Christine M Korsgaard
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 445427 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Christine M Korsgaard |
| NOMBRES | Christine M |
| APELLIDO | Korsgaard |
| FIRMA | KORSGAARD C M |
| AFILIACIONES | Harvard University Press |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 44 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 375 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 44 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1983 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
Rawls e Kant
Tradução: Korsgaard, C. M. (1995). Rawls and Kant: On the primacy of the practical. In Proceedings of the 8th International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995 (Vol. I, pp. 1665–1173). Tradução de Lucas Petroni
Valuing animals, nature, and our own animal nature
Précis of fellow creatures
Tiere wie wir
Hat das Leben eines Tieres einen anderen Wert als das eines Menschen? Nein, sagt die Harvard-Professorin Christine M. Korsgaard und begründet in ihrem Buch "Tiere wie wir", warum Tiere nicht getötet oder benutzt werden dürfen. Sie belässt es aber nicht bei der abstrakten Analyse, sondern erörtert an konkreten Beispielen, warum die handelsüblichen Rechtfertigungen von Massentierhaltung und Tierversuchen moralisch unhaltbar sind. Ihr radikales Buch…
Constitutivism and the virtues
In Self-Constitution, I argue that the principles governing action are “constitutive standards” of agency, standards that arise from the nature of agency itself. To be an agent is to be autonomously efficacious, and the categorical and hypothetical imperatives arise from those two attributes. These principles are also “constitutive” of agency in two more specific ways. First, they meet the “constitution requirement”: the object must meet the stan…
The Animal Antinomy, Part 1
Does a commitment to the moral standing of animals obligate us to try to end predation? “Creation ethicists,” who answer yes, believe that if we could, we ought to create new species of animals who would not need predation. The probable result would be that all animals are domestic. “Abolitionists,” who answer no, argue that the only way we can treat animals well is by leaving them alone. We should not interfere with predation, and should phase o…
The Animal Antinomy, Part 2
The intractable problems of animal ethics arise from a fundamental mismatch between morality and nature: nature resists moral reorganization. This chapter argues that we should reject the principle that “ought implies can” and do the best that we can for animals. It asks what is involved in treating animals as ends in themselves and rejects apartheid—the abolitionist’s ban on interaction between people and animals. It then examines specific pract…
A Kantian Case for Our Obligations to the Other Animals
When we act rationally, we treat things that are good for us as if they were good absolutely. We choose to pursue them, and demand that others respect our choices, thus treating ourselves as ends in ourselves. This argument—Kant’s argument for the Formula of Humanity—establishes that there are two senses in which rationality commits us to the view that we are ends in ourselves. The demands that we make on others commit us to the view that we are …
Species-Being and the Badness of Extinction and Death
This paper offers an account of the property Feuerbach and Marx called “species-being,” the human being’s distinctive tendency to identify herself as a member of her species, and to think of the species as a “we.” It links the notion to Kant’s theory of rights, arguing that every claim of right commits the maker of that claim to something like world government, and therefore to the conception of humanity as a collective agent. It also links speci…
Fellow Creatures
This book argues that we are obligated to treat all sentient animals as “ends in themselves.” Drawing on a theory of the good derived from Aristotle, it offers an explanation of why animals are the sorts of beings who have a good. Drawing on a revised version of Kant’s argument for the value of humanity, it argues that rationality commits us to claiming the standing of ends in ourselves in two senses. As autonomous beings, we claim to be ends in …
Fellow Creatures
Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels
"This is a successor work to Why the West Rules for Now, in which Morris once again advances an ambitious account of how certain 'brute material forces' limit and help determine the 'culture, values, and beliefs,' including the moral codes, that humans have adopted over the last 20,000 years. The present volume originated as Ian Morris's Tanner Lectures on Human Values, delivered at Princeton University in November of 2012"...Introduction
The Normative Constitution of Agency
On a naturalistic conception of agency, someone is an agent when certain of his own mental states are the cause of his movements. On a normative conception, a person constitutes his agency by following certain principles or laws. In Kant’s conception, for example, a movement counts as the agent’s own when it is chosen autonomously, that is, in accordance with the categorical imperative. To say that someone acts is to imply that his movements are …
From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble
Aristotle believes that an agent lacks virtue unless she enjoys the performance of virtuous actions, while Kant claims that the person who does her duty despite contrary inclinations exhibits a moral worth that the person who acts from inclination lacks. Despite these differences, this chapter argues that Aristotle and Kant share a distinctive view of the object of human choice and locus of moral value: that what we choose, and what has moral val…
On Having a Good
In some recent papers I have been arguing that the concept ‘good-for’ is prior to the concept of ‘good’ (in the sense in which final ends are good), and exploring the implications of that claim. One of those implications is that everything that is good is good for someone. That implication seems to fall afoul of our intuitions about certain cases, such as the intuition that a world full of happy people and animals is better than a world full of m…
Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law
Journal Article Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law Get access Christine M. Korsgaard Christine M. Korsgaard * *Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University. Email: [email protected]. This article was delivered as the Hart Lecture at Oxford in 2012. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 33, Issue 4, Winter 2013, Pages 629–648, https://d…
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
Philosophy
The Activity of Reason
I contrast two views of the relations among reason (the active dimension of the mind), rational principles, and reasons. On the Kantian view, rational principles are constitutive principles of rational activity, and substantive reasons result from applying those principles. According to Scanlon and Broome, substantive reasons exist independently of rational principles, whose function and normative status then becomes problematic. The problem for …
Integrity and Interaction
If Platonic justice and the categorical imperative are constitutive principles of action, there must be a connection between moral goodness and having a unified soul. But one might object that these principles of unification are merely formal and do not lead to substantive moral commitments. Following Plato's comparison of the city and the soul, the objection is rephrased as one concerning the relationship between inward justice (between the part…
Formal and Substantive Principles of Reason
This chapter lays out the principles of practical reason whose normativity the book defends, and distinguishes them from other proposed principles of practical reason. The principle of instrumental reason is interpreted broadly as the general principle of practical judgment or application. Substantive moral principles, identified in terms of their distinctively moral content, are distinguished from formal moral principles, which dictate a certain…
The Constitutional Model
Agency requires psychic unity, but there are two models of how this may be achieved. According to the Combat Model, as described by Hume, unity is achieved when either reason or passion wins the battle for control of action. According to Plato's Constitutional Model, the relevant sort of unity is the kind that a political constitution imposes on a group of people, making it possible for them to function as a single unified agent. This chapter exa…
The Metaphysics of Normativity
The principles of practical reason constitute us as agents because they unify our agency, and the book argues that this is what makes them normative. Behind this account is a teleological metaphysics, especially clear in Aristotle, according to which the function of normative principles in general is unification. This chapter explains and defends this account. It also explains the idea of constitutive standards and principles, normative standards…
Autonomy and Efficacy
According to the account defended in the previous chapter, Kant's categorical and hypothetical imperatives are constitutive principles of action. This chapter substantiates that claim by explaining action as an autonomous and efficacious movement. Conformity to the categorical imperative renders you autonomous, and conformity to the hypothetical imperative renders you efficacious. These ideas give rise to a problem, since non-human animals also a…
Expulsion from the Garden
Practical Reason and the Unity of the Will
This chapter explains how the principles of practical reason serve to unify the will, and how that makes them normative. This account of normativity is contrasted to two other accounts that are examined first. Hume's empiricist account is criticized for reducing principles of practical reason to descriptions of the effects that certain judgments usually have on the will, and argues that this account cannot distinguish the normative ought from the…
Self-Constitution
Christine M. Korsgaard presents an account of the foundation of practical reason and moral obligation, based on a new theory of action and interaction. She proposes that the function of an action is to constitute the agency and therefore the identity of the person who does it, and that only morally good action can serve this function
Two Distinctions in Goodness
Philosophy
Fellow Creatures
This book argues that we are obligated to treat all sentient animals as “ends in themselves.” Drawing on a theory of the good derived from Aristotle, it offers an explanation of why animals are the sorts of beings who have a good. Drawing on a revised version of Kant’s argument for the value of humanity, it argues that rationality commits us to claiming the standing of ends in ourselves in two senses. As autonomous beings, we claim to be ends in …
Kant’s Analysis of Obligation
Journal Article Kant's Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Foundations I Get access Christine M. Korsgaard Christine M. Korsgaard The University of Chicago Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 72, Issue 3, 1 July 1989, Pages 311–340, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198972317 Published: 09 December 2014
A Kantian Case for Our Obligations to the Other Animals
When we act rationally, we treat things that are good for us as if they were good absolutely. We choose to pursue them, and demand that others respect our choices, thus treating ourselves as ends in ourselves. This argument—Kant’s argument for the Formula of Humanity—establishes that there are two senses in which rationality commits us to the view that we are ends in ourselves. The demands that we make on others commit us to the view that we are …
Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law
Journal Article Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law Get access Christine M. Korsgaard Christine M. Korsgaard * *Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University. Email: [email protected]. This article was delivered as the Hart Lecture at Oxford in 2012. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 33, Issue 4, Winter 2013, Pages 629–648, https://d…
Creating the Kingdom of Ends
When we hold a person responsible, we regard her as answerable for her actions, reaction, and attitudes. We use the concept of responsibility in two contexts, the legal and the personal. We use it in the legal context when we must determine whether to punish someone for a crime or make him liable for another's losses. We use it in the context of everyday personal interaction, when we are pressed to decide what attitude we will take toward another…
On Having a Good
In some recent papers I have been arguing that the concept ‘good-for’ is prior to the concept of ‘good’ (in the sense in which final ends are good), and exploring the implications of that claim. One of those implications is that everything that is good is good for someone. That implication seems to fall afoul of our intuitions about certain cases, such as the intuition that a world full of happy people and animals is better than a world full of m…
Constitutivism and the virtues
In Self-Constitution, I argue that the principles governing action are “constitutive standards” of agency, standards that arise from the nature of agency itself. To be an agent is to be autonomously efficacious, and the categorical and hypothetical imperatives arise from those two attributes. These principles are also “constitutive” of agency in two more specific ways. First, they meet the “constitution requirement”: the object must meet the stan…
Creating the Kingdom of Ends
Two Distinctions in Goodness
Philosophy
Kant's Formula of Universal Law
Philosophy
Skepticism about Practical Reason
Kant's Formula of Humanity
Morality as Freedom
Kant’s Analysis of Obligation
Journal Article Kant's Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Foundations I Get access Christine M. Korsgaard Christine M. Korsgaard The University of Chicago Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 72, Issue 3, 1 July 1989, Pages 311–340, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198972317 Published: 09 December 2014
Creating the Kingdom of Ends
When we hold a person responsible, we regard her as answerable for her actions, reaction, and attitudes. We use the concept of responsibility in two contexts, the legal and the personal. We use it in the legal context when we must determine whether to punish someone for a crime or make him liable for another's losses. We use it in the context of everyday personal interaction, when we are pressed to decide what attitude we will take toward another…
Creating the Kingdom of Ends
Christine Korsgaard has become one of the leading interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy. She is identified with a small group of philosophers who are intent on producing a version of Kant's moral philosophy that is at once sensitive to its historical roots while revealing its particular relevance to contemporary problems. She rejects the traditional picture of Kant's ethics as a cold vision of the moral life which emphasises duty at the expense…
Skepticism about practical reason
The Kantian approach to moral philosophy is to try to show that ethics is based on practical reason: that is, that our ethical judgments can be explained in terms of rational standards that apply directly to conduct or to deliberation. Part of the appeal of this approach lies in the way that it avoids certain sources of skepticism that some other approaches meet with inevitably. If ethically good action is simply rational action, we do not need t…
Creating the Kingdom of Ends
As the virtuous man is to himself, he is to his friend also, for his friend is another self.Aristotle
The Sources of Normativity
Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative. They make claims on us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least when we invoke them, we make claims on one another; but where does their authority over us - or ours over one another - come from? Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers: voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal…
Reclaiming the History of Ethics
The essays in this volume offer an approach to the history of moral and political philosophy that takes its inspiration from John Rawls. All the contributors are philosophers who have studied with Rawls and they offer this collection in his honour. The distinctive feature of this approach is to address substantive normative questions in moral and political philosophy through an analysis of the texts and theories of major figures in the history of…
Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals ranks alongside Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as one of the most profound and influential works in moral philosophy ever written. In Kant's own words its aim is to search for and establish the supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative. Kant argues that every human being is an end in himself or herself, never to be used as a means by others, and that mora…
Creating the Kingdom of Ends
The Constitution of Agency
This book is a collection of ten papers on practical reason and moral psychology. Part 1 defends the view that the principles of practical reason are constitutive principles of action. By governing our actions in accordance with Kant's categorical imperative and the principle of instrumental reason we take control of our own movements and so render ourselves active, self-determining beings. Part II takes up the question of the role of our passive…
The constitution of agency
Christine M. Korsgaard is one of today's leading moral philosophers: this volume collects ten papers by her on practical reason and moral psychology. Korsgaard draws on the work of important figures in the history of philosophy such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hume, showing how their ideas can inform the solution of contemporary and traditional philosophical problems, such as the foundations of morality and practical reason, the nature of agen…
Integrity and Interaction
If Platonic justice and the categorical imperative are constitutive principles of action, there must be a connection between moral goodness and having a unified soul. But one might object that these principles of unification are merely formal and do not lead to substantive moral commitments. Following Plato's comparison of the city and the soul, the objection is rephrased as one concerning the relationship between inward justice (between the part…
Formal and Substantive Principles of Reason
This chapter lays out the principles of practical reason whose normativity the book defends, and distinguishes them from other proposed principles of practical reason. The principle of instrumental reason is interpreted broadly as the general principle of practical judgment or application. Substantive moral principles, identified in terms of their distinctively moral content, are distinguished from formal moral principles, which dictate a certain…
The Constitutional Model
Agency requires psychic unity, but there are two models of how this may be achieved. According to the Combat Model, as described by Hume, unity is achieved when either reason or passion wins the battle for control of action. According to Plato's Constitutional Model, the relevant sort of unity is the kind that a political constitution imposes on a group of people, making it possible for them to function as a single unified agent. This chapter exa…
The Metaphysics of Normativity
The principles of practical reason constitute us as agents because they unify our agency, and the book argues that this is what makes them normative. Behind this account is a teleological metaphysics, especially clear in Aristotle, according to which the function of normative principles in general is unification. This chapter explains and defends this account. It also explains the idea of constitutive standards and principles, normative standards…
Autonomy and Efficacy
According to the account defended in the previous chapter, Kant's categorical and hypothetical imperatives are constitutive principles of action. This chapter substantiates that claim by explaining action as an autonomous and efficacious movement. Conformity to the categorical imperative renders you autonomous, and conformity to the hypothetical imperative renders you efficacious. These ideas give rise to a problem, since non-human animals also a…
Expulsion from the Garden
Practical Reason and the Unity of the Will
This chapter explains how the principles of practical reason serve to unify the will, and how that makes them normative. This account of normativity is contrasted to two other accounts that are examined first. Hume's empiricist account is criticized for reducing principles of practical reason to descriptions of the effects that certain judgments usually have on the will, and argues that this account cannot distinguish the normative ought from the…
How to be a Person
If reasons are public in their normative force, every agent's reasons are normative for every other's. How then can an agent have a practical identity of his own? After sketching an anti-realist account of value, the first part of this chapter proposes that the answer to that question rests in an attitude an agent can and should have towards his own identity. He can view it as a valuable instance of human possibility, a possible role in the large…
Defective Action
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