The having objection to bundle theories of subjects of experience
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10691634 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Donnchadh O''Conaill (0000-0003-2747-6693, University of Fribourg, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2024 |
| Volumen | 74 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 1367-1375 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2024-09-25 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqae040 |
| OpenAlex | W4396725027 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 13 |
The self or subject of experiences is often regarded as a mysterious entity, prompting approaches that seek to deflate it, metaphysically speaking. One such approach is the bundle theory, the most well-known version of which holds that each subject is a bundle of experiences. This version of the bundle theory seems vulnerable to the having objection: since subjects have experiences, they cannot be identical with bundles of experiences. I shall argue that while the having objection is intuitively plausible, its dialectical force is limited since it does not work without substantial further metaphysical assumptions
Bundle · Epistemology · Materials Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 2 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |