Mark Schroeder
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 460474 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Mark Schroeder |
| NOMBRES | Mark |
| APELLIDO | Schroeder |
| FIRMA | SCHROEDER M |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Southern California |
| ORCID | 0009-0006-6949-7686 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 40 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 174 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 39 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2004 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
The (Political) Show Must Go On
Given the importance of both family and partisanship in identity formation, these two may be at odds for those in cross-partisan families. Within these households, exposure to cross-partisan media is inevitable, serving to prime partisan identity and even acting as a catalyst for partisan conflict. Although much work has investigated the role of media in affective polarization, and the role of family in partisanship, little work bridges the two. …
What it Means to Call Your Patient Obese
Perceived weight stigma has been shown to have serious consequences in healthcare, including poorer mental health, physical health, and other social injustices for overweight individuals. However, the full impact of stigmatized language use (like “obese”) in patient-provider interactions remains unclear. Therefore, we conducted an online experiment (N = 501) in the US to examine the effects of stigmatized language use in conversations with health…
Digitally curated beauty
Introducing Discord
In this article, I introduce and explain an underappreciated but pervasive phenomenon that I call discord. Discord helps to explain the source, dynamics, and resilience of many forms of interpersonal conflict. And it is a kind of misunderstanding into which philosophy offers a particularly privileged form of insight. By better understanding the nature of discord, we can better understand its inevitability, better navigate it, and better appreciat…
Agnostic wrongs and pragmatic disencroachment
She only loves me when I'm dieting
Latinos living in the U.S. must negotiate traditional Latino cultural expectations while simultaneously navigating U.S. norms around body image. Insights into Latino family communication about body image and food may explain lower rates of receiving care and identify key areas of interventions in this area. Therefore, the current study explores the perceived content, strategies, and justifications of the messages Latino adult children receive abo…
Analytic Existentialism
This volume brings together ten essays in which analytic philosophers engage with existentialism. The essays take up central existentialist themes, such as freedom, consciousness, and bad faith. Some bring existentialist ideas to bear on issues in contemporary analytic philosophy; some engage analytically with existentialist concerns; some employ the methods of analytic philosophy to interpret existentialist texts; and some articulate how existen…
Précis of Reasons First
This is an overview of the main themes and theses of Reasons First for a book symposium, and intended to be read alongside the other contributions to that symposium
Reply to Reasons Latesters
It is an honor to receive such careful and attentive criticism. In this response, I attempt to put the criticisms of the reasons latesters into the context of my argumentative aims in the book and to point toward how they might be answered
Defining Moral Realism
Wherever philosophers disagree, one of the things at issue is likely to be what they disagree about, itself. In addition to asking whether moral realism is true, and which forms of moral realism are more likely to be true than others, we can also ask what it would mean for some form of moral realism to be true. The usual aspiration of such inquiry is to find definitions that all can agree on, so that we can use terms in a uniform way. But we doub…
Experientialism Unidealized
Trials and Triumphs of University-Funded Open-Access Publishing
Mark Schroeder reflects on nine years of leading JESP and the continuing value of and challenges for the model of university-funded full-open access publishing in philosophy, and he announces new leadership of and support for the journal
Desiring Under the Proper Guise
Introduction:] "According to the thesis of the guise of the normative, all desires are associated with an appearance or judgment to the effect that the object of desire, or at least something systematically related to the object of the desire, satisfies an important normative property or figures in an important normative relation. This thesis has held promise, according to many, to explain why motivation by desire rationalizes or makes intelligib…
Noncognitivism in Ethics
According to noncognitivists, when we say that stealing is wrong, what we are doing is more like venting our feelings about stealing or encouraging one another not to steal, than like stating facts about morality. These ideas challenge the core not only of much thinking about morality and metaethics, but also of much philosophical thought about language and meaning. Noncognitivism in Ethics is an outstanding introduction to these theories, rangin…
Reasons First
The last fifty years or more of ethical theory have been preoccupied by a turn to reasons. The vocabulary of reasons has become a common currency not only in ethics, but in epistemology, action theory, and many related areas. It is now common, for example, to see central theses such as evidentialism in epistemology and egalitarianism in political philosophy formulated in terms of reasons. And some have even claimed that the vocabulary of reasons …
The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism
The Importance of Being in a Position to Know
When Beliefs Wrong
Normative Ethics and Metaethics
Metaethics concerns questions about normative inquiry, rather than questions within normative inquiry. Metaethics may also be contrasted with normative ethics as philosophy of science is contrasted with science. This chapter focuses on the classification of easy paradigms. Views which make claims about the nature of moral language, thought, epistemology, or reality, including noncognitivism, moral error theory, contextualism, relativism, and redu…
Ensuring a Future for Open-Access Publishing
Does Expressivism Have Subjectivist Consequences
Explaining the Reasons We Share
This volume presents over a decade of work by Mark Schroeder, one of the leading figures in contemporary metaethics. One new and ten previously published papers weave together treatments of reasons, reduction, supervenience, instrumental rationality, and legislation, to explore the nature and limits of moral explanation
Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge
Showing How to Derive Knowing How
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment 1
This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On thi…
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment 1
This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On thi…
The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons
This article offers a general argument against the orthodox ‘object-given’/‘state-given’ theory, according to which the distinction between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reason is just the distinction between ‘object-given’ and ‘state-given’ reasons, on the grounds that it fails to account for ‘right’ kind reasons against intention and belief
Expression for Expressivists
Expressivism’s central idea is that normative sentences bear the same relation to non‐cognitive attitudes that ordinary descriptive sentences bear to beliefs: the expression relation. Allan Gibbard tells us that “that words express judgments will be accepted by almost everyone”– the distinctive contribution of expressivism, his claim goes, is only a view about what kind of judgments words express. But not every account of the expression relation …
The Scope of Instrumental Reason
Allow me to rehearse a familiar scenario. We all know that which ends you have has something to do with what you ought to do. If Ronnie is keen on dancing but Bradley can’t stand it, then the fact that there will be dancing at the party tonight affects what Ronnie and Bradley ought to do in different ways. In short, (HI) you ought, if you have the end, to take the means. But now trouble looms: what if you have dreadful, murderous ends? Ought you …
Ought , Agents, and Actions
According to a naive view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, 'ought' often expresses a relation between agents and actions—the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naive view that 'ought' always expresses this relation—adherents of the naive view are happy to allow that 'ought' also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, th…
What is the Frege-Geach Problem
In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as theFrege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the pro…
The hypothetical imperative
According to the standard view, Kant held that hypothetical imperatives are universally binding edicts with disjunctive objects: take-the-means-or-don't-have-the-end. But Kant thought otherwise. He held that they are edicts binding only on some—those who have an end
How Does the Good Appear To Us
According to what Kant called formula of the schools, we desire only what we conceive to be good, and avoid only what we conceive to be bad. Historically, many philosophers have found attractive the even claim that the desire for a certain should be identified with a positive evaluation of this thing (23). It is this stronger claim that Sergio Tenenbaum is concerned to defend—or rather, to resurrect—in Appear ances of the Good. In this volume, Te…
Does Expressivism Have Subjectivist Consequences
She only loves me when I'm dieting
Latinos living in the U.S. must negotiate traditional Latino cultural expectations while simultaneously navigating U.S. norms around body image. Insights into Latino family communication about body image and food may explain lower rates of receiving care and identify key areas of interventions in this area. Therefore, the current study explores the perceived content, strategies, and justifications of the messages Latino adult children receive abo…
Showing How to Derive Knowing How
The Scope of Instrumental Reason
Allow me to rehearse a familiar scenario. We all know that which ends you have has something to do with what you ought to do. If Ronnie is keen on dancing but Bradley can’t stand it, then the fact that there will be dancing at the party tonight affects what Ronnie and Bradley ought to do in different ways. In short, (HI) you ought, if you have the end, to take the means. But now trouble looms: what if you have dreadful, murderous ends? Ought you …
Instrumental Mythology
In this response to Joseph Raz’s important and provocative article, “The Myth of Instrumental Reason,” it is argued that Raz is unsuccessful in his own terms at avoiding the unintuitive commitments that he argues plague other accounts of relationship between ends and reasons. Fortunately, it is argued, these unintuitive commitments are not truly so bad
