Folk psychology and proximal intentions

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21591900
AutoresAlfred R Mele (0000-0002-4988-1027, Florida State University, autor de correspondencia), Alfred Mele (Florida State University), Thomas Nadelhoffer (0000-0001-8038-7177, College of Charleston), Maria Khoudary (Duke University)
Año2021
Volumen34
Número6
Páginas761-783
Fecha de publicación2021-08-18
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2021.1915471
OpenAlexW3159555367
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas26

There is a longstanding debate in philosophy concerning the relationship between intention and intentional action. According to the Single Phenomenon View, while one need not intend to A in order to A intentionally, one nevertheless needs to have an A-relevant intention. This view has recently come under criticism by those who think that one can A intentionally without any relevant intention at all. On this view, neither distal nor proximal intentions are necessary for intentional action. In this paper we present the results of two studies that explore folk ascriptions of proximal intentions and intentional actions in garden-variety, non-moral cases. Our findings suggest a very tight relationship between the two. We argue that the results from these two studies cohere with the Single Phenomenon View and give theorists who reject this view on conceptual grounds reason to worry

Cognitive science · Criticism · Epistemology · Folk psychology · Phenomenon · Worry · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology