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Christopher S Hill

Datos Biográficos

ID979599
NOMBREChristopher S Hill
NOMBRESChristopher S
APELLIDOHill
FIRMAHILL C S
AFILIACIONESJohn Brown University
ORCID0000-0003-1036-1195
VERIFICADOSí
TOTAL DE OBRAS37
TOTAL DE CITAS29
TOTAL COMO AUTOR38
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN1976
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2024
ÍNDICE H2
  • Replies to E. J. Green, Zoe Jenkin, and Jack Lyons

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Mind & Language•2024

    I argue for three claims. (1) The phenomenology of visual experience is exhausted by awareness of appearance properties (i.e., certain constantly changing characteristics of external objects that are relational and viewpoint‐dependent). (2) Cognition differs from perception in that it has a purely discursive or linguistic dimension, whereas perception is pervasively analog and iconic; but this does not determine a border between the two domains, …

  • On Block's delineation of the border between seeing and thinking

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2024•Referencias: 10

    This note is concerned with Ned Block's claim that cognition differs from perception in being paradigmatically conceptual, propositional, and non-iconic. As against Block, it maintains that large stretches of cognition constitutively involve, or depend on, iconic representations

  • Susanna Schellenberg on perception

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Mind & Language•2022

    Schellenberg's book The unity of perception is full of innovative ideas and challenges to preconceptions. This discussion endorses several of Schellenberg's main contentions, but it also challenges her handling of several key topics, such as hallucinations and perceptual awareness of particulars, and it expresses doubts about the informativeness of her main analytic tool, the notion of a perceptual capacity

  • Armchair Methods in Philosophy of Mind

    Christopher S Hill, ProtoSociology Project•ARTICLE•ProtoSociology•2022

    Jaegwon Kim relied principally on armchair methods in approaching problems in philosophy of mind. This paper is concerned with the nature of such methods and their prospects of success. Identifying the main armchair methods as introspection, modal reasoning involving conceivability tests, and conceptual analysis, the paper argues that insofar as the first two members of this trio aim to reveal the constitutive metaphysical natures of mental state…

  • Gupta has built a magnificent mansion, but can we live in it

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2022

  • Neander on a Mark of the Mental

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2022

  • Unrevisability

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Referencias: 11

  • Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge

    Christopher S Hill•BOOK•Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge•2014

  • Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge

    Christopher S Hill•BOOK•Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge•2014

    This volume presents a selection of essays by the leading philosopher Christopher S. Hill. Together, they address central philosophical issues related to four key concerns: the nature of truth; the relation between experiences and brain states; the relation between experiences and representational states; and problems concerning knowledge

  • Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism

    Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2013•Referencias: 3

    This splendid book makes several major contributions to the philosophy of mind. It is concerned principally with phenomenal consciousness, but it also has very useful things to say about a range of other topics, including representation, causation, causal exclusion, reduction, constitution, and the question of whether, and if so how, relational properties are grounded in intrinsic properties. It is innovative, deep, clear, judicious, and carefull…

  • Quine

    Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2011•Referencias: 5

  • Modality, Modal Epistemology, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness

    Christopher S Hill•CHAPTER•The Architecture of the Imagination•2006

    Cartesian modal arguments for property dualism presuppose that facts about the essential natures of pain and other qualitative properties can be grasped a priori by merely conceiving of them or imagining them. This chapter argues that this presupposition fails. It then proposes a theory of metaphysical necessity that in effect reduces it to the subjunctive conditional — to say that it is metaphysically necessary that p, it claims, is equivalent t…

  • Précis of Thought and World

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2006

  • Replies to Marian David, Anil Gupta, and Keith Simmons

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2006

  • Remarks on David Papineau's Thinking about Consciousness

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2005

  • Thought and World

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•BOOK•Thought and World•2002

    There is an important family of semantic notions that we apply to thoughts and to the conceptual constituents of thoughts - as when we say that the thought that the Universe is expanding is true. Thought and World presents a theory of the content of such notions. The theory is largely deflationary in spirit, in the sense that it represents a broad range of semantic notions - including the concept of truth - as being entirely free from substantive…

