Sense Perception and Mereological Nihilism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10691707
AutoresAnita Brenner (0000-0001-8258-5708, Hong Kong Baptist University, autor de correspondencia), Andrew Brenner (Hong Kong Baptist University , Hong Kong)
Año2023
Volumen74
Número1
Páginas68-83
Fecha de publicación2023-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqac081
OpenAlexW4311809349
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas32

In the debate over the existence of composite objects, it is sometimes suggested that perceptual evidence justifies belief in composite objects. But it is almost never suggested that we are perceptually justified in believing in composite objects on the basis of the fact that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences enables us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise. But while the thought that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences cannot enable us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise is commonly taken for granted, it requires some defence, both in light of its importance in shaping the debate and in light of its recently coming under attack by a prominent philosopher of perception. In this paper, I offer such a defence

Aesthetics · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Linguistics · Mereology · Nihilism · Object (grammar) · Perception · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment