Social Choice in a Representative Democracy

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3337805
AutoresJean-Pierre Benoît, Jean-Pierre Benoı̂t (0000-0002-6178-7199, New York University), Lewis A Kornhauser (0000-0001-7601-1492, New York University)
Año1994
Volumen88
Número1
Páginas185-192
Fecha de publicación1994-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2944890
OpenAlexW1969778665
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas8
Referencias citadas7

Citizens of a representative democracy are twice removed from legislation. First, they do not deliberate and vote directly on legislation. Rather they elect assemblies that enact such legislation in their stead. Second, and less commonly remarked, citizens do not vote directly for assemblies. Rather they vote for individual candidates, with the candidates receiving the most votes elected. We examine the efficiency properties of these voting systems

Democracy · Direct democracy · Economics · Law and economics · Legislation · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Representative democracy · Social choice theory · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Public Administration