Deliberation and Acting for Reasons
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10697154 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Nomy Arpaly, Timothy Schroeder (The Ohio State University) |
| Año | 2012 |
| Volumen | 121 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 209-239 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2012-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Editorial | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-1539089 |
| OpenAlex | W2118618473 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 20 |
| Referencias citadas | 24 |
Theoretical and practical deliberation are voluntary activities, and like all voluntary activities, they are performed for reasons. To hold that all voluntary activities are performed for reasons in virtue of their relations to past, present, or even merely possible acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless allow us to think and act for reasons, and these processes must be the ones that generate the voluntary activities making up ordinary deliberation. These nondeliberative, nonvoluntary processes by means of which we are able to deliberate for reasons are the fundamental processes by means of which we can think or do anything for a reason: once it has been seen that they must exist, it can be recognized that they are ubiquitous. As a result, the usefulness of deliberation to rational belief and action is intermittent, contingent, and modest. Deliberation is a tremendously valuable tool for increasing human capacities to think and act for good reasons in challenging contexts, but in the end it is merely a tool, wielded by people through the same nondeliberative, nonvoluntary capacities to think and act for reasons that they are enhancing the effectiveness of by deliberating
Action (physics) · Deliberation · Epistemology · Law and economics · Perception · Political science · Politics · Process (computing) · Sociology · Virtue · Voluntary action · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology
The Importance of Being Rational
Normative Reasons
Aesthetic Insight and Mental Agency
Problems and solutions for a hybrid approach to grounding practical normativity
Practical Deliberation is Normative
Reasons Not to Consider Our Options
The relationship between free will and consciousness
Response to Commentators on Existential Flourishing
Is the wandering mind a planning mind
Zetetic indispensability and epistemic justification
The Aim of Practical Reasoning
The Role of ‘Autonomy’ in Teaching Expertise
Deliberative Agency, Self‐Control, and the Divided Mind
Manipulation
Side Effects and the Structure of Deliberation
Deliberators Must Be Imperfect
The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning
Rationality, autonomy, and obedience to linguistic norms
A zetetic approach to perspectivism
Nudging for judging that p
The Possibility of Practical Reason
Ethics and Practical Reason
Why Be Rational?
The Extended Mind
The Activity of Reason
Ten Problems of Consciousness
The Sources of Normativity
Human Nature
Varieties of Practical Reasoning
Caring and the Boundary-Driven Structure of Practical Deliberation
The Possibility of Practical Reason
The Practice of Moral Judgment
Sense and Content
The Practice of Moral Judgment
Actions, Reasons, and Causes
The self-regulating mind
| Obras citantes distintas | 20 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,82 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2015 - 2025 (11) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 20 |