Lewis A Kornhauser
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 894394 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Lewis A Kornhauser |
| NOMBRES | Lewis A |
| APELLIDO | Kornhauser |
| FIRMA | KORNHAUSER L A |
| AFILIACIONES | New York University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7601-1492 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 16 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 25 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 16 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1979 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Learning the Law Together
We examine a model of case-by-case learning by judges and litigants. A judge hearing cases learns partial information about the best legal rule, gradually partitioning the case space. The evolution of doctrine is path dependent but displays strong limit properties, converging to the best legal rule. Litigant behavior strongly affects the speed of convergence. If existing case law induces litigants to modify their behavior, convergence is faster b…
Does the Law Change Preferences
“I would prefer not” H ERMAN M ELVILLE , B ARTLEBY THE S CRIVENER : A S TORY OF W ALL S TREET (1853), reprinted in T HE P IAZZA T ALES 32, 48 (London, Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1856). Scholars have recently challenged the claim in classical deterrence theory that law influences behavior only through the expected sanction imposed. Some go further and argue that law may also “shape preferences,” changing people’s wants and values. In this Article, we …
Bargaining and Strategic Voting on Appellate Courts
Many appellate courts and regulatory commissions simultaneously produce case dispositions and rules rationalizing the dispositions. We explore the properties of the American practice for doing this. We show that the median judge is pivotal over case dispositions, although she and others may not vote sincerely. Strategic dispositional voting is more likely when the case location is extreme, resulting in majority coalitions that give the appearance…
Testing a fine is a price in the lab
Aggregate rationality in adjudication and legislation
Analyses of complex entities such as bureaucracies, courts, legislatures, and firms typically personify them. A strong conception of personification requires that these entities have rational interests, rational (factual) beliefs, and rational normative judgments. On one account of personification, such personified rationality should be aggregate rationality: the interests, beliefs, and normative judgments should depend only on the interests, bel…
Decision Rules in a Judicial Hierarchy
This paper extends the analysis of the structure of judicial hierarchies to environments in which litigants may have asymmetric information about the merits of the case. We identify equilibria in which the error rate is zero. In each equilibrium, at least one of the inferior courts does not decide cases on the basis of its prior beliefs. Rather, in the absence of an informative signal, an inferior court decides against the informed litigant in or…
The Many as One
On Justifying Cost‐Benefit Analysis
This essay considers two problems in the justification of cost‐benefit analysis. First, it argues that because cost‐benefit analysis values policies, variation in imputed “values of life” are not, in theory, cause for concern. Second, it argues that the current framework of justification, which focuses on the moral justification of the formal theory of cost‐benefit analysis, is inadequate because it ignores (1) the institutional context in which …
Social Choice in a Representative Democracy
Citizens of a representative democracy are twice removed from legislation. First, they do not deliberate and vote directly on legislation. Rather they elect assemblies that enact such legislation in their stead. Second, and less commonly remarked, citizens do not vote directly for assemblies. Rather they vote for individual candidates, with the candidates receiving the most votes elected. We examine the efficiency properties of these voting syste…
Reputation and Patience in the 'War of Attrition
This article presents an approach to selecting among the many subgame-perfect equilibria that exist in a standard concession game with complete information. The authors extend the description of a game to include a specific "irrational" (mixed) strategy for each player. Depending on the irrational strategies chosen, the authors demonstrate that this approach may select a unique equilibrium in which the weaker player concedes immediately. A player…
Just lotteries
Unpacking the Court
In this Article, we offer some observations about the attributes of multijudge courts and their relationship to basic themes in the theory of adjudication. While this first venture falls short of a comprehensive theory, it involves considerably more than minor tinkering with conventional understandings of adjudication. Our effort to incorporate the fact of group decisionmaking into analysis of the judging process has led us to generate a fundamen…
L'analyse économique du droi
The Great Image of Authority
Control of conflicts of interest in class-action suits
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law
This article suggests an alternative way of thinking about the role of law at the time of divorce. It is concerned primarily with the impact of the legal system on negotiations and bargaining that occur outside the courtroom. We see the primary function of contemporary divorce law not as imposing order from above, but rather as providing a framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine their postdissolution rights and responsib…
Social Choice in a Representative Democracy
Citizens of a representative democracy are twice removed from legislation. First, they do not deliberate and vote directly on legislation. Rather they elect assemblies that enact such legislation in their stead. Second, and less commonly remarked, citizens do not vote directly for assemblies. Rather they vote for individual candidates, with the candidates receiving the most votes elected. We examine the efficiency properties of these voting syste…
The Many as One
Bargaining and Strategic Voting on Appellate Courts
Many appellate courts and regulatory commissions simultaneously produce case dispositions and rules rationalizing the dispositions. We explore the properties of the American practice for doing this. We show that the median judge is pivotal over case dispositions, although she and others may not vote sincerely. Strategic dispositional voting is more likely when the case location is extreme, resulting in majority coalitions that give the appearance…
Aggregate rationality in adjudication and legislation
Analyses of complex entities such as bureaucracies, courts, legislatures, and firms typically personify them. A strong conception of personification requires that these entities have rational interests, rational (factual) beliefs, and rational normative judgments. On one account of personification, such personified rationality should be aggregate rationality: the interests, beliefs, and normative judgments should depend only on the interests, bel…
Just lotteries
Control of conflicts of interest in class-action suits
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law
This article suggests an alternative way of thinking about the role of law at the time of divorce. It is concerned primarily with the impact of the legal system on negotiations and bargaining that occur outside the courtroom. We see the primary function of contemporary divorce law not as imposing order from above, but rather as providing a framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine their postdissolution rights and responsib…
Control of conflicts of interest in class-action suits
The Great Image of Authority
L'analyse économique du droi
Unpacking the Court
In this Article, we offer some observations about the attributes of multijudge courts and their relationship to basic themes in the theory of adjudication. While this first venture falls short of a comprehensive theory, it involves considerably more than minor tinkering with conventional understandings of adjudication. Our effort to incorporate the fact of group decisionmaking into analysis of the judging process has led us to generate a fundamen…
Just lotteries
Reputation and Patience in the 'War of Attrition
This article presents an approach to selecting among the many subgame-perfect equilibria that exist in a standard concession game with complete information. The authors extend the description of a game to include a specific "irrational" (mixed) strategy for each player. Depending on the irrational strategies chosen, the authors demonstrate that this approach may select a unique equilibrium in which the weaker player concedes immediately. A player…
Social Choice in a Representative Democracy
Citizens of a representative democracy are twice removed from legislation. First, they do not deliberate and vote directly on legislation. Rather they elect assemblies that enact such legislation in their stead. Second, and less commonly remarked, citizens do not vote directly for assemblies. Rather they vote for individual candidates, with the candidates receiving the most votes elected. We examine the efficiency properties of these voting syste…
On Justifying Cost‐Benefit Analysis
This essay considers two problems in the justification of cost‐benefit analysis. First, it argues that because cost‐benefit analysis values policies, variation in imputed “values of life” are not, in theory, cause for concern. Second, it argues that the current framework of justification, which focuses on the moral justification of the formal theory of cost‐benefit analysis, is inadequate because it ignores (1) the institutional context in which …
The Many as One
Decision Rules in a Judicial Hierarchy
This paper extends the analysis of the structure of judicial hierarchies to environments in which litigants may have asymmetric information about the merits of the case. We identify equilibria in which the error rate is zero. In each equilibrium, at least one of the inferior courts does not decide cases on the basis of its prior beliefs. Rather, in the absence of an informative signal, an inferior court decides against the informed litigant in or…
Aggregate rationality in adjudication and legislation
Analyses of complex entities such as bureaucracies, courts, legislatures, and firms typically personify them. A strong conception of personification requires that these entities have rational interests, rational (factual) beliefs, and rational normative judgments. On one account of personification, such personified rationality should be aggregate rationality: the interests, beliefs, and normative judgments should depend only on the interests, bel…
Testing a fine is a price in the lab
Does the Law Change Preferences
“I would prefer not” H ERMAN M ELVILLE , B ARTLEBY THE S CRIVENER : A S TORY OF W ALL S TREET (1853), reprinted in T HE P IAZZA T ALES 32, 48 (London, Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1856). Scholars have recently challenged the claim in classical deterrence theory that law influences behavior only through the expected sanction imposed. Some go further and argue that law may also “shape preferences,” changing people’s wants and values. In this Article, we …
Bargaining and Strategic Voting on Appellate Courts
Many appellate courts and regulatory commissions simultaneously produce case dispositions and rules rationalizing the dispositions. We explore the properties of the American practice for doing this. We show that the median judge is pivotal over case dispositions, although she and others may not vote sincerely. Strategic dispositional voting is more likely when the case location is extreme, resulting in majority coalitions that give the appearance…
Learning the Law Together
We examine a model of case-by-case learning by judges and litigants. A judge hearing cases learns partial information about the best legal rule, gradually partitioning the case space. The evolution of doctrine is path dependent but displays strong limit properties, converging to the best legal rule. Litigant behavior strongly affects the speed of convergence. If existing case law induces litigants to modify their behavior, convergence is faster b…
Political science (13 obras) · Law (11 obras) · Economics (10 obras) · Law and economics (9 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (5 obras) · Psychology (5 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Legal and Constitutional Studies (4 obras) · Business (3 obras)