Elisabetta Lalumera
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5997067 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Elisabetta Lalumera |
| NOMBRES | Elisabetta |
| APELLIDO | Lalumera |
| FIRMA | LALUMERA E |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Bologna |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0345-0838 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 2 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2020 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Clarifying the muddle
Cognitive biases are widely discussed in the medical literature as systematic deviations from rational judgment and as significant contributors to diagnostic error. However, the prevailing view of cognitive biases as inherently epistemically detrimental may be challenged by recent research highlighting their potential utility. In this paper, we argue that the impact of cognitive biases in medicine depends not only on their internal cognitive stru…
Psilocybin, moralization and psychotherapy
The resurgence of interest in psychedelic substances for psychiatric treatment has sparked both excitement and scepticism within the scientific community. This paper addresses the moralisation and hype surrounding psychedelic therapies. Through a systematic review of the literature and a detailed case study, we illustrate that the therapeutic effect of psychedelics is not solely pharmacological but is instead facilitated by their ability to enhan…
An overview on trust and trustworthiness
An overview on trust and trustworthiness: individual and institutional dimensionsPhilosophical Psychology is dedicating this issue on trust and trustworthiness to Katherine Hawley (1971Hawley ( -2021) ) for two reasons.First, she was an expert in the area.Hawley was one of the most relevant voices in the philosophical debate on trust, distrust, trustworthiness, and untrustworthiness.Second, she was a role model for professional philosophers who e…
‘Are mental disorders brain disorders?’ is a question of conceptual choice
This contribution focuses on what type of question “Are mental disorders brain disorders?” is and what task Anneli Jefferson performs in her book with the same title . I distinguish between conceptual engineering and conceptual choice, the former involving the individuation of an adequate concept for a specific goal, and the latter involving the normative problem of whether we should employ the concept at hand. I contend that Anneli Jefferson’s b…
Wherein is the concept of disease normative? From weak normativity to value-conscious naturalism
In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity…
The DSM-5 introduction of the Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder as a new mental disorder
The latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) included the Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder (SPCD) as a new mental disorder characterized by deficits in pragmatic abilities. Although the introduction of SPCD in the psychiatry nosography depended on a variety of reasons—including bridging a nosological gap in the macro-category of Communication Disorders—in the last few years researchers have iden…
Covid-19 as the underlying cause of death
Reliability of molecular imaging diagnostics
The concept of disease in the time of Covid-19
Philosophers of medicine have formulated different accounts of the concept of disease. Which concept of disease one assumes has implications for what conditions count as diseases and, by extension, who may be regarded as having a disease (disease judgements) and for who may be accorded the social privileges and personal responsibilities associated with being sick (sickness judgements). In this article, we consider an ideal diagnostic test for cor…
The concept of disease in the time of Covid-19
Philosophers of medicine have formulated different accounts of the concept of disease. Which concept of disease one assumes has implications for what conditions count as diseases and, by extension, who may be regarded as having a disease (disease judgements) and for who may be accorded the social privileges and personal responsibilities associated with being sick (sickness judgements). In this article, we consider an ideal diagnostic test for cor…
The DSM-5 introduction of the Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder as a new mental disorder
The latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) included the Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder (SPCD) as a new mental disorder characterized by deficits in pragmatic abilities. Although the introduction of SPCD in the psychiatry nosography depended on a variety of reasons—including bridging a nosological gap in the macro-category of Communication Disorders—in the last few years researchers have iden…
Covid-19 as the underlying cause of death
Reliability of molecular imaging diagnostics
Wherein is the concept of disease normative? From weak normativity to value-conscious naturalism
In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity…
An overview on trust and trustworthiness
An overview on trust and trustworthiness: individual and institutional dimensionsPhilosophical Psychology is dedicating this issue on trust and trustworthiness to Katherine Hawley (1971Hawley ( -2021) ) for two reasons.First, she was an expert in the area.Hawley was one of the most relevant voices in the philosophical debate on trust, distrust, trustworthiness, and untrustworthiness.Second, she was a role model for professional philosophers who e…
‘Are mental disorders brain disorders?’ is a question of conceptual choice
This contribution focuses on what type of question “Are mental disorders brain disorders?” is and what task Anneli Jefferson performs in her book with the same title . I distinguish between conceptual engineering and conceptual choice, the former involving the individuation of an adequate concept for a specific goal, and the latter involving the normative problem of whether we should employ the concept at hand. I contend that Anneli Jefferson’s b…
Psilocybin, moralization and psychotherapy
The resurgence of interest in psychedelic substances for psychiatric treatment has sparked both excitement and scepticism within the scientific community. This paper addresses the moralisation and hype surrounding psychedelic therapies. Through a systematic review of the literature and a detailed case study, we illustrate that the therapeutic effect of psychedelics is not solely pharmacological but is instead facilitated by their ability to enhan…
Clarifying the muddle
Cognitive biases are widely discussed in the medical literature as systematic deviations from rational judgment and as significant contributors to diagnostic error. However, the prevailing view of cognitive biases as inherently epistemically detrimental may be challenged by recent research highlighting their potential utility. In this paper, we argue that the impact of cognitive biases in medicine depends not only on their internal cognitive stru…
Psychology (7 obras) · Epistemology (5 obras) · Medicine (4 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Cognitive science (3 obras) · Mental Health and Psychiatry (3 obras) · Pathology (3 obras) · Philosophy of medicine (3 obras) · Philosophy of science (3 obras) · Psychiatry (3 obras)