The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID23155687
EditoresPaul Bloomfield (0000-0002-1664-6979, ,), David Copp (0000-0002-5206-5223, Philosophy, University of California-Davis)
Año2023
Fecha de publicación2023-12-21
Open AccessNo
TipoBOOK
RevistaOxford Handbook of Moral Realism (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190068226.001.0001
OpenAlexW4386828044
ISBN9780190068226
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9

Morality seems to play a special role in human life distinct from conventional norms, like those of etiquette, or simple preferences based on subjective tastes. There are various theories of the foundations of morality, some of which treat morality as “subjective” in an important way. “Moral realism” is, however, a family of theories that take morality to have an objective factual basis, such that morality is not “up to us” and is not “under our control.” The twenty-five chapters in the volume, as well as the introduction by the editors, explore the central ideas and themes constituting moral realism and defend particular views about it. The volume is divided into four parts: “About Moral Realism and its Varieties,” “Naturalism,” “Non-naturalism,” and “Neither Naturalism Nor Non-Naturalism.”

Epistemology · Etiquette · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Morality · Naturalism · Realism · Sociology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy