Jr James M Snyder
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4532490 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Jr James M Snyder |
| NOMBRES | Jr James M |
| APELLIDO | Snyder |
| FIRMA | SNYDER J J M |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 3 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 95 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 3 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2009 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2011 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Electoral Selection with Parties and Primaries
We develop a model of intraparty candidate selection under partisan electoral competition and voter uncertainty. Candidates for office belong to parties, which are factions of ideologically similar candidates. Each party’s candidate for a general election can be selected either by a “centralized” mechanism that effectively randomizes over possible candidates or by voters in a primary election. The electorate cares about ideology and valence, and …
Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending
Strong” political parties within legislatures are one possible solution to the problem of inefficient universalism, a norm under which all legislators seek large projects for their districts that are paid for out of a common pool. We demonstrate that even if parties have no role in the legislature, their role in elections can be sufficient to reduce spending. If parties in the electorate are strong, then legislators will demand less distributive …
Using Multimember District Elections to Estimate the Sources of the Incumbency Advantage
In this article we use a novel research design that exploits unique features of multimember districts to estimate and decompose the incumbency advantage in state legislative elections. Like some existing related studies we also use repeated observations on the same candidates to account for unobserved factors that remain constant across observations. Multimember districts have the additional feature of copartisans competing for multiple seats wit…
Using Multimember District Elections to Estimate the Sources of the Incumbency Advantage
In this article we use a novel research design that exploits unique features of multimember districts to estimate and decompose the incumbency advantage in state legislative elections. Like some existing related studies we also use repeated observations on the same candidates to account for unobserved factors that remain constant across observations. Multimember districts have the additional feature of copartisans competing for multiple seats wit…
Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending
Strong” political parties within legislatures are one possible solution to the problem of inefficient universalism, a norm under which all legislators seek large projects for their districts that are paid for out of a common pool. We demonstrate that even if parties have no role in the legislature, their role in elections can be sufficient to reduce spending. If parties in the electorate are strong, then legislators will demand less distributive …
Electoral Selection with Parties and Primaries
We develop a model of intraparty candidate selection under partisan electoral competition and voter uncertainty. Candidates for office belong to parties, which are factions of ideologically similar candidates. Each party’s candidate for a general election can be selected either by a “centralized” mechanism that effectively randomizes over possible candidates or by voters in a primary election. The electorate cares about ideology and valence, and …
Using Multimember District Elections to Estimate the Sources of the Incumbency Advantage
In this article we use a novel research design that exploits unique features of multimember districts to estimate and decompose the incumbency advantage in state legislative elections. Like some existing related studies we also use repeated observations on the same candidates to account for unobserved factors that remain constant across observations. Multimember districts have the additional feature of copartisans competing for multiple seats wit…
Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending
Strong” political parties within legislatures are one possible solution to the problem of inefficient universalism, a norm under which all legislators seek large projects for their districts that are paid for out of a common pool. We demonstrate that even if parties have no role in the legislature, their role in elections can be sufficient to reduce spending. If parties in the electorate are strong, then legislators will demand less distributive …
Electoral Selection with Parties and Primaries
We develop a model of intraparty candidate selection under partisan electoral competition and voter uncertainty. Candidates for office belong to parties, which are factions of ideologically similar candidates. Each party’s candidate for a general election can be selected either by a “centralized” mechanism that effectively randomizes over possible candidates or by voters in a primary election. The electorate cares about ideology and valence, and …
Economics (3 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 obras) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (3 obras) · Business (2 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Legislature (2 obras) · Political economy (2 obras)