Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8397397
AutoresJoseph Melia (University of Leeds, autor de correspondencia), Juha Saatsi (0000-0002-8440-8761, University of Leeds, autor de correspondencia)
Año2006
Volumen57
Número3
Páginas561-585
Fecha de publicación2006-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axl020
OpenAlexW2069319595
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas14
Referencias citadas14

Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument which cannot be so easily blocked by the structural realist. We examine various ways in which the structural realist may respond, and conclude that the best way of blocking the model theoretic argument involves formulating his Ramseyfied theories using intensional operators. 1. Introduction 2. The model theoretic arguments 3. On Ramseyfying away predicates 4. The model theoretic argument bites back 5. Restricting the second order quantifiers5.1Naturalness 5.2Intrinsic 5.3Qualitative 5.4Contingent and causal 6. Intensional operators and relations between properties 7. Conclusion

Argument (complex analysis) · Content (measure theory) · Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Order (exchange) · Proposition · Realism · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science