Commitment Problems in Alliance Formation

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6229367
AutoresBrett V Benson (Vanderbilt University), Barbara Clark Smith (0000-0002-7125-7220, Vanderbilt University, autor de correspondencia), Bradley C Smith
Año2023
Volumen67
Número4
Páginas1012-1025
Fecha de publicación2023-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ajps.12693
OpenAlexW4210698644
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas18
Referencias citadas43

If military alliances cause significant shifts in the distribution of power, why does anticipation of their formation or expansion provoke hostility from adversaries in some cases and not others? We develop a theory to explain this variation, advancing three arguments about the connection between alliances, commitment problems and war. First, we show that prospective allies can avoid provoking a common enemy by offering concessions to offset losses from an anticipated power shift from an alliance. Second, limits to an alliance's power or implementation speed may make such bargains possible. Allies manipulate these factors to set the terms of cooperation to avoid provoking a shared enemy. Finally, when such bargains are not possible, incentives for preventive war exist but the outbreak of such wars may be avoided. Although preventive war cannot be ruled out altogether, the conditions that make it most attractive also make it unlikely to be carried out

Adversary · Alliance · Anticipation (artificial intelligence · Computer security · Economics · Hostility · Incentive · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Power (physics · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology