David Copp
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 985818 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | David Copp |
| NOMBRES | David |
| APELLIDO | Copp |
| FIRMA | COPP D |
| AFILIACIONES | University of California, Davis |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5206-5223 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 98 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 198 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 74 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 26 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1976 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
Offending by mentioning
1. Anderson and Lepore (2013) argue that the offensiveness of slur terms can’t consist (merely?) in their having derogatory meanings because even quotation marks fail to prevent offence being cause
Epistemic virtue in higher education
Epistemic virtues are character traits conducive to principled ways of thinking, leading to a life of flourishing. Recent years have witnessed an emergence of theoretical accounts describing how they develop. However, few if any studies have conducted rigorous empirical investigation into the mechanisms of intellectual virtue development. In this study, we review several significant frameworks before utilizing a randomized, pretest/posttest contr…
Ethical Realism and Robust Normativity
The chief objection to ethical realism is its purported inability to account for “robust normativity.” Ethical realism postulates facts, such as the fact that torture is wrong, which it takes to be states of affairs partly constituted by ethical properties, such as wrongness. The objection is that ethical realism, so understood, is unable to explain the “robust normativity” of these facts. This chapter explores strategies for addressing the objec…
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism
Morality seems to play a special role in human life distinct from conventional norms, like those of etiquette, or simple preferences based on subjective tastes. There are various theories of the foundations of morality, some of which treat morality as “subjective” in an important way. “Moral realism” is, however, a family of theories that take morality to have an objective factual basis, such that morality is not “up to us” and is not “under our …
Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism
Normative naturalism and normative nihilism
The fundamental issue dividing normative naturalists and non-naturalists concerns the nature of normativity. Non-naturalists hold that the normativity of moral properties and facts sets them apart from natural properties and facts in an important and deep way. As Derek Parfit explains matters, the normative naturalist distinguishes between normative concepts and the natural properties to which these concepts refer and also between normative propo…
‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, Blameworthiness, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
This chapter discusses Harry Frankfurt’s argument against principle of alternate possibilities’ (PAP) by presenting a counterexample that draws on the intuitions that led Frankfurt to reject PAP. It shows that there are arguments for PAP that parallels the several intuitive arguments for the Maxim. This suggests a reason over and the Derivation for thinking that PAP and the Maxim are theoretical siblings. The chapter discusses the objection that …
Are There Substantive Moral Conceptual Truths
This chapter explains the motivation for Conceptual Nonnaturalism. The upshot is pessimistic and skeptical about the prospects for Conceptual Nonnaturalism. Importantly and characteristically, nonnaturalism rejects the thesis of normative naturalism that moral and other normative properties are natural ones. Conceptual Nonnaturalism is compatible with metaphysical naturalism, according to which the natural exhausts reality. The chapter describes …
Constructivism in Ethics
Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics and action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new essays writte…
Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory1
Moral and political philosophers commonly appeal to moral “intuitions” at crucial points in their reasoning. This chapter considers recent challenges to this practice—here referred to as “the Method”—based in empirical studies of moral intuitions. It contends that such studies do not justify radical or revisionary conclusions about the Method. A method is aimed at achieving certain goals. The key issue is the nature of the goals in relation to wh…
The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis
Reasonable Acceptability and Democratic Legitimacy
In his recent book, David Estlund argues that democratic states can be legitimate while epistocracy cannot be legitimate. His argument rests on his “Qualified Acceptability Requirement,” according to which a state is legitimate only if its coercive enforcement of law can be justified on a basis that is acceptable to all possible qualified points of view. This principle may seem to express a Rawlsian liberal ideal, but I claim it is undermined by …
Comment on Lorenzo Sacconi, Marco Faillo and Stefania Ottone. Contractarian Compliance, Welfarist Justice, and Conformist Utility
This comment addresses two issues that arise in Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone's essay. The first is the problem of compliance as it arises in social contract theory. The second is the problem of avoiding an incoherence that arises in the formulation of welfarist principles of distributive justice if these principles are taken to be concerned with the distribution of welfare without restriction. Sacconi, Faillo, and Ottone define an interesting class of p…
Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness
International Justice and the Basic Needs Principle
Is Society-Centered Moral Theory a Contemporary Version of Natural Law Theory
David Braybrooke argues that the core of the natural law theory of Thomas Aquinas survived in the work of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Rousseau. Much to my surprise, Braybrooke argues as well that David Copp’s society-centered moral theory is a secular version of this same natural law theory. Braybrooke makes a good case that there is an important idea about morality that is shared by the great philosophers in his group and that this idea is also fou…
Do We Have Any Justified Moral Beliefs
In this fine book, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues for a “moderate Pyrrhonian” skeptical view about justified moral belief.1 His argument rests on the thesis that the justification of a belief is a relation between that belief and a class of alternatives (83–87). On this thesis, the “contrast-class view,” we can assess the justification of a belief relative to various contrast classes. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that there is no showing that any pa…
The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory
Morality in a Natural World
The central philosophical challenge of metaethics is to account for the normativity of moral judgment without abandoning or seriously compromising moral realism. In Morality in a Natural World, David Copp defends a version of naturalistic moral realism that can accommodate the normativity of morality. Moral naturalism is often thought to face special metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic problems as well as the difficulty in accounting for …
The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis
Some Forms and Limits of Consequentialism
Morality in a natural world
"The central philosophical challenge of metaethics is to account for the normativity of moral judgment without abandoning or seriously compromising moral realism. In this book, David Copp defends a version of naturalistic moral realism and argues that it can accommodate the normativity of morality."--Jacket
The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory
Nonnaturalism
Reflections on the evolutionary basis of morality
The Idea of a Legitimate State
Morality, Normativity, and Society
This book defends a form of naturalistic and relativistic moral realism. The guiding intuition is that any society needs to be characterized by a social moral code in order to enable its members to live together successfully. According to the “society centred theory”, it follows that certain moral codes are justified. And according to the “standard-based theory” of normative judgment, it follows that corresponding moral propositions may be true. …
Belief, Reason, and Motivation
Morality and Virtue
Morality, Normativity, and Society
Moral claims not only purport to be true, they also purport to guide our choices. This book presents a new theory of normative judgment, the which offers a schematic account of the truth conditions of normative propositions of all kinds, including moral propositions and propositions about reasons. The heart of Copp's approach to moral propositions is a theory of the circumstances under which corresponding moral standards qualify as justified, the…
What Collectives Are
An account of the ontological nature of collectives would be useful for several reasons. A successful theory would help to show us a route through the thicket of views known as "methodological individualism". It would have a bearing on the plausibility of legal positivism. It would be relevant to the question whether collectives are capable of acting. The debate about the ontology of collectives is therefore important for such fields as the theor…
Hobbes on Artificial Persons and Collective Actions
homas Hobbes's theory of artificial persons yields an imT portant and classic account of collective actions, and of what I call actions,' phenomena which have received little attention despite large amount of work which has been done recently on action theory. Moreover, Hobbes's theory of central importance to his own political philosophy; a grasp of it necessary for a proper understanding of content of social contract. Hobbes himself says in int…
Social Unity and the Identity of Persons
Milk, Honey, and The Good Life on Moral Twin Earth
Does Moral Theory Need the Concept of Society
We have the intuition that the function of morality is to make society possible. That is, the function of morality is to make possible the kind of cooperation and coordination among people that is necessary for societies to exist and to cope with their problems. This intuition is reflected in the 'society centered' moral theory I defended in my book, Morality, Normativity, and Society. The theory is a relativistic version of moral naturalism and …
Pluralism and Stability in Liberal Theory
The "Possibility" of a Categorical Imperative
In part III of Groundwork for Metaphysics of Morals, Kant attempted to solve a that he took to be an especially serious one for his moral philosophy. He described it as of showing the of a categorical imperative.1 At end of part II of Groundwork, he said that he needed to show this in order to show that morality is something real, and not a chimerical idea without any truth-that morality is not a mere phantom of brain (Ak 445).2 The importance of…
A Skeptical Challenge to Moral Non-Naturalism and a Defense of Constructivist Naturalism
Desires, Motives, and Reasons
Philosophy, Morality and International Affairs
Balance and Refinement
Philosophy, Morality and International Affairs
Satisfaction of Interest and the Concept of Morality
This work addresses itself to the question: How is morality to be properly defined? Also explored are the distinguishing characteristics of a moral code. The conclusion to which this analysis leads is that moralities do not necessarily concern themselves with satisfaction of human interests and with conflict resolution
On Human Conduct
Moral Reasoning and Truth
Hobbes on Artificial Persons and Collective Actions
homas Hobbes's theory of artificial persons yields an imT portant and classic account of collective actions, and of what I call actions,' phenomena which have received little attention despite large amount of work which has been done recently on action theory. Moreover, Hobbes's theory of central importance to his own political philosophy; a grasp of it necessary for a proper understanding of content of social contract. Hobbes himself says in int…
Risk and Responsibility
On Justice
Utilitarianism and Co-Operation
The author identifies and defines the features of traditional utilitarian theories which account for their appeal, demonstrates that no theory which is exclusively act-oriented can have all the properties that ultilitarians have attempted to build into their theories, and develops a new theory co-operative utilitarianism, which is radically different than traditional theories
What Collectives Are
An account of the ontological nature of collectives would be useful for several reasons. A successful theory would help to show us a route through the thicket of views known as "methodological individualism". It would have a bearing on the plausibility of legal positivism. It would be relevant to the question whether collectives are capable of acting. The debate about the ontology of collectives is therefore important for such fields as the theor…
Rights and Goods
Theories of justice, argues Virginia Held, are usually designed for a perfect, hypothetical world. They do not give us guidelines for living in an imperfect world in which the choices and decisions that we must make are seldom clear-cut. Seeking a morality based on actual experience, Held offers a method of inquiry with which to deal with the specific moral problems encountered in daily life. She argues that the division between public and privat…
Morals by Agreement
Consequentialist Rights
It is commonplace to criticize utilitarianism on the ground that it does not take moral rights seriously; that it cannot account for the rights we have, and for their role in constraining our pursuit of the overall good. Wayne Sumner does not directly address this criticism in The Moral Foundation of Rights . Instead he attempts to show that consequentialism can defeat nihilism about rights: the view that there are no moral rights at all
Responsibility for Collective Inaction
The Concept of a Society
The concept of a society is central to several areas of philosophy, including social and political philosophy, philosophy of social science and moral philosophy. Yet little attention has been paid to the concept and we do not have an adequate philosophical account of it. It is a concept that is difficult to explain systematically, and it is subject to distortion or simple-minded attacks whenever it plays a major role in a philosophical theory. Me…
The "Possibility" of a Categorical Imperative
In part III of Groundwork for Metaphysics of Morals, Kant attempted to solve a that he took to be an especially serious one for his moral philosophy. He described it as of showing the of a categorical imperative.1 At end of part II of Groundwork, he said that he needed to show this in order to show that morality is something real, and not a chimerical idea without any truth-that morality is not a mere phantom of brain (Ak 445).2 The importance of…
Difference Rules, OK? Well, Up to a Point
Moral Differences
In a wide-ranging inquiry Richard W. Miller provides resources for coping with the most troubling types of conflict - disagreements in conviction, conflicting interests, and the tension between conscience and desires. Drawing on most fields in philosophy and the social sciences, including his previous work in the philosophy of science, he presents an account of our access to truth, and, within this framework, develops a theory of justice and an a…
Title Pages
Theories of Moral Justification
The standard-based theory leaves us with two central questions: First, under what conditions would a moral standard qualify as justified? And second, what is common to the content of moral propositions in virtue of which any moral proposition entails that some moral standard is justified? A theory of the content and truth conditions of moral propositions should enable us to answer both questions. The philosophically interesting thing about moral …
The Concept of a Society
The concept of a society is central to the project of this book. It enters into the conception of a moral code, and it is obviously pivotal in society-centered moral theory. This chapter aims to distinguish societies from collective entities of other kinds, such as nations, states, organizations, and families. A satisfactory ontology of societies must obviously mesh with a general ontology of collectives. Such things are not sets or any other kin…
Can Societies Be Choosers?
Society-centered theory commits me to the thesis that societies can be choosers, that societies are capable in principle of making choices that can be assessed for rationality. Many will see this idea as the height of philosophical folly. They will charge it with various sins, including holism, anthropomorphism, and the fallacy of composition. Yet, as I will argue, the idea that a society can make a choice does not have any worrisome metaphysical…
Morality and Society
In order to yield substantive moral implications, the characteristic J thesis of society-centered theory must be combined with a specific theory of societal rationality. In this chapter, I develop the societal analogue of the needs-and values theory and combine it with the J thesis. I call the result the “needs-based society-centered theory.” In the course of the chapter, I will propose various minor amendments to the J thesis. I will postpone ad…
Normative Skepticism
The standard-based theory presents us with several questions, the most important of which is, Under what conditions would a moral standard qualify as justified? In this chapter, I present a skeptical argument that brings into stark relief the difficulty of this question. The argument puts the problem in a much wider context, however, by calling into question not only the existence of justified moral standards but also the existence of relevantly …
Needs, Values, and Reason
I have argued that the choices and preferences of societies can be evaluated on the basis of principles of rational choice. In this chapter, I propose a theory of “self-grounded” rational choice, called the “needs-and-values” theory. I suggest that it is the appropriate theory to use in developing the society-centered theory. A theory of rational choice specifies a standard for choice and implies that the standard is appropriately justified. But …
A Conception of Morality
We are left with the two central questions I distinguished in the preceding chapter. The society-centered theory is intended to answer the first of these questions by providing an account of the conditions under which a moral standard would qualify as justified. It asserts roughly that a moral code is justified, relative to a society, if and only if the society would be rational to select it to serve as its social moral code. It is a standard-ori…
Epistemology (75 obras) · Philosophy (71 obras) · Sociology (44 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (43 obras) · Political science (39 obras) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (35 obras) · Law (27 obras) · Psychology (23 obras) · Morality (22 obras) · Economics (18 obras)