Federica Alberti
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4382745 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Federica Alberti |
| NOMBRES | Federica |
| APELLIDO | Alberti |
| FIRMA | ALBERTI F |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Portsmouth |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5946-5804 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 2 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2015 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Experimental Effects of Institutionalizing Co-determination by a Procedurally Fair Bidding Rule
From an institutional perspective we contribute to corporate governance of firms by (1) proposing a procedurally fair mechanism that is ethically desirable, and (2) experimentally testing whether procedural fairness crowds-in ethical behavior of managers (on behalf of shareholders) and workers. The experiment sees one ‘manager’ and three ‘workers’ (possibly representing three sections of the firm) co-determining an efficiency-enhancing investment…
Representative bureaucracy and organizational attractiveness
Drawing upon representative bureaucracy theory, this study investigates the relationship between passive and symbolic representation by examining the extent to which a more passively representative public organization would be attractive as an employer. The study involved a randomized survey experiment of members of the public in the US and UK. Overall, and contrary to the theory of representative bureaucracy, results show that women found a male…
Middle Pleistocene Cave Bear Genome Calibrates the Evolutionary History of Palaearctic Bears
Concession Bargaining
We test experimentally whether dynamic interaction is crucial for concession bargaining. In our complete information bargaining experiments, two parties with asymmetric conflict payoffs try to agree how to share a commonly known pie by bargaining over a finite number of successive trials (agreement attempts). We compare the fully dynamic interaction to one less dynamic and one static protocol. In the quasi-dynamic protocol, later trials merely re…
Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods
Does the Endowment of Contributors Make a Difference in Threshold Public-Good Games?
We investigate experimentally whether the endowment of potential contributors changes outcomes in threshold public-good games. We find that the variance in contributions is significantly reduced for low and high levels of endowment in comparison with an intermediate level of endowment. This difference emerges with experience. Evidence on whether the level of endowment influences the success rate at providing public goods is more mixed. We provide…
Concession Bargaining
We test experimentally whether dynamic interaction is crucial for concession bargaining. In our complete information bargaining experiments, two parties with asymmetric conflict payoffs try to agree how to share a commonly known pie by bargaining over a finite number of successive trials (agreement attempts). We compare the fully dynamic interaction to one less dynamic and one static protocol. In the quasi-dynamic protocol, later trials merely re…
Does the Endowment of Contributors Make a Difference in Threshold Public-Good Games?
We investigate experimentally whether the endowment of potential contributors changes outcomes in threshold public-good games. We find that the variance in contributions is significantly reduced for low and high levels of endowment in comparison with an intermediate level of endowment. This difference emerges with experience. Evidence on whether the level of endowment influences the success rate at providing public goods is more mixed. We provide…
Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods
Concession Bargaining
We test experimentally whether dynamic interaction is crucial for concession bargaining. In our complete information bargaining experiments, two parties with asymmetric conflict payoffs try to agree how to share a commonly known pie by bargaining over a finite number of successive trials (agreement attempts). We compare the fully dynamic interaction to one less dynamic and one static protocol. In the quasi-dynamic protocol, later trials merely re…
Middle Pleistocene Cave Bear Genome Calibrates the Evolutionary History of Palaearctic Bears
Experimental Effects of Institutionalizing Co-determination by a Procedurally Fair Bidding Rule
From an institutional perspective we contribute to corporate governance of firms by (1) proposing a procedurally fair mechanism that is ethically desirable, and (2) experimentally testing whether procedural fairness crowds-in ethical behavior of managers (on behalf of shareholders) and workers. The experiment sees one ‘manager’ and three ‘workers’ (possibly representing three sections of the firm) co-determining an efficiency-enhancing investment…
Representative bureaucracy and organizational attractiveness
Drawing upon representative bureaucracy theory, this study investigates the relationship between passive and symbolic representation by examining the extent to which a more passively representative public organization would be attractive as an employer. The study involved a randomized survey experiment of members of the public in the US and UK. Overall, and contrary to the theory of representative bureaucracy, results show that women found a male…
Economics (3 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 obras) · Microeconomics (3 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Psychology (2 obras) · Social Psychology (2 obras) · Social Psychology (2 obras) · Accounting (1 obras) · Agreement (1 obras) · Archaeology (1 obras)