I. IntroductionMany of our acts benefit some people and burden others.According to some moral views, when all other things are equal, we are morally required to act in the way that maximizes the sum of benefits minus burdens. 1 We can say that these views are aggregative.The bestknown aggregative view is Utilitarianism, but there are others. 2 Aggregative views tend to have counterintuitive implications in cases in which we must choose…
The Exploitation Problem
Partial aggregation in ethics
Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer 'yes' and 'no', respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. These views contrast with fully aggregative moral views, which imply that the answer…
Aggregation, Complaints, and Risk
Joe Horton I. IntroductionMany of our acts benefit some people and burden others.According to some moral views, when all other things are equal, we are morally required to act in the way that maximizes the sum of benefits minus burdens. 1 We can say that these views are aggregative.The bestknown aggregative view is Utilitarianism, but there are others. 2 Aggregative views tend to have counterintuitive implications in cases in which we must choose…
Always Aggregate
The Exploitation Problem
Aggregation, Risk, and Reductio
Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer “yes” and “no,” respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. In this article, I develop a risk-based reductio argument that shows that there can …
New and Improvable Lives
According to weak utilitarianism, at least when other things are equal, you should maximize the sum of well-being. This view has considerable explanatory power, but it also has two implications that seem to me implausible. First, it implies that, other things equal, it is wrong to harm yourself, or even to deny yourself benefits. Second, it implies that, other things equal, given the opportunity to create new happy people, it is wrong not to. The…
Partial aggregation in ethics
Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer 'yes' and 'no', respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. These views contrast with fully aggregative moral views, which imply that the answer…
Evaluative Uncertainty and Permissible Preference
There has recently been an explosion of interest in rational and moral choice under evaluative uncertainty—uncertainty about values or reasons. However, the dominant views on such choice have at least three major problems: they are overly demanding, they are incompatible with supererogation, and they cannot be applied to agents with credence in indeterminate evaluative theories. The authors propose a unified view that solves all these problems. A…
Philosophy (6 obras) · Free Will and Agency (5 obras) · Epistemology (4 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Sociology (4 obras) · Citation (3 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Economics (3 obras) · Library science (3 obras) · Positive economics (3 obras)