Full Belief and Loose Speech

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10694578
AutoresSarah Mo (0000-0001-7938-1800, University of Michigan, autor de correspondencia), Sarah Moss (University of Michigan)
Año2019
Volumen128
Número3
Páginas255-291
Fecha de publicación2019-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-7537270
OpenAlexW2963317025
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas20
Referencias citadas61

This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed under entailment, or does the preface paradox show that rational agents can believe inconsistent propositions? Does whether you believe a proposition depend partly on your practical interests? My account of belief resolves the tension between conflicting answers to these questions that have been defended in the literature. In addition, my account complements fruitful probabilistic theories of assertion and knowledge

Assertion · Belief revision · Credence · Epistemology · Logical consequence · Probabilistic logic · Proposition · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Psychology