Anita Brenner
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 534932 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Anita Brenner |
| NOMBRES | Anita |
| APELLIDO | Brenner |
| FIRMA | BRENNER A |
| AFILIACIONES | Hong Kong Baptist University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8258-5708 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 20 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 20 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1927 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Must Objects Which Undergo Fission Cease to Exist
In cases of fission a thing or person splits into two things or persons. It is often thought that in cases of fission the thing or person which fissions could not be numerically identical with one result of fission rather than the other, on the grounds that it would be objectionably arbitrary for the thing or person to end up as one result of fission rather than the other. I show that this sort of argument fails. Two fission cases which receive s…
Absence and Nothing
Over the course of the book Mumford defends what he calls “soft Parmenideanism.” Soft Parmenideanism has an ontological component and a methodological component. The ontological component: there are no negative entities (such things as absences or omissions or voids or nothings). The methodological component: we should not reject negative entities at all cost, but should rather accept negative entities if they are indispensable components of the …
Metaphysical Foundationalism and Theoretical Unification
Theoretical virtues and the methodological analogy between science and metaphysics
Conditional Probabilities and Symmetric Grounding
I present new counterexamples to the asymmetry of grounding: we have prima facie reason to think that some conditional probabilities partially ground their inverse conditional probabilities, and vice versa. These new counterexamples may require that we reject the asymmetry of grounding or, alternatively, that we reject one or more of the assumptions (regarding, e.g., the correct interpretation of probability) that enable the counterexamples. Eith…
Sense Perception and Mereological Nihilism
In the debate over the existence of composite objects, it is sometimes suggested that perceptual evidence justifies belief in composite objects. But it is almost never suggested that we are perceptually justified in believing in composite objects on the basis of the fact that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences enables us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples…
Explaining Why There is Something Rather than Nothing
It is sometimes supposed that, in principle, we cannot offer an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. I argue that this supposition is a mistake, and stems from a needlessly myopic conception of the form explanations can legitimately take. After making this more general point, I proceed to offer a speculative suggestion regarding one sort of explanation which can in principle serve as an answer to the question “why is there …
How does God know that 2 + 2 = 4
Sometimes theists wonder how God's beliefs track particular portions of reality, e.g. contingent states of affairs, or facts regarding future free actions. In this article I sketch a general model for how God's beliefs track reality. God's beliefs track reality in much the same way that propositions track reality, namely via grounding. Just as the truth values of true propositions are generally or always grounded in their truthmakers, so too God'…
Mereology and ideology
Four-dimensionalism, eternalism, and deprivationist accounts of the evil of death
Why Composition Matters
Many say that ontological disputes are defective because they are unimportant or without substance. In this paper, we defend ontological disputes from the charge, with a special focus on disputes over the existence of composite objects. Disputes over the existence of composite objects, we argue, have a number of substantive implications across a variety of topics in metaphysics, science, philosophical theology, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Sin…
Science and the special composition question
Mereological Nihilism and Personal Ontology
Mereological nihilists hold that composition never occurs, so that nothing is ever a proper part of anything else. Substance dualists generally hold that we are each identical with an immaterial soul. In this paper, I argue that every popular objection to substance dualism has a parallel objection to composition. This thesis has some interesting implications. First, many of those who reject composition, but accept substance dualism, or who reject…
Mereological nihilism and the special arrangement question
The Wind that Swept Mexico
The Wind That Swept Mexico. The History of the Mexican Revolution, 1910- 1942
Spain’s Venture in Democracy
Essay| December 01 1933 Spain’s Venture in Democracy Anita Brenner Anita Brenner The author of the following article has spent a considerable period in the Spanish Republic, observing the experiment at close range. Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Current History (1933) 39 (3): 309–314. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1933.39.3.309 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary D…
Idols Behind Altars
Idols Behind Altars
Texas and Southwestern Lore
Collection of popular folklore from Texas and the Southwest, including ballads, cowboy songs, Native American myths, superstitions and other miscellaneous folk tales. It also contains the proceedings of the Texas Folklore Society. The index begins on page 243
Science and the special composition question
Mereological nihilism and the special arrangement question
Mereology and ideology
Conditional Probabilities and Symmetric Grounding
I present new counterexamples to the asymmetry of grounding: we have prima facie reason to think that some conditional probabilities partially ground their inverse conditional probabilities, and vice versa. These new counterexamples may require that we reject the asymmetry of grounding or, alternatively, that we reject one or more of the assumptions (regarding, e.g., the correct interpretation of probability) that enable the counterexamples. Eith…
Texas and Southwestern Lore
Collection of popular folklore from Texas and the Southwest, including ballads, cowboy songs, Native American myths, superstitions and other miscellaneous folk tales. It also contains the proceedings of the Texas Folklore Society. The index begins on page 243
Idols Behind Altars
Idols Behind Altars
Spain’s Venture in Democracy
Essay| December 01 1933 Spain’s Venture in Democracy Anita Brenner Anita Brenner The author of the following article has spent a considerable period in the Spanish Republic, observing the experiment at close range. Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Current History (1933) 39 (3): 309–314. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1933.39.3.309 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary D…
The Wind That Swept Mexico. The History of the Mexican Revolution, 1910- 1942
The Wind that Swept Mexico
Mereological nihilism and the special arrangement question
Mereological Nihilism and Personal Ontology
Mereological nihilists hold that composition never occurs, so that nothing is ever a proper part of anything else. Substance dualists generally hold that we are each identical with an immaterial soul. In this paper, I argue that every popular objection to substance dualism has a parallel objection to composition. This thesis has some interesting implications. First, many of those who reject composition, but accept substance dualism, or who reject…
Science and the special composition question
Why Composition Matters
Many say that ontological disputes are defective because they are unimportant or without substance. In this paper, we defend ontological disputes from the charge, with a special focus on disputes over the existence of composite objects. Disputes over the existence of composite objects, we argue, have a number of substantive implications across a variety of topics in metaphysics, science, philosophical theology, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Sin…
How does God know that 2 + 2 = 4
Sometimes theists wonder how God's beliefs track particular portions of reality, e.g. contingent states of affairs, or facts regarding future free actions. In this article I sketch a general model for how God's beliefs track reality. God's beliefs track reality in much the same way that propositions track reality, namely via grounding. Just as the truth values of true propositions are generally or always grounded in their truthmakers, so too God'…
Mereology and ideology
Four-dimensionalism, eternalism, and deprivationist accounts of the evil of death
Explaining Why There is Something Rather than Nothing
It is sometimes supposed that, in principle, we cannot offer an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. I argue that this supposition is a mistake, and stems from a needlessly myopic conception of the form explanations can legitimately take. After making this more general point, I proceed to offer a speculative suggestion regarding one sort of explanation which can in principle serve as an answer to the question “why is there …
Metaphysical Foundationalism and Theoretical Unification
Theoretical virtues and the methodological analogy between science and metaphysics
Conditional Probabilities and Symmetric Grounding
I present new counterexamples to the asymmetry of grounding: we have prima facie reason to think that some conditional probabilities partially ground their inverse conditional probabilities, and vice versa. These new counterexamples may require that we reject the asymmetry of grounding or, alternatively, that we reject one or more of the assumptions (regarding, e.g., the correct interpretation of probability) that enable the counterexamples. Eith…
Sense Perception and Mereological Nihilism
In the debate over the existence of composite objects, it is sometimes suggested that perceptual evidence justifies belief in composite objects. But it is almost never suggested that we are perceptually justified in believing in composite objects on the basis of the fact that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences enables us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples…
Absence and Nothing
Over the course of the book Mumford defends what he calls “soft Parmenideanism.” Soft Parmenideanism has an ontological component and a methodological component. The ontological component: there are no negative entities (such things as absences or omissions or voids or nothings). The methodological component: we should not reject negative entities at all cost, but should rather accept negative entities if they are indispensable components of the …
Must Objects Which Undergo Fission Cease to Exist
In cases of fission a thing or person splits into two things or persons. It is often thought that in cases of fission the thing or person which fissions could not be numerically identical with one result of fission rather than the other, on the grounds that it would be objectionably arbitrary for the thing or person to end up as one result of fission rather than the other. I show that this sort of argument fails. Two fission cases which receive s…
Epistemology (13 obras) · Philosophy (13 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (12 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 obras) · Computer Science (7 obras) · Metaphysics (7 obras) · Philosophy of language (6 obras) · Philosophy of science (6 obras) · Mereology (5 obras) · Nihilism (5 obras)