Juha Saatsi
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 959530 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Juha Saatsi |
| NOMBRES | Juha |
| APELLIDO | Saatsi |
| FIRMA | SAATSI J |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Leeds |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8440-8761 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 23 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 170 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 23 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2005 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2021 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
Scientific realism and underdetermination in quantum theory
This paper surveys the status of scientific realism in relation to quantum physics, focusing on the problem of underdetermination
Historical inductions, Old and New
What is theoretical progress of science
The epistemic conception of scientific progress equates progress with accumulation of scientific knowledge. I argue that the epistemic conception fails to fully capture scientific progress: theoretical progress, in particular, can transcend scientific knowledge in important ways. Sometimes theoretical progress can be a matter of new theories ‘latching better onto unobservable reality’ in a way that need not be a matter of new knowledge. Recognisi…
Explanatory Abstractions
A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical explanations explain in a way that is radically different from the way causal explanations explain. While causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, some abstract explanations allegedly explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the micro-details or causal laws, for example. We opp…
Taking Reductionism to the Limit
This article analyzes the antireductionist argument from renormalization group explanations of universality and shows how it can be rebutted if one assumes that the explanation in question is captured by the counterfactual dependence account of explanation
On Explanations from Geometry of Motion
This article examines explanations that turn on non-local geometrical facts about the space of possible configurations a system can occupy. I argue that it makes sense to contrast such explanations from geometry of motion with causal explanations. I also explore how my analysis of these explanations cuts across the distinction between kinematics and dynamics. 1. Introduction2. Toy Example3. Geometry of Motion in Classical Mechanics4. Beyond Class…
Replacing recipe realism
Structuralism with and without causation
Dynamical Systems Theory and Explanatory Indispensability
I examine explanations’ realist commitments in relation to dynamical systems theory. First I rebut an ‘explanatory indispensability argument’ for mathematical realism from the explanatory power of phase spaces. Then I critically consider a possible way of strengthening the indispensability argument by reference to attractors in dynamical systems theory. The take-home message is that understanding of the modal character of explanations (in dynamic…
Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism
Recalling a Habermas-inspired experimental realism
Inconsistency and scientific realism
Reassessing Woodward’s Account of Explanation
We reassess Woodward’s counterfactual account of explanation in relation to regularity explananda. Woodward presents an account of causal explanation. We argue, by using an explanation of Kleiber’s law to illustrate, that the account can also cover some noncausal explanations. This leads to a tension between the two key aspects of Woodward’s account: the counterfactual aspect and the causal aspect. We explore this tension and make a case for jett…
Miraculous Success? Inconsistency and Untruth in Kirchhoff’s Diffraction Theory
Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theory is extremely successful despite being both inconsistent and not even approximately true. Some habitual realist proclamations simply cannot be maintained in the face of Kirchhoff’s theory, as the realist is forced to acknowledge that theoretical success can in some circumstances be explained in terms other than truth. The idiosyncrasy (or otherwise) …
The Enhanced Indispensability Argument
The Enhanced Indispensability Argument (Baker [2009]) exemplifies the new wave of the indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism. The new wave capitalizes on mathematics' role in scientific explanations. I will criticize some analyses of mathematics' explanatory function. In turn, I will emphasize the representational role of mathematics, and argue that the debate would significantly benefit from acknowledging this alternative viewpoint…
Grasping At Realist Straws
Eclectic realism—the proof of the pudding
Critical Commentaries on Critical Rationalism
Realism about Structure
The central concern of this article is whether the semantic approach has the resources to appropriately capture the core tenets of structural realism. Chakravartty (2001) has argued that a realist notion of correspondence cannot be accommodated without introducing a linguistic component, which undermines the approach itself. We suggest that this worry can be addressed by an appropriate understanding of the role of language in this context. The re…
Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content
Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument…
Reconsidering the Fresnel–Maxwell theory shift
On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies
The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction (in its best known form) is fallacious. It re-establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores the propriety of the reali…
A pluralist account of non-causal explanation in science and mathematics
The Enhanced Indispensability Argument
The Enhanced Indispensability Argument (Baker [2009]) exemplifies the new wave of the indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism. The new wave capitalizes on mathematics' role in scientific explanations. I will criticize some analyses of mathematics' explanatory function. In turn, I will emphasize the representational role of mathematics, and argue that the debate would significantly benefit from acknowledging this alternative viewpoint…
Reassessing Woodward’s Account of Explanation
We reassess Woodward’s counterfactual account of explanation in relation to regularity explananda. Woodward presents an account of causal explanation. We argue, by using an explanation of Kleiber’s law to illustrate, that the account can also cover some noncausal explanations. This leads to a tension between the two key aspects of Woodward’s account: the counterfactual aspect and the causal aspect. We explore this tension and make a case for jett…
Reconsidering the Fresnel–Maxwell theory shift
Explanatory Abstractions
A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical explanations explain in a way that is radically different from the way causal explanations explain. While causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, some abstract explanations allegedly explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the micro-details or causal laws, for example. We opp…
Miraculous Success? Inconsistency and Untruth in Kirchhoff’s Diffraction Theory
Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theory is extremely successful despite being both inconsistent and not even approximately true. Some habitual realist proclamations simply cannot be maintained in the face of Kirchhoff’s theory, as the realist is forced to acknowledge that theoretical success can in some circumstances be explained in terms other than truth. The idiosyncrasy (or otherwise) …
Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content
Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument…
On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies
The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction (in its best known form) is fallacious. It re-establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores the propriety of the reali…
What is theoretical progress of science
The epistemic conception of scientific progress equates progress with accumulation of scientific knowledge. I argue that the epistemic conception fails to fully capture scientific progress: theoretical progress, in particular, can transcend scientific knowledge in important ways. Sometimes theoretical progress can be a matter of new theories ‘latching better onto unobservable reality’ in a way that need not be a matter of new knowledge. Recognisi…
On Explanations from Geometry of Motion
This article examines explanations that turn on non-local geometrical facts about the space of possible configurations a system can occupy. I argue that it makes sense to contrast such explanations from geometry of motion with causal explanations. I also explore how my analysis of these explanations cuts across the distinction between kinematics and dynamics. 1. Introduction2. Toy Example3. Geometry of Motion in Classical Mechanics4. Beyond Class…
Replacing recipe realism
Historical inductions, Old and New
Taking Reductionism to the Limit
This article analyzes the antireductionist argument from renormalization group explanations of universality and shows how it can be rebutted if one assumes that the explanation in question is captured by the counterfactual dependence account of explanation
Realism about Structure
The central concern of this article is whether the semantic approach has the resources to appropriately capture the core tenets of structural realism. Chakravartty (2001) has argued that a realist notion of correspondence cannot be accommodated without introducing a linguistic component, which undermines the approach itself. We suggest that this worry can be addressed by an appropriate understanding of the role of language in this context. The re…
Dynamical Systems Theory and Explanatory Indispensability
I examine explanations’ realist commitments in relation to dynamical systems theory. First I rebut an ‘explanatory indispensability argument’ for mathematical realism from the explanatory power of phase spaces. Then I critically consider a possible way of strengthening the indispensability argument by reference to attractors in dynamical systems theory. The take-home message is that understanding of the modal character of explanations (in dynamic…
Scientific realism and underdetermination in quantum theory
This paper surveys the status of scientific realism in relation to quantum physics, focusing on the problem of underdetermination
Structuralism with and without causation
Inconsistency and scientific realism
Eclectic realism—the proof of the pudding
Reconsidering the Fresnel–Maxwell theory shift
On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies
The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction (in its best known form) is fallacious. It re-establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores the propriety of the reali…
Realism about Structure
The central concern of this article is whether the semantic approach has the resources to appropriately capture the core tenets of structural realism. Chakravartty (2001) has argued that a realist notion of correspondence cannot be accommodated without introducing a linguistic component, which undermines the approach itself. We suggest that this worry can be addressed by an appropriate understanding of the role of language in this context. The re…
Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content
Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument…
Critical Commentaries on Critical Rationalism
Eclectic realism—the proof of the pudding
Grasping At Realist Straws
Miraculous Success? Inconsistency and Untruth in Kirchhoff’s Diffraction Theory
Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theory is extremely successful despite being both inconsistent and not even approximately true. Some habitual realist proclamations simply cannot be maintained in the face of Kirchhoff’s theory, as the realist is forced to acknowledge that theoretical success can in some circumstances be explained in terms other than truth. The idiosyncrasy (or otherwise) …
The Enhanced Indispensability Argument
The Enhanced Indispensability Argument (Baker [2009]) exemplifies the new wave of the indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism. The new wave capitalizes on mathematics' role in scientific explanations. I will criticize some analyses of mathematics' explanatory function. In turn, I will emphasize the representational role of mathematics, and argue that the debate would significantly benefit from acknowledging this alternative viewpoint…
Reassessing Woodward’s Account of Explanation
We reassess Woodward’s counterfactual account of explanation in relation to regularity explananda. Woodward presents an account of causal explanation. We argue, by using an explanation of Kleiber’s law to illustrate, that the account can also cover some noncausal explanations. This leads to a tension between the two key aspects of Woodward’s account: the counterfactual aspect and the causal aspect. We explore this tension and make a case for jett…
Recalling a Habermas-inspired experimental realism
Inconsistency and scientific realism
Replacing recipe realism
Structuralism with and without causation
Dynamical Systems Theory and Explanatory Indispensability
I examine explanations’ realist commitments in relation to dynamical systems theory. First I rebut an ‘explanatory indispensability argument’ for mathematical realism from the explanatory power of phase spaces. Then I critically consider a possible way of strengthening the indispensability argument by reference to attractors in dynamical systems theory. The take-home message is that understanding of the modal character of explanations (in dynamic…
Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism
Taking Reductionism to the Limit
This article analyzes the antireductionist argument from renormalization group explanations of universality and shows how it can be rebutted if one assumes that the explanation in question is captured by the counterfactual dependence account of explanation
On Explanations from Geometry of Motion
This article examines explanations that turn on non-local geometrical facts about the space of possible configurations a system can occupy. I argue that it makes sense to contrast such explanations from geometry of motion with causal explanations. I also explore how my analysis of these explanations cuts across the distinction between kinematics and dynamics. 1. Introduction2. Toy Example3. Geometry of Motion in Classical Mechanics4. Beyond Class…
Historical inductions, Old and New
What is theoretical progress of science
The epistemic conception of scientific progress equates progress with accumulation of scientific knowledge. I argue that the epistemic conception fails to fully capture scientific progress: theoretical progress, in particular, can transcend scientific knowledge in important ways. Sometimes theoretical progress can be a matter of new theories ‘latching better onto unobservable reality’ in a way that need not be a matter of new knowledge. Recognisi…
Explanatory Abstractions
A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical explanations explain in a way that is radically different from the way causal explanations explain. While causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, some abstract explanations allegedly explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the micro-details or causal laws, for example. We opp…
Scientific realism and underdetermination in quantum theory
This paper surveys the status of scientific realism in relation to quantum physics, focusing on the problem of underdetermination
A pluralist account of non-causal explanation in science and mathematics
Epistemology (22 obras) · Philosophy (22 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (20 obras) · Realism (12 obras) · Philosophy of science (10 obras) · Mathematics (8 obras) · Computer Science (7 obras) · Physics (6 obras) · Argument (complex analysis) (5 obras) · Metaphysics (5 obras)