The concept of disease in the time of Covid-19

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21702337
AutoresMaria Cristina Amoretti (0000-0003-2892-577X, Rina Services (Italy), autor de correspondencia), Elisabetta Lalumera (0000-0002-0345-0838, University of Bologna)
Año2020
Volumen41
Número5-6
Páginas203-221
Fecha de publicación2020-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaMetamedicine (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0166-2031 • E-ISSN: 1573-1200
EditorialSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11017-021-09540-5
PMID33594601
OpenAlexW3130891718
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas41

Philosophers of medicine have formulated different accounts of the concept of disease. Which concept of disease one assumes has implications for what conditions count as diseases and, by extension, who may be regarded as having a disease (disease judgements) and for who may be accorded the social privileges and personal responsibilities associated with being sick (sickness judgements). In this article, we consider an ideal diagnostic test for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection with respect to four groups of people—positive and asymptomatic; positive and symptomatic; negative; and untested—and show how different concepts of disease impact on the disease and sickness judgements for these groups. The suggestion is that sickness judgements and social measures akin to those experienced during the current COVID-19 outbreak presuppose a concept of disease containing social (risk of) harm as a component. We indicate the problems that arise when adopting this kind of disease concept beyond a state of emergency

Alternative medicine · Disease · Harm · Pathology · Philosophy of medicine · Medicine · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments · Social Psychology