The Mirror of the World
Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8070893 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Christopher Peacocke (0000-0002-8372-7373, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2014 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2014-02-27 |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | BOOK |
| Revista | Mirror of the World (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699568.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W4244392096 |
| ISBN | 9780199699568 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 47 |
Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness - perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal - and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives
Cognitive psychology · Consciousness · Epistemology · First person · Geography · Illusion · Interpersonal communication · Metaphysics · Psychoanalysis · Representation (politics) · Self · Self-consciousness · Anthropological Studies and Insights · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Interdisciplinary Cultural and Social Studies · Philosophy · Psychology · Religious Studies and Spiritual Practices · Social Psychology
Challenging evolutionary psychology with the eternalist view of the world
Epistemological and socio-cultural modalities of self-consciousness in Kant
Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness
Cocka-tooling around
Locating the self
What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership
Self-Experience Despite Self-Elusiveness
On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action
Fostering dialogue
Ordinary self‐consciousness as philosophical problem
Immunity to error through misidentification
Errors through misidentification and the specialness of first-person thought
IEM explained
Remember me? First person thought, memory and explanations of IEM
Interpersonal connection
Self‐location in perceptual experience
The polysemy of “I”
Selfless Memories
First-Person Perspective in Experience
Replies to Paul, Brennan, O’Brien
Boyle’s Elusive Egoism
Imposing Mind Onto World
A puzzle about first-person imagination
Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept
Three grades of self involvement and the deduction of objectivity in The Practical Self
Other I’s, communication, and the second person
The subject-as-object problem
Self-preservation (or, whose incredulous stare is it anyway?)
Against the Pathology Argument for Self-Acquaintance
Constitutive Self-Consciousness
Why did Trump say “I hope you will let Flynn go” to Comey
Really Looking and Being Seen
The early Yogācāra theory of no-self
De Se Preferences and Empathy for Future Selves1
Consciousness and Perspectival De Se content
De se thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification
First-person representations and responsible agency in AI
Memory-based reference and immunity to error through misidentification
Perspectives on de se immunity
The Cogito and sums
The having objection to bundle theories of subjects of experience
Is Kant's I think Unique
The Feeling of Bodily Ownership
The puzzle of mirror self-recognition
Self-referring as self-directed action
Reflective reasoning & philosophy
Mental Files
| Obras citantes distintas | 47 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 4,7 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 45 |