What’s your Opinion? Negation and ‘Weak’ Attitude Verbs

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10687874
AutoresHerbert I Schiller (0000-0001-7229-9337, University of Sheffield, autor de correspondencia), Henry Ian Schiller (The University of Sheffield , UK)
Año2023
Volumen73
Número4
Páginas1141-1161
Fecha de publicación2023-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqad049
OpenAlexW4367680153
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas17

Attitude verbs like ‘believe’ and ‘want’ exhibit neg-raising: an ascription of the form a doesn’t believe that p tends to convey that a disbelieves—i.e., believes the negation of—p. In ‘Belief is Weak’, Hawthore et al. observe that neg-raising does not occur with verbs like ‘know’ or ‘need’. According to them, an ascription of the form a believes that p is true just in case a is in a belief state that makes p more likely than not, and so—excepting cases of complete indifference—a will either believe p or disbelieve p. I expand and revise this explanation: so-called ‘weak’ attitude verbs are used in ascriptions of an opinion about some subject matter S—a kind of selection from among the elements of S—and these ascriptions are themselves responsive to conversational topics that presuppose that the subject of the ascription has an opinion about S. ‘Strong’ attitude verbs denote more direct relationships between subject and world

Ascription · Epistemology · Linguistics · Negation · Raising (metalworking) · Selection (genetic algorithm) · Subject (documents) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology