Alfred R Mele
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 956210 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Alfred R Mele |
| NOMBRES | Alfred R |
| APELLIDO | Mele |
| FIRMA | MELE A R |
| AFILIACIONES | Florida State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4988-1027 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 63 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 52 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 60 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 3 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1981 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
On a Disappearing Agent Argument
Libertarianism, decision-making, and a point of no return
Causalism
On being able to intend
Soft Libertarianism and Quantum Randomizers
Weakness of Will
This chapter sketches a view about how paradigmatic weak-willed actions are produced that it contrasts with competing views, including some ancient views. Along the way, it explores the entanglement of weakness of will with such issues as how our intentional actions are to be explained, the power of practical reasoning and practical evaluative judgments, the nature of intentions, the motivational strength of desires, decision-making, self-control…
Free Will
Deciding
To decide to A, as I conceive of it, is to perform a momentary mental action of forming an intention to A. I argue that ordinary instances of practical deciding, so conceived, falsify the following two theses: (1) Necessarily, S intentionally A-s only if S intends to A; (2) In every actual case of intentionally A-ing, the agent intends to A. But I also argue that actions of some other types falsify these theses. Practical deciding is not unique i…
Folk psychology and proximal intentions
There is a longstanding debate in philosophy concerning the relationship between intention and intentional action. According to the Single Phenomenon View, while one need not intend to A in order to A intentionally, one nevertheless needs to have an A-relevant intention. This view has recently come under criticism by those who think that one can A intentionally without any relevant intention at all. On this view, neither distal nor proximal inten…
Intentional action without knowledge
Surrounding Self-Control
This book is one of the fruits of the Philosophy and Science of Self-Control project, a three-year project designed to explore the topic of self-control from a variety of angles: neuroscience; social, cognitive, and developmental psychology; decision theory; and philosophy. The book is divided into four main parts: “What is self-control and how does it work?”; “Temptation and goal pursuit”; “Self-control, morality, and law”; and “Extending self-c…
Direct Versus Indirect
This article has two primary aims. The first is to identify relationships among direct control, direct moral responsibility for an action, and directly free action. The second is to provide a partial map depicting the bearing of some familiar competing views about moral responsibility and free action – traditional compatibilism, semicompatibilism, and event‐causal libertarianism – on differences in conceptions of direct and indirect species of mo…
Manipulated Agents
Ordinary people think free will is a lack of constraint, not the presence of a soul
A Libertarian View of Akratic Action
Free Will and Science
This article examines the work of two figures in fields whose work has had a significant impact on recent free-will debates, neuroscientist Benjamin Libet and psychologist Daniel Wegner. Libet's groundbreaking experimental studies on human subjects relating brain activities to the appearance or production of conscious experience, volition, and willed action have been much discussed by philosophers and scientists over the past few decades and have…
Libertarianism and Human Agency
Motivated Irrationality
Approaching self-deception
Effective Intentions
Do your intentions have no effect on your actions? Is free will an illusion? Some scientists say yes. Alfred Mele shows that these claims are not justified by the data and that there is weighty evidence of the existence of effective conscious intentions or the power of conscious will.
Effective intentions
Tthere is weighty evidence of the existence of effective conscious intentions or the power of conscious will. Mele examines the accuracy of subjects' reports about when they first became aware of decisions or intentions in laboratory settings and develops some implications of warranted skepticism about the accuracy of these reports. In addition, he explores such questions as whether we must be conscious of all of our intentions and why scientists…
Rationality and the Good
For more than thirty years, Robert Audi has been one of the most creative and influential philosophical voices on a broad range of topics in the fields of ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, and philosophy of religion. This volume features thirteen chapters by renowned scholars plus new writings by Audi. Each chapter presents both a position of its author and a critical treatment of related ideas of Audi's, and he responds to eac…
Free Will and Luck
This book aims to help readers think more clearly about free will. It identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to the justified belief in the existence of free will, and meets them head on. It also clarifies the central concepts in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will: …
The Folk Concept of Intentional Action
THE FOLK CONCEPT OF INTENTIONAL ACTION: A COMMENTARY Alfred R. Mele, Florida State University In this commentary, I discuss the three main articles in this volume that present survey data relevant to a search for something that might merit the label “the folk concept of intentional action” – the articles by Joshua Knobe and Arudra Burra, Bertram Malle, and Thomas Nadelhoffer. My guiding question is this: What shape might we find in an analysis of…
Lenman on externalism and amoralism
Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases
The thought-experiment Suppose someone-Black, let us say-wants Jones to perform a certain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones is going to decide to do something other than what he wants him t…
The Intention/Volition Debate
1992). The Intention/Volition Debate. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 323-337
Aristotle's Wish
Aristotle's Wish ALFRED R. MELE IN Nicomachean Ethics (NE) VI. 2 Aristotle asserts that "the origin of action-its efficient, not its final cause--is choice (prohairesis), and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end" (1139a31-32). It is evidently a special kind of action about which Aristotle is speaking here, for although all chosen actions are voluntary, not all voluntary actions are chosen (NE 1 1 1 lb7-1o, 1 112aa4-a 5, Eu…
Rationality and the Good
For more than thirty years, Robert Audi has been one of the most creative and influential philosophical voices on a broad range of topics in the fields of ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, and philosophy of religion. This volume features thirteen chapters by renowned scholars plus new writings by Audi. Each chapter presents both a position of its author and a critical treatment of related ideas of Audi's, and he responds to eac…
Aristotle's Theory of Moral Insight
In this stimulating and thought-provoking book, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for free will and argues that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. Finding no good reason for accepting determinism, but believing moral responsibility to be indubitable, he concludes that determinism should be rejected. £18 Deontology Together with a Table of…
Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions
Regarding a recent book of mine, John Fischer wrote (1999, p. 139): am faced with the difficult task of doing a critical notice of a book, with almost all of which I agree! I face a similar task here. Fischer and Ravizza's Responsibility and Control is an excellent book. It develops, in admirable detail, an attractive compatibilist position on moral responsibility in a trio of related spheres-actions, consequences, and omissions-and it presents p…
Motivation
The term 'motivation' has considerable currency both in moral philosophy and in the philosophy of mind. It appears in debates between internalists and externalists about moral judgments and moral reasons, in the related controversy over moral realism, and in explanatory schemes for purposive behavior offered in the philosophy of mind. But what is motivation? My aim in this paper is to elucidate a notion of motivation associated with a popular per…
Lenman on externalism and amoralism
The Illusion of Conscious Will and the Causation of Intentional Actions
Effective Reasons and Intrinsically Motivated Actions
Alvin Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 76. Donald Davidson is prepared to say at least that it is (logically) impossible to perform an intentional action without some appropriate reason. See his Hempel on Explaining Action, p. z64 in Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, i980). 2Actions, Reasons, and Causes, Journal of Philosophy 6o (i 963). Reprinted in Essays on Actions and…
Is Akratic Action Unfree
On New Year's Eve Fred resolved not to eat an after-dinner snack for the entire month of January. It is now January I5 and he still has not succumbed to temptation. Tonight, however, Fred finally gives in. While watching the NBC Sunday night movie, he experiences a desire to eat the piece of chocolate pie which he has set aside for tomorrow's dessert. He is not at all surprised by the desire's nagging presence, for he has had similar desires almo…
The Folk Concept of Intentional Action
THE FOLK CONCEPT OF INTENTIONAL ACTION: A COMMENTARY Alfred R. Mele, Florida State University In this commentary, I discuss the three main articles in this volume that present survey data relevant to a search for something that might merit the label “the folk concept of intentional action” – the articles by Joshua Knobe and Arudra Burra, Bertram Malle, and Thomas Nadelhoffer. My guiding question is this: What shape might we find in an analysis of…
On Action
Incontinent Believing
Self-deception, action, and will
The Practical Syllogism and Deliberation in Aristotle’s Causal Theory of Action
La theorie aristotelicienne de l'action fait du syllogisme pratique la forme de la deliberation. L'A. etudie ces deux notions separement puis dans leur relation systematique et il refute l'interpretation du syllogisme pratique proposee par J. Cooper dans Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, Cambridge (MA), 1975.
Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics
Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics ALFRED R. MELE COM~rNTATORS ON THr Nicomachean Ethics (NE) have long been laboring under the influence of a serious misunderstanding of one of the key terms in Aristotle's moral philosophy and theory of action. This term is prohairesis (choice), the importance of which is indicated by Aristotle's assertions that choice is the proximate efficient cause of action (NE 6. 1139a31--32) and that in which "the…
Self-deception, action, and will
Self-Deception
Journal Article Self-Deception Get access Alfred R. Mele Alfred R. Mele Davidson College. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, Issue 133, October 1983, Pages 365–377, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219163 Published: 01 October 1983
Aristotle on the Roles of Reason in Motivation and Justification
L'ethique d'Aristote: Quel role la phronesis joue-t-elle dans la generation des desirs des agents verteux et dans la justification de leurs fins?.
Aristotle on the Proximate Efficient Cause of Action
In this paper I shall attempt to locate and articulate Aristotle's answer to a foundational question in the theory of action - viz., ‘what is the proximate (efficient) cause of action?’ This task is certainly of historical importance, since one cannot hope to understand Aristotle's interesting and influential theory of action without understanding his views on the proximate efficient cause of action. But the present project is not, I should think…
Aristotle's Wish
Aristotle's Wish ALFRED R. MELE IN Nicomachean Ethics (NE) VI. 2 Aristotle asserts that "the origin of action-its efficient, not its final cause--is choice (prohairesis), and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end" (1139a31-32). It is evidently a special kind of action about which Aristotle is speaking here, for although all chosen actions are voluntary, not all voluntary actions are chosen (NE 1 1 1 lb7-1o, 1 112aa4-a 5, Eu…
Aristotle's Theory of Moral Insight
In this stimulating and thought-provoking book, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for free will and argues that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. Finding no good reason for accepting determinism, but believing moral responsibility to be indubitable, he concludes that determinism should be rejected. £18 Deontology Together with a Table of…
Aristotle's Philosophy of Action.
Dr Charles examines some main themes in Aristotle's philosophy of action. He is interested both in the exegesis of Aristotle and in the relation between his views and those of certain fashionable present-day philosophers. He argues that the set of positions which he attributes to Aristotle constitutes an alternative which deserves serious consideration. First he discusses Aristotle's views on the identity conditions for processes, and then his ac…
Is Akratic Action Unfree
On New Year's Eve Fred resolved not to eat an after-dinner snack for the entire month of January. It is now January I5 and he still has not succumbed to temptation. Tonight, however, Fred finally gives in. While watching the NBC Sunday night movie, he experiences a desire to eat the piece of chocolate pie which he has set aside for tomorrow's dessert. He is not at all surprised by the desire's nagging presence, for he has had similar desires almo…
Incontinent Believing
Effective Reasons and Intrinsically Motivated Actions
Alvin Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 76. Donald Davidson is prepared to say at least that it is (logically) impossible to perform an intentional action without some appropriate reason. See his Hempel on Explaining Action, p. z64 in Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, i980). 2Actions, Reasons, and Causes, Journal of Philosophy 6o (i 963). Reprinted in Essays on Actions and…
Motivational internalism
Akratic Feelings
Irrationality
Akratic Action and the Practical Role of Better Judgment
Irrationality
Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behaviour is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality - most incontinent action and self-deception - pose such difficult problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Alfred Mele shows that incontinent action and self deception are indeed possible. Philosophers; psychologists
Springs Of Action
In this book, Alfred Mele tackles some central problems in the philosophy of action. His purpose is to construct an explanatory model for intentional behaviour, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reasons, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. Part One comprises a comprehensive examination of the standard treatments of the relations between desires, beliefs, and actions. In Part Two, M…
Intentions and Interpretations
Even if everything is up for grabs in philosophy, some things are very difficult to doubt. It is hard to believe, for example, that no one ever acts intentionally. Even the most powerful arguments for the unreality of intentional action could do no more, we believe, than place one in roughly the position in which pre-Aristotelian Greeks found themselves when presented with one of Zeno's arguments that nothing can move from any given point A to an…
On Action
The Intention/Volition Debate
1992). The Intention/Volition Debate. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 323-337
Mental Causation
Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behaviour have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical doma…
Springs of Action
Springs of Action
Motivation
The term 'motivation' has considerable currency both in moral philosophy and in the philosophy of mind. It appears in debates between internalists and externalists about moral judgments and moral reasons, in the related controversy over moral realism, and in explanatory schemes for purposive behavior offered in the philosophy of mind. But what is motivation? My aim in this paper is to elucidate a notion of motivation associated with a popular per…
Epistemology (48 obras) · Philosophy (47 obras) · Psychology (35 obras) · Free Will and Agency (22 obras) · Philosophy (16 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (15 obras) · Physics (14 obras) · Action (physics) (12 obras) · Social Psychology (12 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (11 obras)