  • Thought and World

    Christopher S Hill•BOOK•Thought and World•2002

  • The Mysterious Flame

    Christopher S Hill, Colin Mcginn•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2001

    In recent years the nature of consciousness--our immediately known experiences--has taken its place as the most profound problem that science faces. Now in this brilliant and thoroughly accessible new book Colin McGinn takes a provocative position on this perplexing problem. Arguing that we can never truly know consciousness--that the human intellect is simply not equipped to unravel this mystery--he demonstrates that accepting this limitation in…

  • The Mysterious Flame

    Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2001

    Book Review| April 01 2001 The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A MATERIAL WORLD. By Colin McGinn. New York Basic Books, 1999. Pp. xiii, 242. Christopher S. Hill Christopher S. Hill Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 300–303. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-2-300 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter Linke…

  • From Assertion to Belief

    Christopher S Hill, ProtoSociology Project•ARTICLE•ProtoSociology•2000

  • Consciousness and the Origins of Thought

    Christopher S Hill, Norton Nelkin•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1999

  • There are Fewer Things in Reality Than are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy

    Christopher S Hill, Brian P Mclaughlin et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1999•Citada por: 23

  • Peacocke on semantic values

    Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•1998

    This paper was written during my tenure of a fellowship at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. Notes This paper was written during my tenure of a fellowship at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh.

  • Supervenience and Materialism

    Christopher S Hill, MARK ROWLANDS•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1998

    The concept of supervenience supervenience and token identity supervenience and reduction supervenience and psychological laws supervenience and explanation

  • Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism

    Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1996•Citada por: 2

    I will be concerned here with a theory of doxastic justification that was first proposed by Alvin Goldman in 1979.1 This theory, which is generally known as process reliabilism, has in recent years gone through a number of changes, and each change has added significantly to its complexity and subtlety. However, for present purposes it suffices to consider a skeletal version of the theory that is similar to the version that was unveiled in Goldman…

Siguiente
  • There are Fewer Things in Reality Than are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy

    Christopher S Hill, Brian P Mclaughlin et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1999•Citada por: 23

  • Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism

    Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1996•Citada por: 2

    I will be concerned here with a theory of doxastic justification that was first proposed by Alvin Goldman in 1979.1 This theory, which is generally known as process reliabilism, has in recent years gone through a number of changes, and each change has added significantly to its complexity and subtlety. However, for present purposes it suffices to consider a skeletal version of the theory that is similar to the version that was unveiled in Goldman…

  • In defense of type materialism

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Synthese•1984•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 13

  • Why Cartesian Intuitions are Compatible With the Identity Thesis

    Christopher S Hill, Christopher Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1981•Citada por: 1

  • Of Bats, Brains, and Minds

    Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1977•Citada por: 1

  • Bertrand Russell's Philosophy

    Christopher S Hill, George Nakhnikian•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1976

  • Of Bats, Brains, and Minds

    Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1977•Citada por: 1

  • Cybernetics and the Philosophy of Mind

    Christopher S Hill, Kenneth M Sayre•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1978

  • The Formal Mechanics of Mind

    C Hill, Christopher S Hill et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1979

  • Why Cartesian Intuitions are Compatible With the Identity Thesis

    Christopher S Hill, Christopher Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1981•Citada por: 1

  • Mechanism, Mentalism, and Metamathematics

    Christopher S Hill, Judson Webb et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1983

  • In defense of type materialism

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Synthese•1984•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 13

  • The Logic of Mind

    Christopher S Hill, Christopher Hill et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1984

  • Neurophilosophy

    Christopher S Hill, Christopher Hill et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1988

    Five chapters in the book's first part, Some Elementary Neuroscience, sketch the history of the science of nervous systems and provide a general introduction to neurophysiology, neuroanatomy, and neuropsychology. In the second part, Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science, chapters place the mind-body problem within the wider context of the philosophy of science. Drawing on recent research in this area, a general account of intertheoreti…

  • Reasons and Experience

    Christopher S Hill, Christopher Hill et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1993

  • Sensations

    Frank Jackson, Christopher S Hill et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1993

    Preface Part I. Introduction: 1. Topics and themes Part II. The Mind-Body Problem: 2. The failings of dualism and the double-aspect theory 3. The failings of functionalism 4. In defense of type materialism Part III. Introspection: 5. Introspective awareness of sensations 6. Introspection and the skeptic Part IV. Sensory Concepts: 7. Concepts of bodily sensations: Their semantic properties 8. Concepts of visual sensations: Their content and their …

  • The Nature of True Minds

    Christopher S Hill, John Heil•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1994

  • Sensations

    Cynthia Macdonald, Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

  • Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism

    Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1996•Citada por: 2

    I will be concerned here with a theory of doxastic justification that was first proposed by Alvin Goldman in 1979.1 This theory, which is generally known as process reliabilism, has in recent years gone through a number of changes, and each change has added significantly to its complexity and subtlety. However, for present purposes it suffices to consider a skeletal version of the theory that is similar to the version that was unveiled in Goldman…

  • Peacocke on semantic values

    Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•1998

    This paper was written during my tenure of a fellowship at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. Notes This paper was written during my tenure of a fellowship at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh.

  • Supervenience and Materialism

    Christopher S Hill, MARK ROWLANDS•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1998

    The concept of supervenience supervenience and token identity supervenience and reduction supervenience and psychological laws supervenience and explanation

  • Consciousness and the Origins of Thought

    Christopher S Hill, Norton Nelkin•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1999

  • There are Fewer Things in Reality Than are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy

    Christopher S Hill, Brian P Mclaughlin et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1999•Citada por: 23

  • From Assertion to Belief

    Christopher S Hill, ProtoSociology Project•ARTICLE•ProtoSociology•2000

  • The Mysterious Flame

    Christopher S Hill, Colin Mcginn•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2001

    In recent years the nature of consciousness--our immediately known experiences--has taken its place as the most profound problem that science faces. Now in this brilliant and thoroughly accessible new book Colin McGinn takes a provocative position on this perplexing problem. Arguing that we can never truly know consciousness--that the human intellect is simply not equipped to unravel this mystery--he demonstrates that accepting this limitation in…

  • The Mysterious Flame

    Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2001

    Book Review| April 01 2001 The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A MATERIAL WORLD. By Colin McGinn. New York Basic Books, 1999. Pp. xiii, 242. Christopher S. Hill Christopher S. Hill Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 300–303. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-2-300 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter Linke…

  • Thought and World

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•BOOK•Thought and World•2002

    There is an important family of semantic notions that we apply to thoughts and to the conceptual constituents of thoughts - as when we say that the thought that the Universe is expanding is true. Thought and World presents a theory of the content of such notions. The theory is largely deflationary in spirit, in the sense that it represents a broad range of semantic notions - including the concept of truth - as being entirely free from substantive…

  • Thought and World

    Christopher S Hill•BOOK•Thought and World•2002

  • Remarks on David Papineau's Thinking about Consciousness

    Open Access•Christopher S Hill•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2005

  • Modality, Modal Epistemology, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness

    Christopher S Hill•CHAPTER•The Architecture of the Imagination•2006

    Cartesian modal arguments for property dualism presuppose that facts about the essential natures of pain and other qualitative properties can be grasped a priori by merely conceiving of them or imagining them. This chapter argues that this presupposition fails. It then proposes a theory of metaphysical necessity that in effect reduces it to the subjunctive conditional — to say that it is metaphysically necessary that p, it claims, is equivalent t…

Philosophy (33 obras) · Epistemology (30 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (16 obras) · Contemporary philosophy (15 obras) · Psychology (14 obras) · Computer Science (13 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (13 obras) · Analytic philosophy (11 obras) · Philosophy (11 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (9 obras)

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