What is the Frege-Geach Problem

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4079342
AutoresMark Schroeder (0009-0006-6949-7686, University of Southern California, autor de correspondencia)
Año2008
Volumen3
Número4
Páginas703-720
Fecha de publicación2008-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00155.x
OpenAlexW2115996425
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas29
Referencias citadas41

In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as theFrege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the problem has since occupied a great deal of the attention both of defenders of broadly noncognitivist views, and of their critics. In this article I explain Geach and Searle's historical objections, and put the subsequent discussion into dialectical context, paying some attention to the developments along the way and how they have enhanced our overall understanding of the problem. The article covers a lot of territory, so we will only be able to see the highlights, along the way. For further reading, see the Works Cited

Attribution · Dialectic · Epistemology · Linguistics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology