Thing causation

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21364062
AutoresNathaniel Baron‐Schmitt (0000-0001-9511-8367, Freie Universität Berlin Berlin Germany, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen58
Número4
Páginas1050-1072
Fecha de publicación2024-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaNoûs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12494
OpenAlexW4393022243
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas72

According to orthodoxy, the most fundamental kind of causation involves one event causing another event. I argue against this event‐causal view. Instead, the most fundamental kind of causation is thing causation, which involves a thing causing a thing to do something. Event causation is reducible to thing causation, but thing causation is not reducible to event causation, because event causation cannot accommodate cases of fine‐grained causation. I defend my view from objections, including C. D. Broad's influential “timing” argument, and I conclude with implications for agent‐causal theories of free will

Causation · Epistemology · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology