Concession Bargaining

An Experimental Comparison of Protocols and Time Horizons

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6284071
AutoresFederica Alberti (0000-0001-5946-5804, Economics and Finance Subject Group, Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, United Kingdom, autor de correspondencia), Sven Fischer (0000-0002-4844-0713, Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University, Newcastle, United Kingdom), Werner Güth (0000-0002-6810-6720, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany), Kei Tsutsui (0000-0002-5560-3023, University of Bath)
Año2018
Volumen62
Número9
Páginas2017-2039
Fecha de publicación2018-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002717720753
OpenAlexW2215484753
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas29

We test experimentally whether dynamic interaction is crucial for concession bargaining. In our complete information bargaining experiments, two parties with asymmetric conflict payoffs try to agree how to share a commonly known pie by bargaining over a finite number of successive trials (agreement attempts). We compare the fully dynamic interaction to one less dynamic and one static protocol. In the quasi-dynamic protocol, later trials merely reveal that so far no agreement has been reached, and in the static protocol, no feedback information is given about earlier trials. We find that neither conflict rate nor efficiency or inequality of agreements differs across protocols. Comparing different numbers of maximal trials shows that more trials render conflict more likely due to less concessions

Econometrics · Economics · Microeconomics · Protocol (science · Test (biology · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Taxation and Compliance Studies