The hypothetical imperative
According to the standard view, Kant held that hypothetical imperatives are universally binding edicts with disjunctive objects: take-the-means-or-don't-have-the-end. But Kant thought otherwise. He held that they are edicts binding only on some—those who have an end
Cudworth and Normative Explanations
Moral theories usually aspire to be explanatory—to tell us why something is wrong, why it is good, or why you ought to do it. So it is worth knowing how moral explanations differ, if they do, from explanations of other things. This paper uncovers a common unarticulated theory about how normative explanations must work—that they must follow what I call the Standard Model. Though the Standard Model Theory has many implications, in this paper I focu…
Slaves of the Passions
Mark Schroeder presents an original theory of reasons for action. This theory is broadly Humean, in holding that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires. 'Slaves of the Passions' will be essential reading for anyone interested in metaethics, practical reason, or explanatory moral theory
Being For
Expressivism — the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare — is no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy. Yet the semantic commitments of expressivism are still poorly understood and have not been very far developed. E…
Having reasons
Huemer’s Clarkeanism
Expression for Expressivists
Expressivism’s central idea is that normative sentences bear the same relation to non‐cognitive attitudes that ordinary descriptive sentences bear to beliefs: the expression relation. Allan Gibbard tells us that “that words express judgments will be accepted by almost everyone”– the distinctive contribution of expressivism, his claim goes, is only a view about what kind of judgments words express. But not every account of the expression relation …
How Does the Good Appear To Us
According to what Kant called formula of the schools, we desire only what we conceive to be good, and avoid only what we conceive to be bad. Historically, many philosophers have found attractive the even claim that the desire for a certain should be identified with a positive evaluation of this thing (23). It is this stronger claim that Sergio Tenenbaum is concerned to defend—or rather, to resurrect—in Appear ances of the Good. In this volume, Te…
What is the Frege-Geach Problem
In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as theFrege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the pro…
Précis of Slaves of the Passions
Ought , Agents, and Actions
According to a naive view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, 'ought' often expresses a relation between agents and actions—the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naive view that 'ought' always expresses this relation—adherents of the naive view are happy to allow that 'ought' also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, th…
Moral Sentimentalism
Book Review| July 01 2011 Moral Sentimentalism Slote, Michael, Moral Sentimentalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. ix + 184 pp. Mark Schroeder Mark Schroeder Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 452–455. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1263710 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter Linke…
Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge
Showing How to Derive Knowing How
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment 1
This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On thi…
The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons
This article offers a general argument against the orthodox ‘object-given’/‘state-given’ theory, according to which the distinction between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reason is just the distinction between ‘object-given’ and ‘state-given’ reasons, on the grounds that it fails to account for ‘right’ kind reasons against intention and belief
Does Expressivism Have Subjectivist Consequences
Explaining the Reasons We Share
This volume presents over a decade of work by Mark Schroeder, one of the leading figures in contemporary metaethics. One new and ten previously published papers weave together treatments of reasons, reduction, supervenience, instrumental rationality, and legislation, to explore the nature and limits of moral explanation
Normative Ethics and Metaethics
Metaethics concerns questions about normative inquiry, rather than questions within normative inquiry. Metaethics may also be contrasted with normative ethics as philosophy of science is contrasted with science. This chapter focuses on the classification of easy paradigms. Views which make claims about the nature of moral language, thought, epistemology, or reality, including noncognitivism, moral error theory, contextualism, relativism, and redu…
Ensuring a Future for Open-Access Publishing
When Beliefs Wrong
The Importance of Being in a Position to Know
Reasons First
The last fifty years or more of ethical theory have been preoccupied by a turn to reasons. The vocabulary of reasons has become a common currency not only in ethics, but in epistemology, action theory, and many related areas. It is now common, for example, to see central theses such as evidentialism in epistemology and egalitarianism in political philosophy formulated in terms of reasons. And some have even claimed that the vocabulary of reasons …
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