Byron A Matthews
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3923895 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Byron A Matthews |
| NOMBRES | Byron A |
| APELLIDO | Matthews |
| FIRMA | MATTHEWS B A |
| AFILIACIONES | Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, Baltimore County |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 4 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 5 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 4 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1975 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1988 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Researching Social Processes in the Laboratory
Temptation and the Maintenance of Trust
Levels of trust, defined by how far ahead in earnings each dyad member risked putting the other, were continuously monitored during two-party exchange. Two experiments investigated whether a bilateral punishment capability would enable trust to be maintained when a strong incentive to be untrustworthy (temptation) was introduced. In Experiment I (total subtraction), both persons were provided with a “start over” button that could set the other pe…
Expansion of Exchange
Three experiments employed procedures which allowed trust levels to be continuously monitored during ongoing two-party exchange. Level of trust was behaviorally defined by degree of "expansion" of exchange-that is, by how far ahead in earnings one party put the other. Higher levels of trust were increasingly risky because they resulted in proportionately greater earnings reductions when the other person was untrustworthy (failed to reciprocate). …
Availability of Communication and Cooperative Problem Solving in Dyads
The initial acquisition of a simple 2-person response was observed under 3 voice communication conditions, Free Communication, Cost Communication, and No Communication. All 7 pairs in both the Free and No Communication conditions successfully acquired the cooperative response; however, 4 of 7 dyads in the Cost Communication group did not. Among pairs that acquired the response, speed of acquisition did not differ by communication condition. An ex…
Expansion of Exchange
Three experiments employed procedures which allowed trust levels to be continuously monitored during ongoing two-party exchange. Level of trust was behaviorally defined by degree of "expansion" of exchange-that is, by how far ahead in earnings one party put the other. Higher levels of trust were increasingly risky because they resulted in proportionately greater earnings reductions when the other person was untrustworthy (failed to reciprocate). …
Temptation and the Maintenance of Trust
Levels of trust, defined by how far ahead in earnings each dyad member risked putting the other, were continuously monitored during two-party exchange. Two experiments investigated whether a bilateral punishment capability would enable trust to be maintained when a strong incentive to be untrustworthy (temptation) was introduced. In Experiment I (total subtraction), both persons were provided with a “start over” button that could set the other pe…
Availability of Communication and Cooperative Problem Solving in Dyads
The initial acquisition of a simple 2-person response was observed under 3 voice communication conditions, Free Communication, Cost Communication, and No Communication. All 7 pairs in both the Free and No Communication conditions successfully acquired the cooperative response; however, 4 of 7 dyads in the Cost Communication group did not. Among pairs that acquired the response, speed of acquisition did not differ by communication condition. An ex…
Expansion of Exchange
Three experiments employed procedures which allowed trust levels to be continuously monitored during ongoing two-party exchange. Level of trust was behaviorally defined by degree of "expansion" of exchange-that is, by how far ahead in earnings one party put the other. Higher levels of trust were increasingly risky because they resulted in proportionately greater earnings reductions when the other person was untrustworthy (failed to reciprocate). …
Temptation and the Maintenance of Trust
Levels of trust, defined by how far ahead in earnings each dyad member risked putting the other, were continuously monitored during two-party exchange. Two experiments investigated whether a bilateral punishment capability would enable trust to be maintained when a strong incentive to be untrustworthy (temptation) was introduced. In Experiment I (total subtraction), both persons were provided with a “start over” button that could set the other pe…
Researching Social Processes in the Laboratory
Psychology (4 obras) · Social Psychology (4 obras) · Social Psychology (3 obras) · Accounting (2 obras) · Accounting (2 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras) · Earnings (2 obras) · Economics (2 obras) · Microeconomics (2 obras) · Temptation (2 obras)