The Activity of Reason

Datos Bibliográficos

ID23179357
AutoresChristine M Korsgaard (autor de correspondencia)
Año2011
Volumen83
Número2
Páginas3-18
Fecha de publicación2011-09-15
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoCHAPTER
RevistaReasons and recognition (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753673.003.0001
OpenAlexW1498519593
ISBN9780199753673
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9

I contrast two views of the relations among reason (the active dimension of the mind), rational principles, and reasons. On the Kantian view, rational principles are constitutive principles of rational activity, and substantive reasons result from applying those principles. According to Scanlon and Broome, substantive reasons exist independently of rational principles, whose function and normative status then becomes problematic. The problem for the Kantian view is that if we can characterize the activity of reason only as “justifying beliefs and actions” then it seems as if reasons must exist prior to that activity. I argue that the activities of justifying our beliefs and actions coincide with the activities of constructing a unified conception of the world and of constructing a unified self, respectively. These alternative descriptions enable us to explain why rational principles are normative and can be used to determine reasons.

Doctrine · Epistemology · Identification (biology) · Intellect · Passion · Perception · Practical reason · Rationality · Realm · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology