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Temptation and the Maintenance of Trust

Effects of Bilateral Punishment Capability

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6283773
AutoresByron A Matthews (Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, Baltimore County), William M Kordonski (Psychological Health Services, Columbia, Maryland), Eliot Shimoff (Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, Baltimore County)
Año1983
Volumen27
Número2
Páginas255-277
Fecha de publicación1983-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002783027002003
OpenAlexW2055607995
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas20

Levels of trust, defined by how far ahead in earnings each dyad member risked putting the other, were continuously monitored during two-party exchange. Two experiments investigated whether a bilateral punishment capability would enable trust to be maintained when a strong incentive to be untrustworthy (temptation) was introduced. In Experiment I (total subtraction), both persons were provided with a “start over” button that could set the other person's session earnings to zero. In Experiment II (partial subtraction), the start over button was replaced by a “subtraction” button that subtracted ten points from the other's earnings. All pairs had previously demonstrated either unwillingness to trust or untrustworthy behavior during temptation. Experiment I found that the availability of the total substraction option allowed trust to be maintained in four of six pairs. In Experiment II, partial subtraction had similar effects for three of six pairs. A bilateral punishment capacity may thus facilitate the maintenance of trust under conditions that otherwise produce distrust and exploitation

Arithmetic · Distrust · Dyad · Earnings · Economics · Incentive · Microeconomics · Punishment (psychology · Set (abstract data type · Subtraction · Temptation · Accounting · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Psychology · Psychology of Social Influence · Social Psychology

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Obras citantes distintas3
Citas por año0,07
Intervalo de citas1985 - 2015 (31)
Velocidad de citaciónhistorical
Altamente citadoNo
Tipos de citaNeutras: 3
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