Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6232146
AutoresDavid Primo (0000-0002-1888-6888, University of Rochester), David M Primo, Jane Mcintosh Snyder (0000-0002-1386-2844, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Jr James M Snyder
Año2010
Volumen54
Número2
Páginas354-370
Fecha de publicación2010-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00435.x
OpenAlexW2082118942
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas38
Referencias citadas56

Strong” political parties within legislatures are one possible solution to the problem of inefficient universalism, a norm under which all legislators seek large projects for their districts that are paid for out of a common pool. We demonstrate that even if parties have no role in the legislature, their role in elections can be sufficient to reduce spending. If parties in the electorate are strong, then legislators will demand less distributive spending because of a decreased incentive to secure a “personal vote” via local projects. We estimate that spending in states with strong party organizations is at least 4% smaller than in states where parties are weak. We also find evidence that strong party states receive less federal aid than states with weak organizations, and we theorize that this is because members of Congress from strong party states feel less compelled to secure aid than members from weak party states

Business · Economics · Government (linguistics · Government spending · Incentive · Law and economics · Legislature · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Universalism · Welfare · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Public Administration