Sensations

A Defense of Type Materialism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10692746
AutoresFrank Jackson (0000-0003-2310-9132), Christopher S Hill (0000-0003-1036-1195), Christopher Hill (0000-0003-2436-1006)
Año1993
Volumen102
Número4
Páginas614
Fecha de publicación1993-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2185695
OpenAlexW2113624358
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas16

Preface Part I. Introduction: 1. Topics and themes Part II. The Mind-Body Problem: 2. The failings of dualism and the double-aspect theory 3. The failings of functionalism 4. In defense of type materialism Part III. Introspection: 5. Introspective awareness of sensations 6. Introspection and the skeptic Part IV. Sensory Concepts: 7. Concepts of bodily sensations: Their semantic properties 8. Concepts of visual sensations: Their content and their deployment Part V. Other Minds: 9. Knowledge of other minds 10. Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal space Index

Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Materialism · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis · Philosophy