Donnchadh O''Conaill
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4281671 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Donnchadh O''Conaill |
| NOMBRES | Donnchadh |
| APELLIDO | O''Conaill |
| FIRMA | CONAILL D Ó |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Fribourg |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2747-6693 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 7 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 3 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2014 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
The Argument From Revelation and the Metaphysics of Properties
Arguments from revelation against physicalism appeal to the special knowledge of phenomenal properties which one can have on the basis of having experiences. In a nutshell, the idea is that by having experiences one can come to know the nature or essence of certain phenomenal properties and thereby learn that they are not physical. This argument is intuitively appealing, but a proper defense of it against physicalist objections requires exploring…
Self-preservation (or, whose incredulous stare is it anyway?)
The having objection to bundle theories of subjects of experience
The self or subject of experiences is often regarded as a mysterious entity, prompting approaches that seek to deflate it, metaphysically speaking. One such approach is the bundle theory, the most well-known version of which holds that each subject is a bundle of experiences. This version of the bundle theory seems vulnerable to the having objection: since subjects have experiences, they cannot be identical with bundles of experiences. I shall ar…
Infinite Regresses, Ground Conditions, and Metaphysical Satisfaction
In this paper we clarify a regress argument for metaphysical foundationalism, distinguishing strong and modest versions of this argument. We suggest that while the strong version is open to objection, the modest version is much more plausible and it supports a methodological stance: one ought to refrain from assuming that anti-foundationalism is metaphysically possible. This modest stance follows from our argument that currently we lack reasons t…
Panpsychism, Emergence, and Pluralities
Einar Bohn [AJP 2019] has proposed a version of panpsychism on which consciousness is fundamentally a property of pluralities of basic objects. I argue that this pluralized panpsychism is structurally similar to emergentism, and faces the problem of explaining how a plurality of basic objects could be a subject of experiences. Because of these issues, pluralized panpsychism is not a substantial improvement on orthodox panpsychism
Substance
Ontic Structural Realism and Concrete Objects
Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that reality is fundamentally structural. One way of developing this position is the claim that the identities of objects are determined by their positions in the structures to which they belong. This raises worries particularly with regard to the identity of concrete objects. In this paper, I examine whether the structures on which concrete objects are dependent should themselves be thought of as concrete or…
Ontic Structural Realism and Concrete Objects
Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that reality is fundamentally structural. One way of developing this position is the claim that the identities of objects are determined by their positions in the structures to which they belong. This raises worries particularly with regard to the identity of concrete objects. In this paper, I examine whether the structures on which concrete objects are dependent should themselves be thought of as concrete or…
Ontic Structural Realism and Concrete Objects
Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that reality is fundamentally structural. One way of developing this position is the claim that the identities of objects are determined by their positions in the structures to which they belong. This raises worries particularly with regard to the identity of concrete objects. In this paper, I examine whether the structures on which concrete objects are dependent should themselves be thought of as concrete or…
Panpsychism, Emergence, and Pluralities
Einar Bohn [AJP 2019] has proposed a version of panpsychism on which consciousness is fundamentally a property of pluralities of basic objects. I argue that this pluralized panpsychism is structurally similar to emergentism, and faces the problem of explaining how a plurality of basic objects could be a subject of experiences. Because of these issues, pluralized panpsychism is not a substantial improvement on orthodox panpsychism
Substance
Infinite Regresses, Ground Conditions, and Metaphysical Satisfaction
In this paper we clarify a regress argument for metaphysical foundationalism, distinguishing strong and modest versions of this argument. We suggest that while the strong version is open to objection, the modest version is much more plausible and it supports a methodological stance: one ought to refrain from assuming that anti-foundationalism is metaphysically possible. This modest stance follows from our argument that currently we lack reasons t…
The having objection to bundle theories of subjects of experience
The self or subject of experiences is often regarded as a mysterious entity, prompting approaches that seek to deflate it, metaphysically speaking. One such approach is the bundle theory, the most well-known version of which holds that each subject is a bundle of experiences. This version of the bundle theory seems vulnerable to the having objection: since subjects have experiences, they cannot be identical with bundles of experiences. I shall ar…
The Argument From Revelation and the Metaphysics of Properties
Arguments from revelation against physicalism appeal to the special knowledge of phenomenal properties which one can have on the basis of having experiences. In a nutshell, the idea is that by having experiences one can come to know the nature or essence of certain phenomenal properties and thereby learn that they are not physical. This argument is intuitively appealing, but a proper defense of it against physicalist objections requires exploring…
Self-preservation (or, whose incredulous stare is it anyway?)
Epistemology (4 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 obras) · Metaphysics (3 obras) · Appeal (2 obras) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 obras) · Philosophy of mind (2 obras)