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Nathaniel Baron‐Schmitt

Datos Biográficos

ID9516786
NOMBRENathaniel Baron‐Schmitt
NOMBRESNathaniel
APELLIDOBaron‐Schmitt
FIRMASCHMITT N B
AFILIACIONESIIT@MIT
ORCID0000-0001-9511-8367
VERIFICADOSí
TOTAL DE OBRAS5
TOTAL DE CITAS3
TOTAL COMO AUTOR5
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN2021
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2025
ÍNDICE H1
  • Introduction

    Open Access•Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt, Nathaniel Baron‐Schmitt et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy•2025

    Powers pervade the natural world, from a flame’s power to burn to a plant’s power to grow. Certain powers seem to be special in being two-way . A two-way power is a single, unified power to do something or its opposite. Whereas a plant’s circumstances determine that it will grow, I seem to have the power to raise my arm or refrain from doing so: it is up to me whether or not to raise it. If this is right, then this power of mine is a two-way powe…

  • Thing causation

    Open Access•Nathaniel Baron‐Schmitt•ARTICLE•Noûs•2024

    According to orthodoxy, the most fundamental kind of causation involves one event causing another event. I argue against this event‐causal view. Instead, the most fundamental kind of causation is thing causation, which involves a thing causing a thing to do something. Event causation is reducible to thing causation, but thing causation is not reducible to event causation, because event causation cannot accommodate cases of fine‐grained causation.…

  • Wronging Oneself

    Daniel Domínguez Muñoz, Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•2024

    When, if ever, do we wrong ourselves? The Self-Other Symmetric answer is: when we do to ourselves what would wrong a consenting other. The standard objection, which has gone unchallenged for decades, is that Symmetry seems to imply that we wrong ourselves in too many cases—where rights are unwaivable, or “self-consent” is lacking. I argue that Symmetry not only survives these would-be counterexamples; it explains and unifies them. The key to Symm…

  • Who cares about winning

    Open Access•Nathaniel Baron‐Schmitt•ARTICLE•European Journal of Philosophy•2023

    Why do we so often care about the outcomes of games when nothing is at stake? There is a paradox here, much like the paradox of fiction, which concerns why we care about the fates and threats of merely fictional beings. I argue that the paradox threatens to overturn a great deal of what philosophers have thought about caring, severing its connection to value and undermining its moral weight. I defend a solution to the paradox that draws on Kendal…

  • Contingent grounding

    Open Access•Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt, Nathaniel Baron‐Schmitt•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Citada por: 3•Referencias: 34

  • Contingent grounding

    Open Access•Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt, Nathaniel Baron‐Schmitt•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Citada por: 3•Referencias: 34

  • Contingent grounding

    Open Access•Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt, Nathaniel Baron‐Schmitt•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Citada por: 3•Referencias: 34

  • Who cares about winning

    Open Access•Nathaniel Baron‐Schmitt•ARTICLE•European Journal of Philosophy•2023

    Why do we so often care about the outcomes of games when nothing is at stake? There is a paradox here, much like the paradox of fiction, which concerns why we care about the fates and threats of merely fictional beings. I argue that the paradox threatens to overturn a great deal of what philosophers have thought about caring, severing its connection to value and undermining its moral weight. I defend a solution to the paradox that draws on Kendal…

  • Thing causation

    Open Access•Nathaniel Baron‐Schmitt•ARTICLE•Noûs•2024

    According to orthodoxy, the most fundamental kind of causation involves one event causing another event. I argue against this event‐causal view. Instead, the most fundamental kind of causation is thing causation, which involves a thing causing a thing to do something. Event causation is reducible to thing causation, but thing causation is not reducible to event causation, because event causation cannot accommodate cases of fine‐grained causation.…

  • Wronging Oneself

    Daniel Domínguez Muñoz, Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•2024

    When, if ever, do we wrong ourselves? The Self-Other Symmetric answer is: when we do to ourselves what would wrong a consenting other. The standard objection, which has gone unchallenged for decades, is that Symmetry seems to imply that we wrong ourselves in too many cases—where rights are unwaivable, or “self-consent” is lacking. I argue that Symmetry not only survives these would-be counterexamples; it explains and unifies them. The key to Symm…

  • Introduction

    Open Access•Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt, Nathaniel Baron‐Schmitt et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy•2025

    Powers pervade the natural world, from a flame’s power to burn to a plant’s power to grow. Certain powers seem to be special in being two-way . A two-way power is a single, unified power to do something or its opposite. Whereas a plant’s circumstances determine that it will grow, I seem to have the power to raise my arm or refrain from doing so: it is up to me whether or not to raise it. If this is right, then this power of mine is a two-way powe…

Epistemology (3 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras) · Mathematical economics (2 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 obras) · Psychology (2 obras) · Causation (1 obras) · Child and Animal Learning Development (1 obras) · Computer Science (1 obras) · Economics (1 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (1 obras)

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