Michael Bratman
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 986083 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Michael Bratman |
| NOMBRES | Michael |
| APELLIDO | Bratman |
| FIRMA | BRATMAN M |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 4 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 26 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 5 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1978 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2015 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Introduction to Philosophy
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason
Two Faces of Intention
We do things intentionally, and we intend to do things. Our commonsense psychology uses the notion of intention to characterize both our actions and our mental states: I might intentionally start my car, and I might intend to start it. My intention to start it clearly does not guarantee that I do. But beyond that it is not obvious how these two phenomena are related. A central problem for a theory of intention is to provide a plausible account of…
Intention and Means-End Reasoning
M /r any times one forms an intention to do something and proceeds to reason about how. For example, at 10:00 A.M. on the East Side of Manhattan I form the intention to meet Susan at Times Square at noon. I then engage in means-end reasoning about how to do this, and reach a decision to take the Times Square bus. Though such reasoning may seem straightforward, reflection suggests otherwise. When I form the intention to meet Susan it seems that I …
Action Theory
1. Introduction.- by the Editors.- 2. Basic Action.- Action, Knowledge, and Representation.- Intention, Practical Knowledge and Representation.- 3. The Volitional Theory Revisited.- Volitions Re-affirmed.- The Volitional Theory Revisited.- 4. The Logic of Action.- The Logic of Action.- The Twofold Structure and the Unity of Practical Thinking.- 5. Events and Actions.- Particulars, Events, and Actions.- Events as Property Exemplifications.- Events…
Two Faces of Intention
We do things intentionally, and we intend to do things. Our commonsense psychology uses the notion of intention to characterize both our actions and our mental states: I might intentionally start my car, and I might intend to start it. My intention to start it clearly does not guarantee that I do. But beyond that it is not obvious how these two phenomena are related. A central problem for a theory of intention is to provide a plausible account of…
Intention and Means-End Reasoning
M /r any times one forms an intention to do something and proceeds to reason about how. For example, at 10:00 A.M. on the East Side of Manhattan I form the intention to meet Susan at Times Square at noon. I then engage in means-end reasoning about how to do this, and reach a decision to take the Times Square bus. Though such reasoning may seem straightforward, reflection suggests otherwise. When I form the intention to meet Susan it seems that I …
Action Theory
1. Introduction.- by the Editors.- 2. Basic Action.- Action, Knowledge, and Representation.- Intention, Practical Knowledge and Representation.- 3. The Volitional Theory Revisited.- Volitions Re-affirmed.- The Volitional Theory Revisited.- 4. The Logic of Action.- The Logic of Action.- The Twofold Structure and the Unity of Practical Thinking.- 5. Events and Actions.- Particulars, Events, and Actions.- Events as Property Exemplifications.- Events…
Intention and Means-End Reasoning
M /r any times one forms an intention to do something and proceeds to reason about how. For example, at 10:00 A.M. on the East Side of Manhattan I form the intention to meet Susan at Times Square at noon. I then engage in means-end reasoning about how to do this, and reach a decision to take the Times Square bus. Though such reasoning may seem straightforward, reflection suggests otherwise. When I form the intention to meet Susan it seems that I …
Two Faces of Intention
We do things intentionally, and we intend to do things. Our commonsense psychology uses the notion of intention to characterize both our actions and our mental states: I might intentionally start my car, and I might intend to start it. My intention to start it clearly does not guarantee that I do. But beyond that it is not obvious how these two phenomena are related. A central problem for a theory of intention is to provide a plausible account of…
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason
Introduction to Philosophy
Analytic philosophy (2 obras) · Contemporary philosophy (2 obras) · Epistemology (2 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 obras) · General interest (2 obras) · Philosophy (2 obras) · Philosophy (2 obras) · Action (physics) (1 obras) · Aesthetics (1 obras) · Agent (philosophy) (1 obras)