Partial aggregation in ethics

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4079664
AutoresJoe Horton (0000-0002-3703-4947, University College London, autor de correspondencia)
Año2021
Volumen16
Número3
Fecha de publicación2021-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12719
OpenAlexW3132402520
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas11
Referencias citadas43

Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer 'yes' and 'no', respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. These views contrast with fully aggregative moral views, which imply that the answer to both questions is 'yes', and with non-aggregative moral views, which imply that the answer to both questions is 'no'. In this article, I review the most natural and influential ways of developing partially aggregative views and explain the main problems they face

Epistemology · Social science · Sociology · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · History · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology