The Politics of Delay in Crisis Negotiations
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10071711 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Haonan Dong (0009-0005-1838-2013, Vanderbilt University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2024 |
| Volumen | 69 |
| Número | 5 |
| Páginas | 793-813 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2024-08-14 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027241267777 |
| OpenAlex | W4401559726 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 39 |
States often intentionally stall crisis negotiations, hoping to build arms or attract allies to achieve a more favorable bargaining position. Why do their adversaries tolerate delay in some cases, but attack upon delay in others? I argue that this is because states cannot perfectly distinguish between intentional and unavoidable delays. This presents a strategic tension: a state prefers to attack preventively if the delay is intentional, but prefers to avoid costly war otherwise. To study this tension, I build a formal model of crisis bargaining with delay tactics, showing that rising states may mask bargaining delays behind natural exogenous delays to complete a peaceful power shift. I find that uncertainty over the source of delay may decrease the risk of war under some conditions, and increase the risk of war under others. I discuss the implications of my theoretical model for the causes of war and power shifts in historical cases
Economics · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance
Britain's Retreat from Empire in East Asia, 1905-1980
The Generalissimo
North Korea’s Entrapment and Time Delay Tactics during Nuclear Negotiations
Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics
The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War
War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire
Great Britain and Japan 1911–15
Bargaining over power
Investigating the Preventive Motive for War
Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904
Count Kato Komei and the Twenty-one Demands
The Diplomacy Of Imperialism, 1890–1902
Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science
A Little Bit of Cheap Talk Is a Dangerous Thing
Containing Rogues
Preventive War as a Result of Long-Term Shifts in Power
Qualitative investigation of theoretical models
Hedging for Better Bets
Information, Commitment, and War
Sanctions and Preventive War
Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining
Crisis Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Opportunism
Peaceful Uncertainty
Shifting Power, Commitment Problems, and Preventive War
Known Unknowns
Rationalist explanations for war
A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War
Delayed Ratification
War as a Commitment Problem
Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining
Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power
Commitment Problems in Alliance Formation
Multimethod Research
The Inefficient Use of Power
Great Britain and the Twenty-One Demands of 1915
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |