Intention and Means-End Reasoning

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10696518
AutoresMichael E Bratman (0000-0001-9424-3537, autor de correspondencia), Michael Bratman
Año1981
Volumen90
Número2
Páginas252
Fecha de publicación1981-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2184441
OpenAlexW1970371273
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas17

M /r any times one forms an intention to do something and proceeds to reason about how. For example, at 10:00 A.M. on the East Side of Manhattan I form the intention to meet Susan at Times Square at noon. I then engage in means-end reasoning about how to do this, and reach a decision to take the Times Square bus. Though such reasoning may seem straightforward, reflection suggests otherwise. When I form the intention to meet Susan it seems that I come to have a reason for taking the Times Square bus that I did not have before. But this plausible view seems to lead quickly to implausible consequences. To avoid these consequences we need to appreciate the special nature of the reason-giving status of my initial intention

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Computer Science · Logic, programming, and type systems · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications