Henry Ian Schiller
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5965844 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Henry Ian Schiller |
| NOMBRES | Henry Ian |
| APELLIDO | Schiller |
| FIRMA | SCHILLER H I |
| AFILIACIONES | The University of Sheffield , UK |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 3 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 1 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 3 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2021 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Genericity and Inductive Inference
We are often justified in acting on the basis of evidential confirmation. I argue that this is because inductive inference supports belief in non-quantificational—or generic —generalizations, rather than universally quantified generalizations. I show how this account supports, rather than undermines, a Bayesian account of inductive inference. Induction from confirming instances of a generalization to belief in the corresponding generic is part of…
What’s your Opinion? Negation and ‘Weak’ Attitude Verbs
Attitude verbs like ‘believe’ and ‘want’ exhibit neg-raising: an ascription of the form a doesn’t believe that p tends to convey that a disbelieves—i.e., believes the negation of—p. In ‘Belief is Weak’, Hawthore et al. observe that neg-raising does not occur with verbs like ‘know’ or ‘need’. According to them, an ascription of the form a believes that p is true just in case a is in a belief state that makes p more likely than not, and so—exceptin…
A Hole in the Box and a Pain in the Mouth
The following argument is widely assumed to be invalid: there is a pain in my finger; my finger is in my mouth; therefore, there is a pain in my mouth. The apparent invalidity of this argument has recently been used to motivate the conclusion that pains are not spatial entities. We argue that this is a mistake. We do so by drawing attention to the metaphysics of pains and holes and provide a framework for their location which both vindicates the …
Genericity and Inductive Inference
We are often justified in acting on the basis of evidential confirmation. I argue that this is because inductive inference supports belief in non-quantificational—or generic —generalizations, rather than universally quantified generalizations. I show how this account supports, rather than undermines, a Bayesian account of inductive inference. Induction from confirming instances of a generalization to belief in the corresponding generic is part of…
A Hole in the Box and a Pain in the Mouth
The following argument is widely assumed to be invalid: there is a pain in my finger; my finger is in my mouth; therefore, there is a pain in my mouth. The apparent invalidity of this argument has recently been used to motivate the conclusion that pains are not spatial entities. We argue that this is a mistake. We do so by drawing attention to the metaphysics of pains and holes and provide a framework for their location which both vindicates the …
Genericity and Inductive Inference
We are often justified in acting on the basis of evidential confirmation. I argue that this is because inductive inference supports belief in non-quantificational—or generic —generalizations, rather than universally quantified generalizations. I show how this account supports, rather than undermines, a Bayesian account of inductive inference. Induction from confirming instances of a generalization to belief in the corresponding generic is part of…
What’s your Opinion? Negation and ‘Weak’ Attitude Verbs
Attitude verbs like ‘believe’ and ‘want’ exhibit neg-raising: an ascription of the form a doesn’t believe that p tends to convey that a disbelieves—i.e., believes the negation of—p. In ‘Belief is Weak’, Hawthore et al. observe that neg-raising does not occur with verbs like ‘know’ or ‘need’. According to them, an ascription of the form a believes that p is true just in case a is in a belief state that makes p more likely than not, and so—exceptin…
Epistemology (3 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras) · Psychology (3 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (2 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras) · Mathematics (2 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 obras) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (1 obras)